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A  sequential  arrangement  of  processing  stages  is  incorporated  into  most  theoretical 
models  of  person  recognition  (e.  g.,  Bruce  &  Young,  1986).  Simple  familiar/unfamiliar 
decisions  are  earliest,  followed  by  access  to  semantic  information,  followed  by  naming. 
To  date,  the  stage  involved  in  semantic  decisions  has  received  least  attention.  Thus, 
relatively  little  is  known  about  how  we  store  personal  semantic  information.  More 
research  into  this  stage  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  better  understand  the  organisation  of 
semantic  memory  for  familiar  people.  The  primary  aim  of  this  dissertation  is  to  provide 
new  evidence  relating  to  the  storage  and  retrieval  of  such  information. 
The  first  line  of  enquiry  attempts  to  discriminate  between  two  influential  models  in 
this  area  (Burton  et  al.,  1990  and  Bredart  et  al.,  1995),  by  using  a  new  method  involving 
semantic  judgement  tasks  in  the  traditional  semantic  priming  paradigm.  In  one  model 
(Burton  et  al.,  1990),  semantic  information  is  stored  in  a  single  undifferentiated  pool.  In 
the  other  model  (Bredart  et  al.,  1995)  semantic  information  is  clustered  into  separate 
pools.  The  two  types  of  account  make  different  predictions  about  certain  patterns  of 
priming  during  information  retrieval.  The  experiments  reported  here  fail  to  discriminate 
between  the  models. 
Later  experiments  identify  the  locus  of  the  reported  semantic  priming  effects  and 
provide  an  explanation  of  these  findings  within  a  structural  model  of  person  recognition. Table  of  Contents 
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INTRODUCTION 
There  is  probably  no  other  visual  stimulus  that  we  look  at  more  often  than  the 
human  face.  It  provides  us  with  a  wealth  of  important  information.  We  can 
immediately  determine  the  person's  sex  and  other  information  such  as  age  and 
expression.  Bruce  and  Young  (1986)  refer  to  this  type  of  information  as  "visually 
derived  semantic  information"  and  this  is  available  in  every  face  we  encounter. 
Determining  whether  someone  is,  say,  British  or  American,  is  another  problem 
entirely.  The  first  type  of  information  can  be  extracted  from  the  face  itself  and  is 
equally  available,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  the  person  is  known  to  us  or  is  a 
complete  stranger.  The  second  type  of  information  is  only  available  for  people  that 
are  known  to  us.  Bruce  and  Young  (1986)  refer  to  this  type  information  as  identity- 
specific  semantic  information.  This  thesis  is  concerned  with  such  identity  specific 
semantic  information. 
On  seeing  a  photograph  of,  say,  Sigmund  Freud,  we  are  able  to  access  a  great 
deal  of  information  about  him:  we  may  recognise  the  face  as  being  familiar;  we  may 
realise  that  it  belongs  to  an  Austrian  psychologist;  and  finally  we  might  remember  his 
name.  Converging  evidence  from  diary  studies  (Young,  Hay,  &  Ellis,  1985), 4 
neuropsychology  (e.  g.,  Flude,  Ellis,  &  Kay,  1989)  and  experimental  psychology 
(e.  g.,  Young,  Mcweeny,  Ellis,  &  Hay,  1986;  Young,  Mcweeny,  Hay,  &  Ellis,  1986) 
appears  to  support  the  time  course  of  the  processing  stages  described  above.  Simple 
familiar/unfamiliar  decisions  are  fastest,  followed  by  access  to  semantic  information, 
followed  by  naming.  This  sequential  arrangement  of  processing  stages  is  incorporated 
into  most  theoretical  models  of  person  recognition  (Bruce  &  Young,  1986;  Burton, 
Bruce,  &  Johnston,  1990;  Hay  &  Young,  1982)  and  a  consensus  overview  of  the 
person  recognition  system  is  beginning  to  emerge. 
By  comparison  to  the  other  stages  outlined  above,  there  is  relatively  little  data 
relating  to  the  stage  involving  semantic  decisions.  How  do  we  store  information 
about  people  that  we  know?  More  information  regarding  this  stage  is  necessary  if  we 
are  to  understand  the  organisation  of  semantic  memory  for  familiar  people.  The 
primary  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  provide  new  evidence  relating  to  the  storage  and 
retrieval  of  such  information. 
However,  in  order  to  examine  the  structure  of  the  semantic  system  pertaining  to 
familiar  people  we  must  begin  by  addressing  more  fundamental  issues.  For  instance, 
is  personal  information  about  people  stored  in  a  unitary  semantic  system  along  with 
other  abstracted  general  knowledge?  Is  this  information  stored  in  a  person  specific semantic  system?  Is  recognising  a  person  (at  least  from  their  face)  a  series  of  modular 
processes,  in  the  sense  proposed  by  Fodor  (1983),  or  is  it  simply  expertise  (e.  g. 
Gauthier,  Skudlarski,  Gore,  &  Anderson,  2000).  If  face  recognition  is  a  series  of 
modular  processes,  does  recognition  in  other  modalities  (e.  g.,  name,  voice,  gait)  tap 
this  same  system  at  some  point  (perhaps  at  the  level  of  person  identification  rather 
than  face  identification),  or  is  recognition  in  these  modalities  mediated  by  a 
completely  separate  sets  of  processes?  Do  these  modular  type  systems  (should  they 
exist)  have  their  own  modality  specific  semantic  stores,  or  do  they  share  access  to 
some  person  specific  system,  or  perhaps  even  a  more  global  general  system?  Finally 
do  any  of  these  postulated,  abstractive,  semantic  systems  actually  exist,  or  do  we  code 
all  information  episodically,  as  a  series  of  memory  traces.  In  order  to  answer  these 
questions  we  will  draw  on  evidence  from  a  wide  variety  of  sources  including: 
experimental  psychology,  cognitive  neuroscience,  and  cognitive  modelling.  I  will 
begin  by  considering  recent  theories  relating  to  the  structure  of  semantic  memory. 
THEORIES  OF  SEMANTIC  MEMORY 
The  question  addressed  here  is  whether  or  not  semantic  memory  forms  a 
unitary  system.  One  way  to  infer  the  workings  of  any  cognitive  system  is  to  look  at 
how  normal  processing  breaks  down  in  brain  damaged  individuals. Neuropsychological  double  dissociations  have  traditionally  played  an  important 
role  in  determining  how  normal  processing  breaks  down.  This  type  of  evidence  has 
been  used  very  effectively  to  demonstrate  that  semantic  memory  can  be  impaired  in 
one  domain  of  knowledge  while  another  remains  relatively  unimpaired.  Such  findings 
alone  indicate  that  there  is  some  type  of  categorial  organisation  of  conceptual 
knowledge;  but  what  might  the  categories  of  such  categorial  organisation  be?  Perhaps 
the  most  common  of  such  semantic  deficits  is  for  living  things  (Warrington  & 
Shallice,  1984).  The  reverse  pattern  (a  deficit  for  non-living  things)  while  less 
common  has  also  been  reported  (e.  g.  Hillis  &  Caramazza,  1991).  One  might  postulate 
three  main  types  of  explanation  for  this  double  dissociation. 
Domain  specific  organization 
The  first  suggests  that  there  may  be  physically  and  functionally  independent 
stores  in  the  brain  for  different  categories  of  knowledge  (e.  g.  Caramazza  &  Shelton, 
1998).  These  authors  claim  that  certain  conceptual  categories  represent  evolutionarily 
adapted  domain-specific  knowledge  systems  that  are  subserved  by  distinct  neural 
mechanisms.  The  categories,  which  these  authors  offer  as  being  determined  by 
evolutionary  adaptation,  are  animals,  plant  life  and  artifacts.  In  a  later  article 
Caramazza  (2000)  relegates  artifacts  to  a  possible  category,  and  advances 7 
conspecifics  as  a  primary  plausible  category  along  with  animals  and  plant  life.  These 
categories  are  suggested  (by  Caramazza)  on  the  basis  that  the  fitness  value  of  such 
adaptations  is  uncontroversial.  For  example,  animals  are  potential  predators  and  a 
source  of  food,  plants  are  a  source  of  food  and  medication,  and  conspecifics  are 
source  of  nurturance  and  protection.  These  authors  argue  that  further  structure  within 
these  broad  domains  of  knowledge  is  not  categorical  in  form,  but  reflects  the 
correlational  properties  of  its  members  (see,  Caramazza  &  Hillis,  1990;  Hillis,  Rapp, 
&  Caramazza,  1995;  and  for  a  related  postion  see,  Riddoch,  Humphreys,  Coltheart, 
&  Funnell,  1988).  Clearly  such  a  position  is  speculative  and  is based  largely  on  the 
perceived  failure  of  other  models  in  this  area  to  account  for  wide-ranging  patterns 
category-specific  deficits  found  in  the  patient  population  (for  review  see  original 
paper,  Caramazza  &  Shelton,  1998).  However,  to  continue  in  a  speculative  vein, 
adding  faces  (our  primary  source  of  information  for  recognising  and  categorising 
people)  to  the  categories  which  are  determined  by  evolutionary  adaptation,  is  not  an 
unreasonable  proposition.  Such  theorising,  leads  to  the  possibility  that  a  specialised 
semantic  system,  coding  personal  information,  may  exist. Modality  specific  organization 
The  second  position  suggests  that  concepts  may  vary  by  modality,  depending 
on  the  type  of  semantic  information  on  which  they  rely.  Thus,  living  things  may 
depend  more  on  information  from  the  sensory  modality,  and  artifacts  may  depend 
more  on  functional  properties  (Warrington  &  Mccarthy,  1983;  Warrington  & 
Mccarthy,  1987;  Warrington  &  Shallice,  1984).  This  type  of  account  assumes  that 
processors  are  specialised  for  type  of  property,  rather  than  for  semantic  category  per 
se.  According  to  this  type  of  account,  selective  damage  to  one  type  of  semantic 
information  will  lead  to  an  apparent  category-specific  deficit.  It  should  be  noted  here 
that  recasting  the  living/nonliving  distinction,  in  terms  of  the  relative  contributions  of 
perceptual  and  functional  properties,  does  not,  in  fact,  alter  the  basic  claim  that 
category-specific  deficits  are  associated  with  damage  to  distinct  stores  of  knowledge. 
It  is  simply  that  now  the  content  of  these  stores  is  determined,  not  by  category 
membership,  but  by  information  type  (perceptual  or  functional). 
Unitary  Semantic  System 
Finally,  and  most  recently,  is  the  suggestion  that  these  category-specific  deficits 
may  emerge  from  the  internal  structure  of  the  concepts  alone,  without  the  need  for 
neural  or  functional  specialisation  (Tyler,  Moss,  Durrant-Peatfield,  &  Levy,  2000). 9 
In  this  framework,  apparent  category-specific  deficits  are  held  to  result  from  damage 
within  a  unitary  semantic  system.  This  theory  suggests  that  the  observed  patterns  of 
impairment  result  from  a  complex  interaction  of  type  of  semantic  feature,  correlations 
between  features,  and  the  extent  to  which  features  are  shared  or  distinctive.  A  feature 
that  is  present  in  only  one  concept  can  be  used  to  identify  uniquely  that  concept.  If  a 
feature  (say,  wings)  is  shared  by  a  large  number  of  concepts  (e.  g.,  sparrow,  chaffinch, 
rook,  penguin,  eagle,  etc),  it  becomes  a  relatively  poor  marker  for  each  particular 
concept.  By  their  nature,  correlation  and  distinctiveness  tend  to  be  inversely  related. 
Highly  correlated  features  (e.  g.,  wings)  are  often  present  in  many  concepts,  and  as 
such  are  not  very  distinctive.  Such  a  property  would  be  resistant  to  damage,  but  its 
preservation  in  a  damaged  system  would  be  more  useful  for  identifying  the  category 
to  which  an  item  belongs,  rather  than  in  distinguishing  it  from  other  category 
members.  On  the  other  hand,  distinctive  features  (at  least  those  that  fail  to  correlate 
with  other  properties)  will  be  very  vulnerable  to  damage.  However,  those  distinctive 
features  that  do  correlate,  especially  with  other  distinctive  features,  will  protect  the 
concept  to  which  they  belong.  Tyler  and  colleagues  suggested  differential  correlation 
patterns  between  semantic  features  for  living  things  and  artefacts  can  provoke  exactly 
the  type  of  dissociation  normally  observed  between  these  categories.  Evidence  in l0 
support  of  this  theory  is  provided  in  a  PDP  model,  which  learns  complex  correlation 
patterns  that  are  defined  by  the  inherent  nature  of  living  things  and  artefacts  and  by 
their  perceptual  and  functional  relationships. 
From  Tyler  et  al.  (2000). 
Proposed  clustering  of  correlated  features,  and  the  differences 
in  structure  for  concepts  in  the  living  and  non-living  domains,  as 
predicted  by  the  conceptual  structure  model.  Each  concept  is 
represented  as  a  pattern  of  activation  over  a  set  of  features. 
Living-things  concepts  (solid  grey)  have  many  highly  intercorrelated 
features  (represented  by  white-striped  circles)  shared  by  all  members  of 
the  domain  and  many  intercorrelated  properties  shared  by  all  members 
of  a  category,  such  as  birds  or  mammals  (represented  by  light  grey 
versus  dark  grey  concepts).  Concepts  also  have  some  distinctive 
features  (target  circles),  but  these  do  not  tend  to  be  highly  correlated 
with  each  other.  Artifacts  (horizontal  stripes)  have  fewer,  less  densely 
intercorrelated  properties  ateither  the  domain  or  category  level. 
Therefore  categories  within  the  domain  (e.  g.  tools,  weapons,  vehicles) 
form  less  well-defined  clusters.  However,  distinctive  properties  tend  to 
occur  in  small  highly  intercorrelated  groups;  that  is,  the  presence  of  one 
property  predicts  the  presence  of  another  within  the  concept.  In  this  way, 
domains  and  categories  form  'lumps'  within  semantic  space,  but  there  is 
no  clear  cut-off  between  them. 11 
Essentially  this  account  views  the  brain  as  a  system,  adapted  to  encode  the 
functional  and  statistical  regularity  of  the  world  around  it.  The  statistical  properties  in 
the  perceptual  surroundings  produce  different  patterns  of  distinctiveness  and 
correlation  in  the  systems  internal  representations.  These  patterns  of  internal 
representations  can  produce  apparent  category-specific  deficits  when  damaged. 
Tyler  et  al.  (2000)  point  out  that  in  addition  to  the  biological  functions  of  living 
things  and  the  specific  uses  of  artefacts,  there  are,  of  course,  many  other  non- 
perceptual  properties  associated  with  our  semantic  knowledge.  The  example  that  they 
use  is  that  lions  generally  live  in  Africa  and  can  be  called  "The  King  of  the  Jungle". 
They  label  this  type  of  knowledge  as  "encyclopaedic"  or  "associative"  and 
acknowledge  that  this  type  of  information  is  beyond  the  scope  of  their  theory,  since  it 
is  not  clear  to  what  extent  these  properties  enter  into  systematic  correlation  with  other 
semantic  information.  Therefore,  Tyler  et  al.  's  theory  can  offer  little  insight  into  the 
problem  of  how  personal  information  for  familiar  people  is  structured.  This  becomes 
clear  if  we  consider  the  type  of  information  that  we  might  use  to  define  Tony  Blair, 
who  generally  lives  in  England  and  is  known  as  "The  Prime  Minister  of  the  UK".  The 
type  of  information  that  defines  Tony  Blair  is  clearly  of  the  type  described  by  Tyler  et 
al.  (2000)  as  "encyclopaedic'  or  "associative".  Theories  that  appeal  to  the 12 
perceptual/functional  distinction  are  equally  unhelpful  here.  We  are  not  interested  in 
semantic  information  that  is  specified  either  by  perceptual  of  functional  properties  but 
in  that  information  which  defines  biographical  properties  of  the  person  in  question. 
The  question  which  remains  unanswered  is  can  the  encyclopaedic  type  categories, 
which  appear  to  delineate  personal  information,  be  created  in  an  analogous  way, 
using  information  that  we  have  acquired  relating  to  people.  For  instance,  we  see  an 
actor  for  the  first  time  in  a  new  film.  Perceptual  type  features,  such  as  American 
(derived  from  accent),  tall,  male,  could  be  coded  in  the  normal  way  using  perceptual 
mechanisms.  These  types  of  features  could  be  viewed  as  similar  to  the  `wings' 
example  above  in  that  individually  they  are  present  in  many  concepts  (e.  g., 
politicians,  sports  stars,  actors,  singers,  TV  presenters,  etc.  )  and  are  not  very 
distinctive  in  terms  of  being  unique  identifiers  of  a  concept.  However,  perhaps  we 
also  code  `action  hero'  when  we  first  observe  this  actor.  Such  a  property  could  be 
described  as  less  well  correlated  but  more  distinctive  and  as  such  would  be  a  better 
marker  for  the  category  of  `movie  star'.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  propose  that 
constellations  of  known  facts  relating  to  people  should  form  statistical  regularities 
that  are  differentially  mapped  in  some  biographical  knowledge  space.  Whether  this 13 
biographical  knowledge  space  should  be  seen  as  separate  store,  or  a  `lump',  in  Tyler 
et  al.  's  unitary  semantic  space  is  an  open  question. 
However,  the  first  theory  offered  above  (e.  g.,  Caramazza  &  Shelton,  1998), 
which  suggested  that  there  may  be  physically  and  functionally  independent  stores  in 
the  brain  for  different  categories  of  knowledge,  is  perhaps  more  compatible  with  what 
is  known  about  the  type  of  information  that  is  stored  relating  to  familiar  people.  The 
basis  for  this  suggestion  is  contained  in  the  models  of  person  recognition,  which  will 
shortly  be  considered.  For  the  moment,  it  is  acknowledged  that  any  theory  relating  to 
the  structure  of  semantic  knowledge  for  familiar  people  should  be  compatible  with 
one  or  other  of  these  more  general  propositions. 
ABSTRACTIONS  OR  INSTANCES 
Is  knowledge  represented  in  an  abstract  or  way  or  stored  as  a  set  of  specific 
instances?  This  question  is  central  to  the  fundamental  premise  on  which  this  thesis  is 
based.  There  is  no  doubt  that  we  can  retrieve  both  abstract  categories  and  specific 
instances  form  memory,  so  the  real  question  is  how  is  the  information  stored. 
The  abstraction/instance  debate  has  largely  focused  around  competing 
explanations  for  repetition  and  semantic  priming  effects.  Repetition  priming  occurs 14 
when  exposure  to  an  item  facilitates  later  processing  of  that  same  item.  Generally 
speaking  it  is  long  lasting  and  does  not  cross  stimulus  domains.  Semantic  priming  is 
the  facilitation  that  occurs  for  a  target  item  when  it  is  immediately  preceded  by  a 
closely  associated  item.  For  example,  a  lexical  decision  on  a  word  (e.  g.,  nurse)  is 
faster  if  it  is  preceded  by  an  associated  word  (e.  g.,  doctor).  Generally  speaking  this 
effect  is  very  short-lived,  but  does  cross  stimulus  domains.  This  facilitation  is  a 
robust  effect  occurring  for  associated  words,  objects  and  faces  and  the  ubiquitous 
nature  of  this  effect  suggests  that  it  may  have  its  locus  in  a  fundamental  memory 
retrieval  mechanism.  How  do  the  competing  abstractionist  and  episodic  theories 
account  for  these  effects? 
Abstractionist  Account 
Until  quite  recently,  the  most  popular  explanation  of  this  priming  effect 
appealed  to  the  concept  of  spreading  activation  (Anderson,  1976;  Collins  &  Quillian, 
1969;  Collins  &  Loftus,  1975;  Quillian,  1967).  Details  may  have  differed  between 
these  theories  but  the  core  ideas  were  essentially  the  same.  According  to  the  models 
of  Collins,  Quillian  &  Loftus  (CLQ),  knowledge  is  stored  as  pieces  of  abstract 
information  in  a  network  of  interconnected  nodes,  and  a  specific  piece  of  information 
can  be  retrieved  from  memory  when  its  node  becomes  active.  Activation  spreads is 
throughout  the  network  in  a  cascade  fashion,  and  residual  activation  at  associated 
nodes  facilitates  subsequent  retrieval  of  that  particular  piece  of  information.  Closely 
related  items  are  grouped  closely  together,  with  less  well  associated  items  further 
away,  and  activation  decays  with  distance  and  time.  For  example,  processing  the 
word  butter  sends  activation  to  associated  concepts  such  as  bread.  The  residual 
activation  at  bread  facilitates  its  subsequent  recognition.  However,  Ratcliff  and 
McKoon  (1981)  demonstrated  that  the  time  required  for  activation  to  spread  from  one 
node  to  another  could  not  be  used  to  explain  effects  of  distance  on  retrieval  time.  The 
same  authors  (1988,  experiment  2),  demonstrated  that  activation  decay  was  also  quite 
rapid  (500ms  in  some  circumstances).  Taken  together,  these  findings  somewhat 
undermined  the  CQL  style  models.  It  may  have  been  possible  to  modify  them  along 
the  lines  suggested  by  Ratcliff  and  McCoon  (1981;  1988),  but  a  new  model  that  fully 
addressed  these  issues  had  already  emerged. 
The  ACT*  model  proposed  by  Anderson  (1983)  could  not  be  criticised  on  the 
above  grounds.  In  this  model  memory  is  again  conceived  as  a  network  of  nodes  and 
retrieval  of  a  piece  of  information  is  consists  of  activating  a  particular  node. 
Activation  spreads  extremely  quickly  in  this  model,  but  nodes  only  remain  active  if 
attention  is  directed  to  them,  and  when  attention  is  shifted  activation  falls  rapidly. 16 
Another  difference  between  this  model  and  the  CLQ  models  involves  the  priming 
mechanism.  In  the  CLQ  models,  residual  activation  at  the  target  node  is  maintained 
even  after  processing  of  the  prime  has  stopped.  In  ACT*  the  prime  and  target  must  be 
simultaneously  active  for  the  association  between  them  to  produce  heightened 
activation  at  the  target.  While  this  mechanism  could  be  compared  to  the  compound- 
cue  mechanism  suggested  by  proponents  of  episodic  style  accounts  (e.  g.,  Ratcliff  & 
McKoon,  1988),  this  model  should  not  be  confused  with  such  accounts,  and  should 
clearly  be  viewed  a  traditional  spreading  activation  type  model. 
Taken  as  a  whole,  the  principle  of  spreading  activation  in  a  semantic  network 
has  provided  the  foundation  for  a  powerful  set  of  theories  regarding  knowledge 
representation  (e.  g.,  word  recognition,  Morton,  1979;  picture  recognition,  Warren  & 
Morton,  1982;  face  recognition,  Burton  et  al.,  1990;  object  recognition,  Biederman  & 
Cooper,  1991;  Humphreys,  Lamote,  &  Lloyd-Jones,  1995).  All  of  these  theories 
assume  that  abstract  representational  units  mediate  recognition,  and  that  these 
representations  are  somehow  updated  through  use.  It  is  this  updating  (usually 
observed  during  the  study  phase  of  a  typical  priming  experiment)  that  allows  more 
efficient  or  accurate  processing  at  some  later  stage  (test  phase  of  typical  experiment). 17 
There  are  differences  within  this  set  of  models,  but  all  share  the  assumption  that 
processing  proceeds  in  stages. 
The  first  stage  is  visual  processing,  followed  by  activation  of  visual  structural 
representations,  followed  by  access  to  semantic  information,  followed  by  naming.  An 
important  aspect  of  this  type  of  `stage'  model  is  that  it  allows  detailed  predictions 
regarding  how  processing  might  be  affected,  by  task  demands  that  tap  the  system  at 
the  different  stages.  A  particular  model  in  this  area  (Burton,  Bruce,  &  Hancock,  1999; 
Burton  et  al.,  1990)  will  be  evaluated  later  in  the  section  entitled  `Models  of  Person 
Recognition'.  This  evaluation  will  show  that  this  style  of  model  makes  predictions 
that  are  incompatible  with  other  theoretical  positions. 
Instance  Accounts 
The  abstractionist  position  described  above  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  an 
episodic  system.  In  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  an  abstraction  could  be  constructed 
without  some  earlier  processing  which  involves  perceiving  and  remembering 
instances  of  exemplars.  However,  the  opposing  view,  considered  here,  is  that  there  is 
only  one  memory  system,  which  stores  an  episodic  trace  for  each  and  every  event. 
A  particular  model  (Hintzman,  1986)  in  this  class  will  now  be  considered  in 
detail.  The  purpose  of  evaluating  this  model  is  to  give  a  flavour  of  this  type 18 
theorising.  The  various  models  in  this  class  do  differ  in  detailed  respects  from  one 
another,  but  the  key  idea  is  constant.  Essentially,  such  theories  propose  that  concepts 
are  not  stored  as  abstracted  categories,  instead  each  specific  processing  episode  lays 
down  its  own  trace. 
Hintzman  (1986)  reports  a  model  (MINERVA  2)  which  is  able  to  retrieve  an 
abstracted  prototype  of  the  category  when  cued  with  the  category  name  and  to 
retrieve  and  disambiguate  a  category  name  when  cued  with  a  category  exemplar.  This 
model,  like  all  in  its  class,  proposes  that  there  is  only  one  memory  system,  which 
stores  episodic  traces  of  each  specific  experience.  Abstract  knowledge  as  such  is  not 
stored  but  can  be  derived  from  the  pool  of  traces  at  the  time  of  retrieval.  This  multiple 
trace  theory  assumes  that  each  processing  episode  gives  rise  to  a  unique  memory 
trace.  Thus,  repetition  of  a  word  (or  a  face  or  an  object)  does  not  strengthen  a  prior 
representation.  Instead,  it  creates  a  new  trace  that  coexists  in  memory  with  other 
traces  relating  to  the  same  item.  In  this  model,  there  are  no  abstract  representations, 
only  traces  of  individual  episodes  that  can  act  in  concert  at  the  time  of  retrieval,  to 
create  the  impression  of  stored  categories. 
In  this  style  of  theorising,  every  experience  is  assumed  to  be  represented 
internally,  by  a  set  of  primitive  properties.  There  are  a  large  number  of  these 19 
properties  and  they  can  be  accessed  via  more  than  one  modality.  The  theory  is  unclear 
as  to  how  these  primitives  are  derived  but  does  posit  that  they  are  not  acquired 
through  experience.  The  crucial  point  here  is  that  the  number  of  primitive  properties, 
though  large,  is  much  smaller  than  the  number  of  experiences  a  person  has. 
Therefore,  experiences  share  primitive  properties  and  the  similarity  of  two 
experiences  is  related  to  the  number  of  properties  they  share. 
Every  conscious  experience  gives  rise  its  own  unique  memory  trace.  So  seeing 
the  same  person  over  and  over  again  will  result  in  several  traces  being  laid  down. 
Hintzman  adopts  the  terminology  of  primary  memory  (PM)  and  secondary  memory 
(SM)  to  distinguish  between  the  representation  of  current  experience  and  the  large 
pool  of  previously  encoded  traces.  Communication  between  PM  and  SM  is  restricted 
to  two  operations.  A  retrieval  cue  (probe)  is  sent  from  PM  to  all  traces  in  SM,  and 
PM  can  receive  a  reply  (echo)  from  SM.  Each  trace  in  SM  is  activated  according  to 
its  similarity  with  the  probe,  so  traces  sharing  many  properties  with  the  probe  are 
strongly  activated,  whereas  traces  sharing  few  properties  are  activated  by  a  much 
smaller  amount.  The  returning  echo  has  two  elements;  intensity  and  content.  The 
intensity  depends  on  the  total  amount  of  SM  activation  that  was  triggered  by  the 
probe.  If  many  traces  are  sufficiently  similar  to  the  probe  then  the  intensity  of  the 20 
echo  will  be  high.  Echo  intensity  can  therefore  be  thought  of  as  a  signal  of  familiarity. 
Echo  content  reflects  the  summed  contributions  of  all  the  traces  in  SM,  as  each  trace 
responds  according  to  its  similarity  with  the  probe.  So,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
probe,  the  number  of  strongly  activated  traces  may  be  large  or  small,  and  depending 
on  how  closely  matched  each  trace  is  to  the  probe,  the  echo  content  may  be  clear  or 
misleading.  Via  this  mechanism  various  pieces  of  abstract  information  may  be 
retrieved  form  a  single  memory  system  storing  only  episodic  traces  (see  figure  1.2). 
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Figure  1.2.  From  Hintzman  (1986).  Trace  Activation:  Each  trace  is  activated  according  to  its 
similarity  to  the  probe.  Feature  values  [f  =  1...  n]  are  listed  from  left  to  right,  and  traces  [i  = 
1...  m]  from  top  to  bottom.  A(r),  the  activation  level  of  the  trace  i,  depends  on  the  proportion  of 
the  features  it  shares  with  the  probe.  Echo  intensity  is  the  sum  of  the  A(1)  values.  Retrieval  of 
Echo  Content:  Activation  is  initiated  by  the  probe  and  passed  down  to  all  features  of  each  trace, 
as  the  product  of  A(:  )  and  the  feature  value.  For  each  feature,  j,  the  products  are  summed  over 
traces  to  yield  C(/).  Echo  content  is  the  set  of  CO)  values. 21 
Logan  (1988,2002)  proposed  a  different  version  of  how  an  instance  account 
might  operate,  embedded  within  his  general  theory  of  automaticity.  He  suggests  that 
there  are  two  ways  in  which  an  action  can  be  executed.  An  algorithm  may  be  applied 
to  the  problem,  or  the  answer  may  simply  be  retrieved  from  memory.  The  algorithm 
method  is  used  for  actions  that  are  new  or  unfamiliar,  but  each  time  an  action  is 
performed  a  memory  for  it  is  created.  This  memory  may  be  used  the  next  time  the 
action  is  required.  So  the  next  time  the  action  is  necessary,  the  action  may  be 
performed  by  either  performing  the  algorithm  or  by  retrieving  a  memory  of 
previously  performing  the  actions.  Whether  an  algorithm  or  a  memory  is  used 
depends  on  which  is  faster.  Logan  uses  a  horse  race  metaphor  to  explain  the  selection 
of  the  algorithm  or  memory  retrieval.  Performing  the  action  will  lead  to  storing  more 
instances  of  the  action  in  memory.  As  more  instances  are  stored  in  memory,  it 
becomes,  statistically,  more  likely  that  one  of  them  will  win  the  race  with  the 
algorithm. 
A  less  strong  view  of  the  instance  account  is  taken  by  theorists  that  propose  that 
skill  transfer,  which  relies  on  the  similarity  of  the  underlying  processes  at  study  and 
test,  is  the  foundation  of  observed  priming  effects.  Support  for  this  position  comes 
from  various  features  of  long-term  priming.  First,  these  priming  effects  can  last  over 22 
hours  or  days  (Jacoby,  1983a;  Jacoby  &  Dallas,  1981),  whereas  theories  that  account 
for  priming  on  the  basis  of  temporary  activation  of  existing  knowledge  typically 
assume  that  priming  dissipates  quickly  (though  see,  Burton,  1990,  for  a  simple 
mechanism  of  long  term  repetition  priming).  Second,  long-term  priming  is  sensitive 
to  the  effect  of  perceptual  overlap  between  study  and  test  operations.  In  particular, 
changes  in  modality  or  study  tasks  often  reduce  or  eliminate  priming  effects  (Jacoby, 
1983b;  Roediger  &  Blaxton,  1987;  Weldon,  1991),  suggesting  that  priming  is 
primarily  mediated  by  the  similarity  of  the  processing  episodes  rather  than  by 
modification  to  abstract  representations. 
Evaluating  the  evidence 
There  has  been  considerable  debate  in  the  literature  regarding  which  type  of 
theory  can  best  account  for  the  wide  range  of  priming  effects  that  have  been  reported 
in  the  word,  object  and  face  (person)  recognition  studies.  For  conflicting  reviews  of  a 
substantial  literature  in  the  lexical  field  see,  Tenpenny  (1995),  who  favours  an 
episodic  interpretation,  and  Bowers  (2000)  who  strongly  supports  the  idea  of  abstract 
encoding. 
Central  to  Tenpenny's  argument  in  support  of  an  instance-based  account  is  that 
many  words  are  processed  between  the  study  and  test  phase  of  a  typical  long-term 23 
priming  experiment.  She  argues  that  these  intervening  words  should  eliminate  the 
priming,  due  to  the  interference  that  results  from  lexical  competition.  However, 
Bowers  (2000)  argues  that  rejecting  abstractionist  theories,  on  the  basis  of  the 
longevity  of  long  term  priming,  is  unwarranted.  First,  the  sheer  number  of  words  read 
in  the  intervening  period  does  not,  in  itself,  preclude  subsequent  priming.  Kirsner  and 
Speelman  (1996)  showed  that  a  low  frequency  word,  with  a  frequency  count  of  one 
per  million  would  be  encountered  only  once  in  forty  days  (assuming  the  average 
person  reads  about  25,000  words  per  day).  Therefore,  it  would  be  unlikely  that  a  low 
a  frequency  word  would  be  encountered  (i.  e.,  primed)  immediately  before  an 
experiment.  So  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  such  a  word  would  not  benefit 
within  the  experimental  setting.  This  interpretation  is  consistent  with  finding  that  the 
size  of  the  priming  effect  for  high  frequency  words  is  smaller  than  that  for  low 
frequency  words,  and  is  occasionally  completely  absent  (Bowers,  1999;  Rajaram  & 
Roediger,  1993). 
Tenpenny  (1995)  further  argues  that  abstractionist  models  cannot  account  for 
the  different  patterns  of  effects  observed  for  short-term  and  long-term  repetition 
priming.  However,  she  ignores  the  possibility  that  short-term  repetition  priming  may 
in  fact  be  semantic  priming  in  all  but  name.  All  items  (words,  object  and  faces)  are 24 
more  closely  related  to  themselves  than  are  close  associates  of  that  item.  Calder  and 
Young  (1996)  termed  this  effect  self-priming  and  proposed  that  it  had  exactly  the 
same  locus  as  short-term  repetition  priming.  In  fact,  they  suggest  that  they  are  one 
and  the  same  thing.  By  this  reasoning,  short-term  and  long-term  priming  effects  are 
mediated  by  different  mechanisms,  and  dissociations  between  them  should  come  as 
no  surprise. 
There  is  another,  more  fundamental  argument  for  prefering  the  abstractionist 
view  over  instance  type  theories.  An  advantage  of  abstract  localised  representations  is 
that  they  support  compositional  representations  (Fodor  &  Pylyshyn,  1988).  In 
contrast,  it  is  unclear  how  combinatorial  systems  can  be  supported  in  an  instance 
model  of  memory.  There  may  be  some  way  that  the  virtual  abstract  codes  (echoes  in 
Hintzman's  conceptualisation)  could  be  used  as  the  building  blocks  for  a  system  (say, 
language)  that  constructs  complex  representations  from  simpler  parts,  but  to  my 
knowledge,  no  instance  theorists  have  suggested  how  this  might  be  achieved. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  imagine  that  an  instance  based  account  could,  in  fact, 
produce  the  type  of  stored  abstract  representations  that  are  generally  denied  by 
theorists  working  in  this  area.  A  general  proposition  in  this  type  of  theorising  is  that 
abstraction  takes  place  at  retrieval  rather  than  at  encoding.  If  this  is  so,  then  a  memory 25 
trace  coding  the  abstraction  is  set  up  (coding  echo  content  in  Hintzman's  model). 
This  echo  must  also  be  stored  as  a  new  trace.  Several  such  traces  would  code 
(potentially)  a  sort  of  super-abstraction.  When  activated  by  the  appropriate  probe  this 
super-abstraction  would  be  manifest  in  the  echo  content  and  would  itself  form  a  new 
trace.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  process  should  not  be  regarded  as  coding 
abstractions.  In  fact,  admitting  there  may  be  both  episodic  and  abstract  memory  traces 
may  provide  an  explanation  for  some  of  the  apparently  contradictory  data  in  this 
field.  Such  a  proposal,  is  made  by  Nadel  and  Moscovitch  (1997). 
Hybrid  Account 
The  multiple  trace  model  proposed  by  Nadel  and  Moscovitch  (1997)  differs 
from  that  proposed  by  Hintzman  (1986)  and  others  (e.  g.,  Logan,  1988)  in  that  it 
admits  separate  episodic  and  semantic  systems.  In  their  model  the  creation  of  multiple 
traces  facilitate  the  extraction  of  `factual'  information  from  an  episode  and  its 
integration  with  pre-existing  semantic  memory  stores.  Facts  about  the  world  (e.  g., 
Ben  Nevis  is  in  Scotland,  oranges  are  round,  etc.  )  acquired  in  the  context  of  a  specific 
episode  are  separated  from  the  episode  and  are  eventually  stored  independently  of  it. 
In  essence,  this  theory  proposes  that  processing  proceeds  according  to  the  following 
stages.  Each  new  episode  is  sparsely  coded  in  an  ensemble  of  hippocampal  complex 26 
neurons  (Marr,  1969;  Treves  &  Rolls,  1994)  and  is bound  into  a  coherent  memory 
trace  (Moscovitch,  1995)  which  includes  the  feature  information.  Each  time  this 
memory  trace  is  re-activated,  it  happens  in  a  slightly  different  experiential  and 
neuronal  context.  This  re-activation  results  in  the  creation  of  a  newly  encoded  trace, 
which  is  again  sparse  and  distributed.  By  virtue  of  activating  a  similar  set  of  neurons 
this  new  trace  shares  some  or  all  of  the  information  about  the  initial  episode.  This 
creation  of  multiple  related  traces  is  said  to  facilitate  the  extraction  of  `factual' 
information  from  the  episode,  which  is  then  integrated  with  pre-existing  semantic 
knowledge  as  described  above. 
At  the  present  time,  it  seems  that  researchers  who  favour  an  instance-based 
approach  are  able  to  account  for  some,  but  not  all  of  the  data,  contained  within  these 
diverse  literatures.  The  same  could  be  said  of  those  who  favour  a  structural  approach. 
This  echoes  many  of  the  historical  debates  in  psychology  (e.  g.,  nature  vs  nurture  in 
child  development,  early  vs  late  selection  in  visual  attention).  Ultimately  both  of 
these  debates  were  resolved  somewhere  in  the  middle.  An  approach  that  admits  both 
an  abstractionist  and  instance-based  approach  may  now  be  warranted.  There  is  good 
reason  to  suppose  that  both  types  of  system  exist  (there  is  certainly  evidence  in  favour 
of  both  positions).  Logan  (1988,2002)  has  proposed  that  a  race  occurs  between 27 
computational  and  memory  processes  when  an  answer  to  a  particular  question  is 
sought.  Perhaps  this  race  has  more  than  two  runners.  Depending  on  task  demands,  the 
answer  to  a  particular  question  may  drop  out  of  the  structure  of  a  particular 
processing  system,  it  may  result  due  to  the  retrieval  of  episodic  traces,  or  it  may  be 
computed  (in  whole  or  in  part)  from  the  output  of  one  or  both  such  systems. 
Whatever  the  resolution  of  this  debate  turns  out  to  be,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
of  a  structured  semantic  system  that  is  not  somehow  based  on  abstracted 
representations.  The  experiments  which  follow  will  be  based  on  the  assumption  that 
abstracted  representations  form  the  basis  of  this  system. 
MODULARITY  OR  EXPERTISE 
The  question  addressed  here  is  whether  person  recognition  is  carried  out  by 
cognitive  systems  that  are  functionally  separate  from  those  processes  that  are  used  for 
objects.  An  important  point  here  is  that  familiar  people  (whether  recognised  from 
their  face  or  voice  or  other  modality)  can  only  be  placed  into  superordinate  categories 
(i.  e.,  occupation,  nationality,  etc.  )  following  access  to  stored  semantic  information 
specifically  relating  to  them.  This  implies  that  they  must  be  identified  at  the  exemplar 
level  before  categorisation  can  take  place.  There  may  some  exceptions  to  this  rule,  in 28 
respect  of  a  small  number  of  familiar  people  who  are  highly  specified  by  their  visual 
appearance  (i.  e.,  super-model,  rock  star,  etc.  ),  but  in  general  it  is  impossible  to 
classify  people  in  this  way  using  only  perceptually  derived  information.  Objects,  on 
the  other  hand,  can  be  easily  classified  (and  usually  are)  using  only  perceptually 
derived  information  at  the  basic  or  subordinate  levels.  Exemplar  level  identification 
(crucial  to  the  classification  of  familiar  people)  does  not  usually  occur,  and  is  in  fact 
unnecessary  for  most  object  categorisation.  An  important  difference,  therefore, 
between  person  and  object  categorisation  is  that  person  categorisation  requires  access 
to  personal  (exemplar  level)  stored  semantic  information,  whereas  object 
categorisation  may  proceed  based  only  on  perceptual  type  codes. 
Modularity 
The  modularity/expertise  debate,  as  it  relates  to  person  recognition,  has  recently 
been  addressed  in  the  specific  area  of  face  recognition.  Our  within-category 
discrimination  ability  relating  to  faces  is  unsurpassed  by  any  other  abilities  we  may 
have  relating  to  other  complex  objects.  So  much  so  that  it  has  been  suggested  that 
face  recognition  is  achieved  by  a  specialised  processing  system,  organised  around 
different  principles  than  those  used  for  other  stimuli  (Farah,  1990;  Tanaka  &  Farah, 
1993).  There  is  a  growing  body  of  evidence  in  favour  of  this  hypothesis.  For 29 
example,  prosopagnosia,  the  impairment  of  face  recognition  after  brain  damage,  can 
leave  object  recognition  relatively  intact  (Farah,  Levinson,  &  Klien,  1995).  On  the 
other  hand,  some  object  agnosics  have  relatively  spared  face  recognition 
(Moscovitch,  Winocur,  &  Behrmann,  1997).  This  double  dissociation  between  face 
and  object  processing  suggests  that  the  two  abilities  are  functionally  distinct,  in  that 
one  process  may  occur  without  the  other.  Further,  it  suggests  that  these  processes  are 
carried  out  in  distinct  anatomically  regions  of  the  brain,  as  brain  damage  can 
selectively  impair  either  ability.  Converging  evidence  comes  from  both  PET  and 
fMRI,  which  have  found  distinct  areas  of  activation  during  face  and  object 
recognition  (De  Renzi,  1997;  Sergent,  Ohta,  &  Macdonald,  1992). 
A  compelling  piece  of  evidence,  suggesting  how  this  localisation  comes  about, 
is  reported  by  Farah,  Rabinowitz,  Quinn  and  Liu  (2000).  They  report  a  case  study  of 
16  year  old  boy,  Adam,  who  is  densely  prosopagnosic,  but  with  no  discernible  deficit 
in  object  recognition.  On  a  battery  of  tests,  Adam's  performance  mimics  that  of  a 
typical  adult  prosopagnosic.  What  made  this  case  special  is  the  fact  that  Adam's  brain 
damage  was  sustained  at  the  age  of  one  day.  This  study  provides  the  strongest 
evidence  to  date  that  the  distinction  between  face  and  object  recognition  is  somehow 
specified  in  the  genome  and  is  anatomically  localised. 30 
Expertise  Account 
Alternatively,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  behavioural  effects  that  have  been 
selectively  observed  for  faces  in  some  studies  (Tanaka  &  Sengco,  1997)  can  also  be 
found  with  non-face  objects  when  experts  view  these  objects  (Gauthier  &  Tarr, 
1997).  These  results  are  at  odds  with  the  idea  of  a  specific  module  for  face 
recognition,  because  they  violate  Fodor's  criterion  of  information  encapsulation, 
which  is  a  crucial  aspect  of  any  modular  system  (Fodor,  1983).  However,  according 
to  this  account  the  functional  and  anatomical  specialisation  for  faces  (at  least  in 
adults)  may  simply  reflect  experience  with  these  objects.  These  authors  argue  that 
because  we  acquire  a  lot  of  experience  for  such  judgements  throughout  our  lives,  we 
can  recognise  faces  at  a  more  specific  level  than  most  other  objects.  The  idea  is  that 
most  objects  are  recognised  most  efficiently  at  what  has  been  called  the  basic  level  of 
abstraction.  For  example  a  dog  is  more  likely  to  categorised  as  a  dog  (basic  level) 
rather  than  as  a  spaniel  or  poodle  (subordinate  level)  (Jolicoeur,  Gluck,  &  Kosslyn, 
1984;  Rosch,  1978;  Tanaka  &  Taylor,  1991).  Objects  at  different  basic  levels  can  be 
distinguished  by  the  presence  of  highly  diagnostic  features  (i.  e.,  wings  are  a 
distinctive  feature  of  birds).  In  contrast,  objects  (including  faces)  within  the  same 
basic  level,  share  many  features.  Therefore  to  distinguish  between  these  objects  at  a 31 
subordinate  level,  one  has  to  rely  on  other  types  of  information,  such  as  colour, 
texture,  and  variations  in  the  configuration  of  the  features  (Bruce  &  Humphreys, 
1994;  Diamond  &  Carey,  1986).  This  position  suggests  that  the  basic  level  at  which 
an  object  is  recognised  changes  with  exposure  to  that  object.  Within  this  framework 
faces  are  typically  recognised  at  a  very  subordinate  level  (i.  e.,  the  exemplar  level:  Bill 
Cinton's  face  or  Tony  Blair's  face).  In  essence  this  position  states  that  without 
expertise,  face  processing  would  not  be  differentiated  from  the  type  of  object 
processing  that  occurs  at  the  basic  level. 
However,  an  important  difference  between  processing  of  familiar  faces  and 
objects  is  not  captured  in  this  type  of  framework.  Familiar  face  categorisation  is 
usually  conducted  at  the  exemplar  level  whereas  object  recognition  is  usually 
conducted  at  the  basic  or  subordinate  levels.  That  is,  a  robin  is  classified  as  a  bird  or 
robin  and  not  as  a  particular  robin,  whereas  a  familiar  person  (say,  Tony  Blair)  is 
usually  classified  as  a  particular  person  (Tony  Blair)  and  not  as  a  politician  or  as  a 
person.  Therefore,  the  processing  of  objects  in  general  should  be  compared  only  with 
unfamiliar  faces.  Alternatively,  a  legitimate  comparison  could  be  made  between 
familiar  faces  and  personally  known  objects  (your  own  car,  wallet,  dog,  etc.  ),  as  it 
could  then  be  argued  that  both  categorisations  occur  at  the  exemplar  level.  To  my 32 
knowledge,  such  experiments  have  not  been  carried  out.  The  main  point  is  that  we 
should  not  directly  compare  processing  that  is  assumed  to  occur  at  different  levels. 
However,  Gauthier,  Anderson,  Tarr,  Skudlarski,  and  Gore  (1997)  claim  that 
subordinate-level  matching  of  objects  (as  compared  to  basic  level  matching  of 
identical  stimuli)  engages  the  fusiform  and  inferior  temporal  gyri  in  a  pattern  that 
resembles  the  activation  that  occurs  in  the  so  called  `fusiform  face  area'  (FFA)  when 
a  face  is  processed.  These  authors  suggest  that  activation  the  FFA  is  related  to 
subordinate  level  categorisation  and  not  face  processing  per  se.  Such  accounts 
suggest  that  faces  and  other  objects  may  be  processed  by  the  same  mechanism  and  is 
dependent  on  the  level  of  expertise  one  has  with  a  particular  class  of  stimuli. 
Evaluation 
The  debate  between  those  who  favour  `face-specific'  processing  versus  those 
who  favour  an  explanation  based  on  expertise  is by  no  means  settled.  Evidence  for 
both  positions  is  largely  derived  from  brain  imaging  techniques,  and  both  sets  of 
researchers  appeal  to  the  idea  that  certain  types  of  processing  activate  certain  brain 
regions.  The  underlying  assumption  here  is  that  if  two  processes  are  anatomically 
distinct,  then  by  implication  they  must  be  also  be  functionally  distinct.  On  the 
surface,  this  is  an  entirely  reasonable  method  to  distinguish  separate  processing 33 
mechanisms.  However,  one  problem  is  that  both  sets  of  researchers  use  different 
techniques  to  identify  the  area  under  investigation  (the  FFA).  Kanwisher  and 
Moscovitch  (2000)  point  out  that  the  region  identified  by  Gauthier  et  al.  (2000),  is 
partially  or  completely  non-overlapping  with  the  FFA,  as  originally  defined  by 
Kanwisher  (1997).  So  there  appears  to  be  disagreement  between  these  research 
groups  on  the  anatomical  location  of  the  area  specialised  for  face  processing.  This 
issue  comes  into  focus  if  we  consider  Gauthier's  and  colleagues  work  with  greebles 
(Gauthier  et  al.,  1997).  These  authors  argue  that  through  extensive  training  with 
greebles,  specialised  mechanisms  can  be  acquired  that  resemble  and  may  even 
overlap  with  those  used  to  recognise  faces.  Kanwisher  (2000)  disputes  this 
conclusion,  again  based  on  the  fact  that  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  brain  regions 
responsive  to  greebles  are  the  same  as  those  claimed  for  faces.  It  may  be  that  face 
processing  and  subordinate-level  processing,  engage  mutually  exclusive  areas  within 
this  general  region,  in  different  individuals,  but  that  these  regions  average  to  the  same 
area  across  a  group  of  individuals.  Further,  even  if  it  were  established  that  greeble 
processing  and  face  processing  do  activate  the  same  distinct  area,  this  does  not  permit 
the  strong  argument  that  face  processing  is  expertise  driven.  A  more  parsimonious 
explanation  may  be  that  an  area  established  for  face  processing  is  recruited  for  the 34 
processing  of  `face  like'  stimuli  (see  Figure  1.3,  for  example  of  a  greeble).  Evidence 
that  other  types  of  expert,  within  category,  discriminations  are  carried  out  in  the  same 
brain  region  as  face  judgements  (the  fusiform  face  area)  is  not  evidence  against  a  face 
module.  It  may  simply  be  that  this  area,  specialised  for  one  type  of  within-category 
discrimination  (i.  e.,  faces)  is  recruited  when  necessary  for  other  within-category 
discriminations. 
Figure  1.3.  Examples  of  greebles 
From  Tarr  &  Gauthier  (2000) 
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A  direct  comparison  between  face  and  object  processing  was  carried  by  Barry, 
Johnston  and  Scanlan  (1998).  Using  a  semantic  priming  technique,  recognition  and 
naming  latencies  were  measured  for  three  classes  of  stimuli;  familiar  faces, 
structurally  similar  objects  (living  things),  and  structurally  distinct  objects  (artifacts), 
across  four  prime  type  conditions  (associated,  same-category,  neutral  and  unrelated). 
A  remarkably  similar  pattern  of  results  was  obtained  for  both  recognition  and 
naming.  For  faces  there  was  large  priming  effect  in  the  associated  prime  condition  but 
none  in  the  same-category  prime  condition.  However,  for  objects  a  priming  effect 35 
was  observed  in  both  the  associated  prime  and  same-category  prime  conditions. 
These  differential  effects  indicate  that  object  and  face  processing  may  be  subserved 
by  different  functional  mechanisms.  These  authors  interpreted  these  results  within  a 
model  which  proposes  that  semantic  knowledge  is  organised  differently  for  people 
and  objects.  The  proposal  is  that  the  semantic  representations  of  objects  are  organised 
around  shared  features  and  abstracted  superordinate  categories.  For  people  the 
suggestion  is  that  these  representations  are  structured  by  networks  of  interpersonal 
relatedness,  rather  than  by  shared  features  or  abstracted  categories.  This  proposal 
accounts  for  the  observed  priming  effects  for  both  associative  and  categorial  prime 
types  for  objects,  and  more  importantly  offers  and  explanation  for  the  associative  but 
not  categorial  priming  for  people. 
However,  a  possible  difficulty  with  this  experiment  relates  to  the  point  that  was 
made  at  the  start  of  this  section.  That  is,  it  compares  familiar  face  processing  (at  the 
exemplar  level)  with  object  processing  at  the  subordinate  or  basic  level.  Clearly  more 
experimental  work  comparing  both  person  and  object  processing  at  the  same  level  of 
categorisation  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  fully  understand  these  mechanisms. 36 
MODELS  OF  PERSON  RECOGNITION 
Until  the  1980s,  research  in  face  recognition  tended  to  focus  on  forensic  issues 
relating  to  unfamiliar  people  (e.  g.,  Ellis,  1975).  This  was  primarily  motivated  by  the 
unreliability  of  eyewitness  identification  (Yarmey,  1979)  despite  the  weight  which 
juries  attached  to  such  reports.  A  shift  occurred  with  the  publication  of  a  study  by 
Bruce  (1979)  when  it  became  clear  that  the  identification  of  familiar  faces  and  the 
discrimination  of  unfamiliar  faces  involved  different  functional  mechanisms. 
In  the  Bruce  (1979)  study  participants  were  asked  to  determine  whether  or  not 
faces  belonged  to  British  prime  ministers.  The  distractor  faces  were  either  visually 
similar  or  semantically  related  (i.  e.,  another  politician)  to  the  targets.  The  results 
showed  that  RTs  to  reject  the  distractors  were  slower  in  comparison  to  unrelated 
faces.  The  effects  of  visual  similarity  and  semantic  similarity  were  found  to  be 
independent,  suggesting  that  visual  and  semantic  analysis  can  proceed  in  parallel. 
This  idea  was  supported  by  Benton  (1980)  who  conducted  a  review  of  the 
neuropsychological  literature  and  reached  the  conclusion  that  different  cerebral 
mechanisms  were  implicated  for  familiar  and  unfamiliar  face  processing. 
The  models  of  person  recognition,  that  are  now  considered,  grew  out  of  earlier 
models  of  word  recognition  in  particular  Morton's  (1979)  logogen  model.  As  such 37 
they  are  embedded  in  the  abstractionist  tradition  discussed  earlier.  These  are 
functional  models,  which  attempt  to  explain  the  processing  stages  involve  in 
recognising  and  retrieving  information  about  people. 
Early  Models 
Hay  and  Young  (1982)  published  the  first  theoretical  framework  which 
attempted  to  explain  the  processing  stages  involved  in  recognition  of  familiar  faces 
Figure  1.3.  Hay  and  Young's  (1982)  stimulus 
model  of  the  functional  components  face 
involved  in  face  recognition. 
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(see  Figure  1.3).  This  model  made  explicit  the  idea  that  face  recognition  may  be 
signalled  by  "face  recognition  units"  (FRUs),  which  were  roughly  analogous  to  the 
lexical  units  proposed  in  the  word  recognition  literature  (e.  g.,  Morton,  1969,1979). 
The  functional  separation  of  visual  and  semantic  processes  in  this  model  provides  an 
explanation  for  the  Bruce  (1979)  data,  which  had  first  suggested  the  parallel  route 
hypothesis.  The  separate  routes  proposed  in  this  model  allow  the  independence  of 
visual  and  semantic  similarity  effects  which  Bruce  observed  to  be  accommodated.  It 
also  provides  a  route  for  the  access  of  identity-specific  semantic  information,  as 
opposed  visually  derived  semantic  information  (this  distinction  becomes  important,  in 
Chapter  5,  which  looks  at  sex  as  an  identity-specific  semantic  decision  rather  than  as 
a  visually  derived  semantic  decision).  At  the  time  of  its  publication,  there  was  little 
experimental  data  to  support  such  a  model,  the  data  from  Bruce  (1979)  being  the 
primary  source.  However,  the  model  did  make  several  predictions  which  were  later 
supported.  In  particular,  it  suggested  that  the  following  malfunctions  should  occur. 
First,  it  suggested  that  should  a  face  fail  sufficiently  to  activate  an  appropriate  FRU, 
then  familiarity  would  not  be  signalled.  Failure  to  recognise  a  colleague,  when  we 
meet  them  out  of  their  normal  context,  would  be  an  example  of  this  type  of  failure. 
Also,  this  is  exactly  the  type  of  failure  experienced  by  prosopagnosic  patients  who 39 
report  that  all  faces  appear  unfamiliar  to  them.  Second,  it  suggests  that  if  the  route 
between  the  FRU  and  `personal  information'  is  blocked,  an  FRU  may  signal 
familiarity,  but  that  access  to  personal  semantic  information  about  the  face  may  not 
be  available.  Essentially  one  would  have  a  strong  feeling  that  the  face  is  familiar 
without  knowing  anything  else  about  it.  Subjectively  this  appears  to  happen  fairly 
frequently.  Finally,  a  blockage  between  `personal  information'  and  `names'  would 
predict  that  the  face  may  be  recognised,  semantic  information  accessed,  but  that  name 
retrieval  should  fail.  This  situation  will  be  very  familiar  to  most  people  and  is,  in  fact, 
easy  to  induce  (Yarmey,  1973).  Importantly,  this  model  also  specified  situations  that 
should  never  arise.  According  to  this  framework,  it  should  be  impossible  correctly  to 
name  a  face  in  the  absence  of  semantic  information  relating  to  it. 
Young,  Hay  and  Ellis  (1985)  provided  evidence,  in  the  form  of  a  large  scale 
diary  study,  which  offered  support  for  the  Hay  and  Young  framework.  These  authors 
asked  participants  to  keep  formal  records  of  any  difficulties  they  experienced  when 
recognising  people  during  the  course  of  their  everyday  activity.  There  were  922 
reported  errors  or  difficulties  recorded  by  22  participants  over  a  seven  week  period. 
None  of  these  involved  an  inability  to  recall  semantic  information  when  the  name  was 
available.  However,  all  participants  reported  failures  of  the  type  suggested  by  the  Hay 40 
and  Young  model,  in  fact,  over  90%  of  all  errors  reported  fell  into  one  of  the  three 
main  categories  described  above. 
Young,  McWeeny,  Hay  and  Ellis  (1986)  reported  further  data  consistent  with  a 
sequence  of  processing  stages  in  which  semantic  codes  are  processed  subsequent  to 
structural  codes  but  prior  to  name  retrieval.  In  essence,  this  study  showed  that 
familiarity  decisions  (is  this  face  familiar?  )  are  faster  than  semantic  decisions  (is  this 
a  politician?  ).  Importantly,  these  authors  also  demonstrated  that  semantic  decisions 
were  easier  to  make  when  all  familiar  faces  were  drawn  from  the  same  semantic 
category,  but  that  the  use  of  consistent  or  mixed  categories  did  not  effect  RTs  for 
familiarity  decisions.  It  was  argued  that  this  experimental  manipulation  does  not 
effect  the  speed  of  the  familiarity  decision  because  such  a  decision  can  be  taken  at  the 
level  of  the  FRUs,  which  is  upstream  of  any  semantic  processing. 
Hay  and  Young's  suggestion  that  FRUs  might  function  in  a  similar  way  to 
logogens  in  models  of  word  recognition  (Morton,  1969;  Warren  &  Morton,  1982) 
was  investigated  by  Bruce  and  Valentine  (1985)  using  the  face  familiarity  decision 
task  developed  by  Bruce  (1983).  Thresholds,  in  logogen  models,  can  be  lowered 
directly  following  presentation  of  the  item  itself  (identity  or  repetition  priming),  or 
indirectly  via  the  semantic  system,  following  presentation  of  a  semantically  related 41 
item  (semantic  or  associative  priming).  The  face  familiarity  task  makes  demands  that 
are  roughly  equivalent  to  the  lexical  decision  task  used  in  word  recognition  studies. 
This  task  involves  presenting  participants  with  a  series  of  familiar  faces  intermixed 
with  unfamiliar  faces.  The  participant's  task  is  to  decide  as  quickly  as  possible 
whether  or  not  the  face  is  familiar.  Bruce  and  Valentine  (1986)  found  that  RTs  for 
familiar  faces  were  faster  if  that  same  person's  face  had  been  presented  previously  (in 
either  the  same  or  different  views).  No  facilitation  was  observed  when  the  earlier 
exposure  was  the  name  of  the  same  person.  This  implies  that  the  locus  of  this 
repetition  priming  effect  must  be  at  a  stage  earlier  than  that  which  names  are 
accessed.  As  names  and  faces  access  the  same  personal  information  in  this  model,  the 
locus  of  this  effect  must  be  upstream  of  this  module.  Bruce  and  Valentine  suggested 
that  the  FRUs  as  the  obvious  possibility. 
Additional  support  for  this  type  of  theorising  came  from  experiments  involving 
semantic  (or  associative)  priming.  Bruce  (1983)  showed  that  familiarity  decisions 
were  faster  if  a  face  was  immediately  preceded  by  that  of  a  close  associate.  For 
example,  participants  were  faster  to  decide  that  Lady  Diana's  face  was  familiar  if  it 
was  preceded  by  the  face  of  Prince  Charles,  rather  than  that  of,  say,  Tony  Blair.  Bruce 
and  Valentine  (1986)  extended  this  finding  using  a  more  elaborate  design.  In  these 42 
experiments,  the  faces  were  presented  in  pairs,  with  a  response  only  required  to  the 
second  face.  Stimulus  onset  asynchronies  (SOAs)  were  varied  between  the  prime  and 
target  faces,  and  the  effect  of  a  related  prime  was  compared  with  both  an  unrelated 
(but  familiar)  and  an  unfamiliar  (neutral)  primes.  The  main  finding  here  was  that 
significant  facilitation  was  found  for  the  related  prime  even  at  very  short  SOAs.  This 
is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  these  effects  are  mediated  by  `automatic'  spreading 
activation  within  the  semantic  system  (Neely,  1976;  Posner  &  Snyder,  1975).  In 
terms  of  the  model  proposed  by  Hay  and  Young  (1982)  these  effects  could  arise 
because  recognition  of  the  prime  face  (e.  g.,  Prince  Charles)  activates  personal 
information  relating  to  him  and  that  this  activation  spreads  to  associated  personal 
information,  which  should  include  that  information  relating  to  Lady  Diana. 
Activation  of  personal  information  should  then  lead  to  reduced  thresholds  at  Lady 
Diana's  FRU. 
These  early  findings  supported  the  idea  that  FRUs  functioned  as  threshold 
devices,  as  suggested  by  Hay  and  Young  (1982),  but  subsequent  work  revealed 
problems  with  this  account.  The  first  difficulty  is  in  interpreting  the  results  from  a 
growing  number  of  repetition  priming  studies.  In  particular,  Ellis  et  al.  (1987)  found 
that  similar  views  of  a  face  gave  more  priming  than  dissimilar  views.  This  finding  is 43 
more  consistent  with  a  visual  memory  rather  than  a  FRU  interpretation.  More 
important  was  the  finding  that  repetition  and  semantic  priming  effects  did  not 
dissipate  in  the  same  way.  Bruce  (1986)  produced  data  which  demonstrated  that 
repetition  priming  effects  showed  no  sign  of  decay  when  intervening  faces  were 
presented  between  prime  and  target  faces.  The  effect  persisted  with  up  to  11 
intervening  faces,  which  corresponded  to  a  time  lag  of  about  60  seconds.  On  the  other 
hand,  semantic  priming  effects  were  observed  only  when  the  prime  face  immediately 
preceded  the  target.  Support  for  these  differential  effects  was  provided  by  Dannebring 
and  Briand  (1982),  who  found  exactly  the  same  type  of  effects  using  words  in  a 
lexical  decision  task.  This  finding  requires  that  additional  assumptions  be  made  about 
the  functioning  of  the  FRUs.  That  is,  threshold  changes  produced  by  direct  `bottom 
up'  activation  of  an  FRU  must  be  distinguished  from  indirect  'top  down'  increases  in 
activation  from  the  semantic  system. 
In  1986,  Bruce  and  Young  produced  one  of  the  most  influential  models  in  the 
area  of  person  recognition  (see  Figure  1.4).  While  this  model  was  more  tightly 
specified,  and  broader  in  scope,  than  that  of  Hay  and  Young  (1982),  its  proposals 
regarding  access  to  semantic  information  were  essentially  the  same.  Processing  in  the 
Bruce  and  Young  (1986)  model  proceeded  in  the  following  way.  Structural  encoding 44 
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processes  produce  a  set  of  descriptions  at  different  levels  of  abstraction.  View  centred 
descriptions  provide  information  for  the  `Expression'  and  `Facial  Speech'  modules. 
However,  from  the  standpoint  of  this  thesis  it  is  the  abstract,  expression  independent, 
descriptions  that  are  of  more  interest.  These  descriptions  provide  information  for  the 
FRUs.  As  in  the  Hay  and  Young  model,  each  FRU  contains  stored  structural  codes 45 
describing  a  known  face.  At  this  point,  Bruce  and  Young  differ  from  Hay  and  Young 
and  propose  that  a  graded  signal,  at  a  level  dependent  on  degree  of  resemblance 
between  the  structural  encoding  the  stored  description,  is  passed  from  the  FRU  to  the 
cognitive  system.  It  was  suggested  that  this  graded  signal  was  used  to  determine  the 
familiarity  of  the  face.  However,  no  mechanism  was  specified  for  translating  this 
signal  into  an  explicit  decision  regarding  whether  or  not  the  face  actually  belonged  to 
a  known  person  or  simply  looked  like  one.  It  was  proposed  that  these  FRUs  had 
access  to  identity-specific  semantic  codes  held  in  a  portion  of  associative  memory, 
which  these  authors  labelled  person  identity  nodes  (PINs).  These  PINs  were  seen  as 
the  entry  point  to  the  more  general  associative  memory  system. 
It  was  further  suggested  that  the  basic  level  of  activation  of  the  FRU  can  be 
`primed',  either  directly,  because  that  face  has  recently  been  seen  (repetition 
priming),  or  indirectly  via  activation  flowing  back  from  the  PINs  to  the  FRUs 
(semantic  priming),  because  an  associated  person  has  just  been  seen.  The  problem 
with  this  account  is  that  it  fails  to  describe  the  different  nature  of  repetition  and 
semantic  priming  effects.  As  previously  discussed,  the  time  course  of  these  effects  are 
different.  Repetition  priming  is  robust  over  a  20  minute  period  (at  least),  and  survives 
several  intervening  items  between  the  study  and  test  phases  of  these  experiments. 46 
Semantic  priming,  on  the  other  hand,  is  abolished  by  only  one  intervening  item, 
Bruce  (1986).  Another  difference  is  that  semantic  priming  crosses  stimulus  domains 
(Young,  Hellawell,  &  deHaan,  1988),  whereas  repetition  priming  is  domain  specific 
(faces  do  not  prime  names  and  vice  versa).  The  differing  nature  of  these  effects 
suggests  that  they  have  different  loci  within  the  system.  The  clear  difficulty  for  the 
Bruce  and  Young  model  is  that  the  locus  of  both  effects  is  activation  at  the  level  of 
the  FRUs.  This  node  may  become  active  for  different  reasons  but  there  is  no 
mechanism  to  describe  how  it  became  active.  The  model  therefore  does  not 
distinguish  between  these  effects. 
So  while  undoubtedly  more  tightly  specified  and  greater  in  scope  than  the 
previous  model,  this  model,  like  its  predecessor,  fails  to  provide  a  sufficiently 
detailed  explanation  regarding  the  differences  observed  between  repetition  and 
semantic  priming  effects.  These  differences  were  taken  to  indicate  that  the  sources  of 
facilitation  arose  at  different  loci  within  the  recognition  system  in  each  case  (Bruce, 
1986;  Young  et  al.,  1988),  but  more  precise  specification  of  the  underlying 
mechanisms,  within  the  Bruce  and  Young  framework,  proved  difficult.  A  further 
problem  for  this  model  was  the  finding  that  a  densely  prosopagnosic  patient  (P.  H.  ) 
demonstrated  preserved  semantic  priming  (deHaan,  Young,  &  Newcombe,  1991; 47 
Young  et  al.,  1988).  Using  an  explicit  recognition  test,  this  patient  failed  to  recognise 
any  of  a  set  of  40  famous  faces  that  were  shown  to  him.  This  even  extended  to  tests 
that  might  be  regarded  as  implicit.  For  example,  he  performed  at  chance  when  asked 
to  guess  which  face  was  famous,  using  pairs  of  faces  that  contained  one  famous  and 
one  non-famous  face.  However,  when  tested  with  the  same  people's  names,  he  was 
able  to  provide  correct  information  for  some  90%  of  the  names  presented,  clearly 
demonstrating  that  had  not  forgotten  that  he  knew  the  people  concerned.  By  using 
faces  as  primes  and  names  as  targets,  Young  et  al.  (1988)  were  able  to  demonstrate 
that  this  patient  showed  the  normal  pattern  of  semantic  priming.  Further,  they  showed 
the  same  pattern  irrespective  of  whether  faces  or  names  were  used  at  the  study  phase. 
Taken  together,  the  effects  of  repetition  priming,  semantic  priming  and  covert 
recognition  in  prosopagnosia,  were  difficult  to  accommodate  within  the  Bruce  and 
Young  framework.  In  order  to  accommodate  such  effects  are  more  detailed  model 
was  necessary. 
IAC  Models 
Using  a  localist  connectionist  procedure,  similar  to  that  described  by 
McCelland  and  Rumelhart  (1981),  Burton  Bruce  and  Johnston  (  1990),  produced  an 48 
implemented  model  of  the  person  identification  route  in  Bruce  and  Young's  model. 
This  model  must  be  regarded  as  a  model  of  familiar  person  recognition  and  has 
nothing  to  say  regarding  processing  that  can  be  undertaken  on  unfamiliar  faces  (e.  g., 
expression  analysis,  facial  speech  analysis).  This  model  is  important  because  it  is 
sufficiently  detailed  to  provide  an  account  of  the  repetition  and  semantic  priming 
effects,  as  well  as  those  effects  observed  in  covert  recognition  in  prosopagnosia. 
Figure  1.5  shows  a  recent  version  of  this  model  (Burton  &  Bruce,  1992).  It  is  a 
simple  interactive  activation  and  competition  (IAC)  network  based  on  the  architecture 
described  by  McClelland  (1981).  It  is  made  up  of  simple  processing  units  clustered 
into  pools.  Within  each  pool  the  units  are  mutually  connected  with  inhibitory  links. 
The  links  between  pairs  of  units  in  separate  pools  are  excitatory  and  all  links  are  bi- 
directional.  There  are  four  pools  of  units  in  the  central  architecture.  Face  recognition 
units  (FRUs)  are  intended  to  code  known  individuals'  faces.  There  is  one  unit  per 
known  face,  and  these  become  active  on  presentation  of  any  recognisable  view  of  the 
face.  The  name  recognition  units  (NRUs)  code  the  names  of  known  individuals  and 
operate  in  analogous  fashion  to  the  FRUs.  The  person  identity  nodes  (PINs)  represent 
the  level  of  a  person,  not  tied  to  the  mode  of  recognition,  and  different  recognition 
routes  converge  here.  This  is  a  key  feature  of  the  model.  By  explicitly  separating  the 49 
Figure  1.5 
PINs  from  semantic  information,  it  is  possible  to  access  the  PINs  and  hence  achieve  a 
sense  of  familiarity,  without  accessing  semantic  information.  Finally,  there  is  a  pool 
of  semantic  information  units  (SIUs)  representing  individual  semantic  propositions. 
In  developing  this  model,  Burton  et  al.  (1990)  proposed  that  familiarity 
decisions  are  taken  at  the  PIN  level.  A  common  activation  threshold  is  set  for  all  units 50 
within  the  pool  and  familiarity  is  signalled  if  any  unit  passes  this  threshold.  A  similar 
mechanism  operates  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  in  order  to  signal  semantic  decisions. 
Repetition  priming  on  to  familiarity  decisions  is  captured  in  the  model  by 
appealing  to  Hebb-like  link  strengthening  between  between  FRUs  or  NRUs  and  their 
respective  PINs  (Burton  et  al.,  1990).  This  priming  does  not  cross  domains,  because 
the  strengthening  of  the  FRU-PIN  link  (which  occurs  on  presentation  of  face)  gives 
no  subsequent  advantage  for  recognition  through  the  NRU-PIN  link  on  presentation 
of  a  name  (or  vice  versa).  Recently,  however,  repetition  priming  has  been  observed 
across  domains  on  to  semantic  decisions  because,  in  addition  to  the  FRU  or  NRU  and 
PIN  links,  the  PIN-SIU  links  are  also  strengthened  (Burton,  Kelly,  &  Bruce,  1998, 
experiment  2).  Irrespective  of  the  stimulus  domain,  priming  should  occur  if  a  shared 
link  has  been  previously  strengthened,  by  an  appropriate  name  or  face,  during  the 
priming  phase.  As  a  consequence  of  the  global  architecture  of  this  model,  all  PIN-SIU 
links  are  strengthened,  so  this  priming  will  persist  even  when  different  semantic 
decisions  are  required  at  study  and  test  (Burton  et  al.,  1998,  experiment  3). 
Reading  names  or  producing  a  name  in  response  to  a  definition  also  primes 
subsequent  naming  of  faces.  This  priming  across  stimulus  domains  takes  advantage 51 
of  link  strengthening  between  PINs  and  SIUs  and  also  between  the  SIUs  and  LOUs 
(lexical  output  units)  (Ellis,  Flude,  Young,  &  Burton,  1996). 
The  mechanism  to  account  for  semantic  priming  involves  the  interaction  of 
PINs  and  SIUs.  When  a  particular  PIN  is  activated,  either  by  it's  associated  FRU  or 
NRU,  activation  from  the  PIN  flows  to  the  SIUs  that  are  connected  to  it.  Some 
activation  flows  back  from  these  SIUs  to  PINs  that  share  semantic  features  with  the 
original  person,  taking  activation  in  any  such  PIN  above  its  resting  level.  For 
example,  suppose  input  is  given  to  the  FRU  of  John  Lennon.  Activation  flows  to  John 
Lennon's  PIN,  which  in  turn  activates  the  SIUs  with  which  he  is  associated  (e.  g., 
Beatle,  songwriter,  British,  etc.  ).  As  Paul  McCartney's  PIN  is  also  connected  to  many 
of  the  same  SIUs,  activation  spreads  back  to  Paul  McCartney's  PIN  taking  it  above 
its  resting  level.  The  level  of  this  `above  resting  activation'  depends  on  how  many 
semantic  features  are  shared.  If  at  this  point  input  is  given  to  Paul  McCartney's  FRU, 
activation  will  flow  to  his  PIN,  which  will  reach  threshold  faster  than  had  it  started  at 
resting  level,  and  this  is  the  basis  of  the  facilitatory  effect. 
Another  strength  of  this  account  is  that  it  provides  a  simple  explanation  for  the 
phenomena  of  covert  recognition  in  prosopagnosia.  This  effect  can  be  simulated  by 52 
simply  by  halving  the  connection  strengths  between  FRUs  and  PINs  (Burton,  Young, 
Bruce,  Johnston,  &  Ellis,  1991). 
A  development  of  the  Burton  et  al.  implemented  model  was  offered  by  Brddart 
et  al  (1995).  The  primary  purpose  was  to  investigate  why  person  naming  always 
comes  after  retrieval  of  semantic  information  in  the  processing  hierarchy.  Burton  and 
Bruce  (1992)  had  previously  offered  an  explanation  for  this  finding  in  terms  of  the 
uniqueness  of  names.  However,  Bredart  et  al.  (1995)  argue  that  a  side  effect  of  this 
proposal  is  the  prediction  that  the  more  you  know  about  a  person  the  harder  it  would 
be  to  retrieve  their  name.  This  follows  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  architecture  of 
the  model.  Many  known  facts  will  activate  many  SIUs  which  will  in  turn  inhibit  the 
name  SIU  of  the  person  concerned. 
Bredart  et  al.  's  solution  to  this  problem  posed  by  the  relative  difficulty  of  name 
retrieval  was  to  propose  that  names  are  stored  separately  from  other  semantic 
information  but  accessed  in  parallel.  Their  model  included  one  pool  of  token  markers 
(equivalent  to  PINs  in  the  Burton  et  al.  model),  one  pool  of  names,  and  several  pools 
of  semantic  properties  such  as  occupation,  nationality  or  political  opinion  (see  Figure 
1.6).  This  model  was  able  to  replicate  the  interesting  properties  of  the  Burton  et  al. 
model  and  also  account  for  the  fact  that  names  are  more  difficult  to  retrieve  than 53 
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identity-specific  semantic  information.  There  must,  of  course,  be  links  from  the  SIUs 
in  this  model  to  lexical  output  units.  These  links  are  made  explicit  in  subsequent 
versions  of  the  model  (see  Valentine,  Brennnen,  &  Bredart,  1996).  This  would  lead  to 
the  prediction  that  one  should  be  faster  to  say  someone's  name  rather  than  their 
occupation,  as  there  is  one  less  processing  stage  involved  in  such  a  decision, 54 
according  to  this  model.  This  prediction  would  appear  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
large  body  of  evidence  that  suggests  semantic  decisions  are  made  faster  than  naming 
decisions.  Recent  data,  demonstrating  that  naming  is  slower  than  making  a  semantic 
decision,  is  also  inconsistent  with  this  prediction  of  the  Bredart  et  al.  model  (Burton, 
Jenkins,  &  McNeill,  2002). 
More  importantly,  the  models  above  provide  a  starting  point  to  study  the 
organisation  of  semantic  knowledge  for  familiar  people.  In  the  Burton  et  al.  model 
semantic  information  is  stored  in  an  undifferentiated  away.  The  Bredart  et  al.  model 
suggest  that  this  knowledge  is  organised  in  separate  pools  such  as  occupation, 
nationality,  etc.  Early  experiments  in  this  thesis  will  test  differential  predictions 
derived  from  these  competing  accounts. 
Before  moving  to  the  experimental  sections  of  this  thesis,  we  need  briefly  to 
address  two  further  issues.  First,  there  has  been  considerable  debate  in  the  literature 
about  whether  semantic  priming  effects  are  in  fact  due  to  associative  or  categorial 
relationships  (Barry,  Johnston,  &  Scanlan,  1998;  Brennen  &  Bruce,  1991;  Young, 
Flude,  Hellawell,  &  Ellis,  1994),  and  this  debate  echoes  a  similar  division  in  the  word 
recognition  literature  (Lupker,  1984;  Shelton  &  Martin,  1992).  Under  a  categorial 
account,  pairs  of  items  prime  each  other  precisely  because  of  their  semantic 55 
relationship.  So,  membership  of  a  common  category  is itself  the  mechanism 
underlying  priming  because  category  membership  provides  a  definitional  relationship 
between  the  items.  In  contrast,  associative  accounts  rely  on  the  fact  that  related  items 
have  common  associations.  Under  the  IAC  account  of  semantic  priming,  described 
above,  pairs  of  items  are  related  to  the  extent  that  their  PINs  share  common  SIUs. 
However  there  is  no  inherent  structure  in  these  PIN-SIU  relationships;  links  to  one 
SIU  do  not  imply  links  to  other,  semantically  related  propositions.  The  relationship 
between  people  is  therefore  based  on  those  SIUs  with  which  each  has  been 
associatively  linked,  and  which  they  happen  to  share  in  common.  A  different  version 
of  the  associative  account  relies  on  simple  co-occurrence  of  two  items;  for  example, 
related  people  will  tend  to  be  seen  together.  This  categorial/associative  issue  is 
unresolved  empirically,  and  is  currently  the  focus  of  much  research  (e.  g.,  Carson  & 
Burton,  2001).  The  problem  for  research  attempting  to  draw  the  distinction 
empirically  is  that  many  items  which  are  related  associatively  will  also  be  related  in  a 
categorial  fashion.  Although  the  experiments  in  this  thesis  are  not  designed  explicitly 
to  address  this  issue,  they  may  have  some  bearing  on  it,  and  we  will  return  to  a 
discussion  of  the  semantic/associative  distinction  in  the  final  chapter.  Throughout 56 
this  thesis,  no  distinction  will  be  made  between  semantic  and  associative  relations, 
and  the  terms  semantic  and  associative  priming  will  be  used  interchangeably. 
The  second  issue  for  consideration  is  the  much  more  general  theoretical 
division  between  abstractionist  accounts  of  priming,  such  as  that  contained  within  the 
IAC  model,  and  episode-based  theories.  Episodic  accounts  of  priming  (e.  g.,  Blaxton, 
1989;  Jacoby,  1983a;  Jacoby  &  Brooks,  1984;  Weldon,  Roediger,  &  Challis,  1989) 
emphasise  the  retrieval  of  stored  event  memories.  Retrieval  (or  re-activation)  of 
information  about  the  priming  episode  facilitates  processing  on  the  second  encounter 
with  the  stimulus.  This  type  of  theory  can  accommodate  much  of  the  repetition 
priming  data.  For  instance,  the  fact  that  face  recognition  (in  a  familiarity  task)  is 
facilitated  by  prior  presentation  of  a  face  but  not  by  prior  presentation  of  a  name,  is 
consistent  with  this  type  of  account.  However,  experiments  in  which  decision-type  is 
manipulated  can  sometimes  provide  patterns  of  priming  which  are  much  harder  to 
accommodate  in  episodic  terms  (e.  g.,  Burton  et  al.,  1998;  Ellis,  Young,  &  Flude, 
1990). 
The  theoretical  debate  between  structural  and  episodic  accounts  of  priming  is 
most  commonly  applied  to  repetition  priming.  However,  the  issue  emerges  in 
semantic  priming  too.  For  example,  Young  et  al.  (1994)  demonstrated  semantic 57 
priming  for  familiarity  decisions  but  not  for  sex  decisions.  This  finding  suggests  that 
priming  is  a  consequence  of  changes  within  the  person  recognition  system  and  is 
consistent  with  structural  accounts.  An  episodic  view  of  priming  sits  most  easily  with 
the  position  that  semantic  priming  is  in  fact  associative  priming,  and  that  facilitation 
is  observed  when  subjects  bring  to  bear  previous  episodes  of  seeing  two  people 
together.  Although  this  thesis  does  not,  of  course,  resolve  this  issue,  some  of  the 
experiments  below  provide  some  converging  evidence  for  a  structural,  rather  than  an 
episodic  view  of  semantic  priming. 
SUMMARY  OF  PERSON  RECOGNITION  MODELS 
Researchers  adopting  an  information  processing  approach,  based  on  logogens 
as  proposed  in  models  of  word  recognition,  has  led  to  functional  models  describing 
the  processing  stages  in  person  recognition  (Bruce  &  Young,  1986;  Hay  &  Young, 
1982).  The  analogy  between  person  recognition  and  word  recognition  was  supported 
by  comparisons  of  repetition  and  semantic  priming  effects  (e.  g.,  Bruce,  1986).  A 
hierarchical  system  was  postulated  in  which  structural  codes  derived  from  a  face  (or 
other  input  modality)  are  compared  to  face  (or  other  modality)  recognition  units. 
Identity  specific  semantic  information  can  then  be  accessed  and  finally  the  person's 
name  can  be  retrieved.  Evidence  for  such  models  was  derived  from  diverse  literatures 58 
including;  diary  studies  (Young  et  al.,  1985),  experimental  psychology  (e.  g.,  Young, 
Mcweeny,  Ellis  et  al.,  1986;  Young,  Mcweeny,  Hay  et  al.,  1986),  and 
neuropsychology  (e.  g.,  Flude  et  al.,  1989). 
These  models  offer  a  parsimonious  explanation  of  wide  ranging  data  in  the 
person  recognition  area  and  will  be  used  guide  the  experiments  reported  in  this  thesis. 
However,  these  models  are  currently  under-specified  in  terms  of  how  semantic 
information  about  familiar  people  might  be  structured. 
OUTLINE  OF  EXPERIMENTAL  SECTION 
The  experimental  section  of  this  thesis  will  seek  to  find  new  data  exploring  the 
structure  of  semantic  memory  for  familiar  people. 
In  Chapter  2,  semantic  priming  using  a  semantic  decision  is  examined.  Priming 
of  this  particular  type  is  found  for  the  first  time.  This  new  semantic  priming  technique 
is  then  combined  with  an  intervening  item  in  order  to  compare  predictions  derived 
from  the  models  of  Burton  et  al.  (1990)  and  Bredart  et  al.  (1995).  The  first  model, 
(Burton  et  al.,  1990),  suggests  that  semantic  is  contained  in  on  large  undifferentiated 
pool,  the  other  (Bredart  et  al.,  1995)  suggests  that  such  information  may  be  contained 59 
in  smaller  pools  which  code  biographical  details  such  as  occupation  and  nationality. 
These  experiments  fail  to  discriminate  between  the  models. 
Chapter  3  pursues  the  task  of  discriminating  between  these  models  by  using  a 
semantic  interference  technique,  but  again  fails  to  discriminate  between  the  models. 
Chapter  4  takes  a  step  backwards,  seeking  to  determine  the  true  nature  of  the 
semantic  priming  effect  observed  in  Chapter  2,  and  the  locus  of  this  effect  is 
established. 
Chapter  5  examines  the  categorisation  of  sex  (traditionally  viewed  as  visually 
derived  semantic  property)  as  an  identity-specific  semantic  property  and  reports  new 
data  which  suggest  that  sex  categorisation  can  tap  similar  processes  as  those  involved 
in  other  identity-specific  classifications. 60 
CHAPTER  TWO 
Exploring  Intervening  Item  Effects 
OVERVIEW 
A  major  limitation  of  current  IAC  models  of  person  recognition  is  that  they  do 
not  provide  an  adequate  model  of  semantic  memory  for  familiar  people.  The  starting 
point  for  this  chapter  is  that  the  current  models  of  memory  for  personal  information 
are  not  satisfactory.  Broad  models  have  been  proposed  but  these  have  not  been 
subject  to  experimental  investigation.  In  this  chapter,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to 
discriminate  between  two  broad  categories  of  explanation. 
Two  popular  contemporary  theories  about  memory  for  personal  information  are 
the  models  proposed  by  Burton  et  al.  (1990)  and  Bredart  et  al.  (1995).  Burton  and 
colleagues'  model  has  already  been  described  in  detail  in  Chapter  1.  In  this  model, 
semantic  information  is  stored  in  a  single  undifferentiated  pool.  Within  this  pool,  all 
information  is  connected  in  inhibitory  fashion,  and  differences  in  the  ease  of  access  to 
this  information  is  due  to  the  pattern  of  connections  outside  the  pool,  rather  than  to 
structure  within  it.  Brddart  et  al.  's  model  was  also  described  in  Chapter  1  and  is 
similar  in  many  ways.  However,  one  important  difference  is  that,  in  this  model, 
semantic  information  is  clustered  into  small  pools,  each  representing  the  range  of possible  values  for  a  particular  attribute.  For  example,  there  is  a  pool  of  information 
representing  possible  nationalities,  another  for  possible  occupations  and  so  forth. 
Figure  2.1  compares  the  structure  of  both  models. 
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The  differing  structure  of  the  models  regarding  the  storage  of  semantic 
information  gives  rise  to  different  predictions  about  patterns  of  semantic  priming 
which  might  be  expected  when  semantic  information  is  retrieved.  In  order  to 
understand  why  each  model  makes  a  different  prediction  about  the  pattern  of 
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semantic  priming  effects  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  look  at  how  theory  in  this  area 
Adopted  from  &Wert  it  it.  (1995) 62 
has  been  influenced  by  the  findings  from  experiments  which  have  examined  semantic 
Priming  effects. 
Semantic  priming  in  the  area  of  person  recognition  has  been  fullY  described  in 
Chapter  I.  Therefore,  the  brief  review  that  follows  will  focus  only  those  findings  that 
are  directlY  pertinent  to  the  question  of  differentiating  between  the  above  models.  In  a 
tYpical  semantic  prin-ýng  experiment,  participants  are  asked  to  make  a  judgement 
about  a  face  (usually  a  familiar/unfamiliar  judgement)  as  fast  as  possible.  Responses 
are  usually  faster  to  an  item  if  it  has  been  preceded  by  a  related  item.  So,  for  example, 
Participants  are  faster  to  recognise  Eric  More6mbe  if  he  was  preceded  by  Ernie  Wise 
than  if  he  was  preceded  by  John  Lennon  (Bruce  &  Valentine,  1986).  It  is  well  known 
that  this  effect  is  short-lived,  and  can  be  destroyed  by  an  intervening  unrelated  item. 
For  example,  a  fast  sequence  of  Wise-Lennon-Morecambe  gives  no  prin-dng,  even 
though  a  sequence  of  Wise-blank-Morecambe  lasting  the  same  time,  produces 
Priming  (Bruce,  1986).  Support  for  the  idea  that  semantic  prin-ýdng  is  eliminated  by  an 
intervening  item  is  provided  by  (Dannenbring  &  Briand,  1982)  who  report  simflar 
effects  using  words. 
Explanations  of  this  effect  commonly  rely  on  the  idea  that  an  intervening  item 
of  wipes  clean"  activation  of  a  concept  within  a  representational  pool,  and  it  is  this 63 
property  that  will  be  recruited,  in  the  following  experiments,  in  an  attempt  to 
discriminate  between  the  models. 
Burton  et  al.  (1990)  offers  an  explanation  of  the  time  course  of  the  semantic 
priming  effects  described  above,  within  an  interactive  activation  and  competition 
Figure  2.2  (Adapted  from  Burton  et  al.,  1990) 
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model.  Figure  2.2  (adaptcd  from  Burton  et  al.,  1990)  simulates  the  activation  levels  of 
two  PINs  during  the  course  of  a  basic  (i.  e.,  no  intervening  item)  semantic  priming 
experiment.  These  simulations  assume  that  a  push  button  response,  in  a  familiarity 
decision  task,  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  appropriate  PIN  reaching  threshold. 
The  number  of  cycles  necessary  for  a  PIN  to  reach  this  threshold  may  be  seen  as  an 
estimate  of  the  time  necessary  to  access  this  person's  identity. 64 
In  this  demonstration,  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  has  been  activated,  and  the 
'Prince  Charles'  PIN  consequently  becomes  active.  As  this  PIN  rises,  the 
semantically  associated  PIN  for  'Princess  Diana'  also  rises.  Figure  2.1  shows  that  the 
'Prince  Charles'  PIN  reaches  threshold  quite  quickly  (after  about  25  cycles).  The 
'Princess  Diana'  PIN  also  rises,  but  stabilises  well  below  threshold.  After  80  cycles, 
activation  to  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  is  switched  off,  and  the  simulation  is  run  for  a 
further  80  cycles  with  no  external  input.  This  period,  devoid  of  external  activation, 
represents  the  inter-stimulus-interval  period  of  a  behavioural  experiment.  During  this 
period,  the  'Prince  Charles'  PIN  falls  quickly  below  threshold.  The  'Princess  Diana' 
PIN,  however,  decays  more  slowly.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  this  PIN  continues  to 
receive  activation,  via  semantic  units  shared  with  Prince  Charles,  which  initially 
outweigh  the  effects  of  decay.  After  the  'inter-stimulus-interval'  of  80  cycles, 
activation  is  applied  to  the  'Princess  Diana'  FRU.  As  the  'Princess  Diana'  PIN  starts 
with  above  resting  activation,  it  reaches  threshold  faster  (i.  e.,  in  fewer  cycles)  than 
did  the  'Prince  Charles'  PIN  on  the  initial  presentation  There  is  a  large  amount  of 
behavioural  data  which  supports  this  model  of  semantic  priming  (e.  g.,  Bruce  & 
Valentine,  1986). Figure  2.3  (Adapted  from  Burton  et  al.,  1990),  shows  how  this  semantic 
Prirning  effect  is  abolished  by  an  intervening  item.  The  first  160  cycles  in  this 
simulation  are  exactly  as  in  Figure  2.1:  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  is  activated  for  80 
cycles,  followed  by  80  cycles  with  no  activation.  At  this  point,  the  FRU  of  an 
unrelated  item  is  activated.  The  simulation  shows  the  effect  of  this  unrelated  item. 
Within-pool  inhibition,  from  the  unrelated  item,  drives  the  'Lady  Diana'  PIN  down 
towards  its  resting  level  of  activation,  thus  abolishing  the  advantage  that  led  to  the 
Priming  effect  in  the  previous  demonstration.  So,  if  Diana's  face  were  now  presented 
(by  activating  her  FRU),  no  advantage  would  be  observed. 
In  summary,  these  simulations  suggest  that  above  resting  levels  of  activation  at 
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a  given  PIN  is  the  mechanism  that  accounts  for  the  semantic  priming  effect,  and  that 
Figure  2.3  (Adapted  from  Burton  et  al.,  1990) 66 
this  effect  is  abolished  by  'within-pool  inhibition'  from  an  intervening  item,  rather 
than  by  the  simple  passage  of  time.  This  simulation  supports  the  behavioural 
experiments  using  intervening  items  reported  by  Bruce  (1986).  The  key  point  is  that 
6  within-pool  inhibition'  is  the  mechanism  that  abolishes  the  prin-ýing  effect.  If  an 
intervening  item  does  indeed  abolish  semantic  priming,  via  the  mechanism  of  within- 
pool  inhibition,  then  it  should  be  possible  to  use  this  effect  to  discover  how 
information  is  clustered  into  pools. 
The  above  demonstrations  simulate  the  semantic  priming  effect  when  a 
familiarity  decision  is  required.  Can  the  same  logic  be  applied  to  semantic  decisions? 
Theoretically,  there  is  no  problem  with  this  proposal.  Just  as  there  is  a  common 
threshold  for  signalling  familiarity  decisions  within  the  PIN  pool,  there  is  a  similar 
common  threshold,  within  the  SIU  pool,  that  signals  semantic  decisions.  Any  SITJ 
crossing  this  threshold  signals  retrieval  of  that  piece  of  semantic  information  (Burton 
et  al.,  1998).  Both  the  Burton  et  al.  and  the  Br6dart  et  al.  models  appeal  to  this  same 
mechanism  to  signal  retrieval  of  semantic  information.  If  a  PIN  can  be  'primed'  by  an 
associated  item,  then  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  an  SlU  can  be  'primed'  in  a 
similar  fashion.  Further,  if  an  SJU  can  be  'primed'  then  it  should  be  possible  to 67 
abolish  this  priming  using  an  intervening  item.  Of  course,  the  semantic  properties  of 
this  intervening  item  will  need  to  be  carefully  controlled. 
To  date,  however,  there  have  been  no  attempts  to  use  semantic  decisions  in  a 
semantic  priming  paradigm.  Therefore,  no  experimental  evidence  is  available  which 
might  guide  predictions  using  this  technique.  However,  an  advantage  of  both  models 
is  that  they  have  been  implemented  and  can  be  therefore  be  used  to  generate  explicit 
predictions.  So,  in  the  absence  of  useful  empirical  data,  the  Burton  et  a].  model  will 
be  used  to  simulate  semantic  priming  effects,  using  decisions  at  the  semantic  level. 
These  predictions  will  be  used  to  guide  the  experiments  presented  in  the  later  part  of 
this  chapter. 
The  previous  simulations  reported  here  (using  data  from  Burton  et  al,  1990), 
modelled  semantic  priming  on  to  afamiliarity  decision,  which  occurs  at  the  level  of 
the  PINs.  Here  we  will  model  semantic  decisions,  which  are  signalled  at  the  level  of 
the  SlUs.  The  following  simulations  use  a  recent  instantiation  of  the  Burton  et  a]. 
model,  as  reported  in  Young  and  Burton  (1999)  (Appendix  1,  gives  the  parameters  of 
this  model). 
These  simulations  assume  that  a  push  button  response  in  a  semantic  decision 
task  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  appropriate  SIU  reaching  threshold.  The  number 68 
Of  cycles  necessary  for  a  unit  to  reach  this  threshold  may  be  seen  as  an  estimate  of  the 
time  necessary  to  access  information  represented  by  this  unit.  Of  course,  responses  in 
experiments  of  this  nature  require  decision  processes  and  motor  response  processes 
that  are  not  modelled  here.  However,  both  Burton  et  a].  and  Brddart  et  aL,  make  the 
assumption  that  these  factors  are  equivalent  across  different  conditions  in  this  type  of 
experiment. 
SIMULATION  2.1 
The  first  demonstration  simulates  the  basic  semantic  prin-ýing  effect  (i.  e.,  no 
intervening  item),  this  time  using  a  semantic  decision.  Figure  2.4  shows  the  activation 
levels  of  two  SlUs  (British  and  American)  during  the  sequential  activation  of  the 
following  FRUs:  'Prince  Charles'  -  'Lady  Diana'.  In  this  demonstration,  the  'Prince 
Figure  2.4 69 
Charles'  FRU  has  been  activated,  this  FRU  passes  activation  to  the  'Prince  Charles' 
PIN,  and  the  'British'  SlU  consequently  becomes  active.  This  'British'  SlU  reaches 
threshold  quite  quickly  (after  about  35  cycles),  and  within-pool  inhibition  drives  the 
'American'  SIU  slightly  below  it's  resting  activation.  After  80  cycles,  activation  to 
the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  is  switched  off,  and  the  simulation  is  run  for  a  further  80 
cycles  with  no  external  input.  During  this  period,  the  'British'  SIU  falls  quickly 
below  threshold,  but  remains  above  it's  resting  level.  After  this  'inter-stimulus- 
interval'  of  80  cycles,  activation  is  applied  to  the  'Princess  Diana'  FRU.  Activation 
flows  from  the  'Princess  Diana'  FRU  to  the  PIN  and  on  to  the  SIUs.  As  the  'British' 
SIU  starts  with  above  resting  activation,  it  reaches  threshold  faster  than  it  did  when 
'Prince  Charles'  was  presented.  This  simulation  therefore  predicts  that  semantic 
priming  should  be  observed  on  to  a  semantic  decision.  This  prediction  will  be  tested 
in  Experiment  1. 
SIMULATION  2.2 
The  following  demonstrations  simulate  the  semantic  priming  effect  on  to  a 
semantic  decision  (nationality)  when  an  intervening  item  is  present.  Figure  2.5  shows 
the  activation  levels  of  the  same  two  SIUs  (British  and  American)  during  the 70 
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Pý  ChwWW  .  'Hugh  QMW  P  %.  bdy  WnW 
ISO 
Threshold 
100  - 
60  - 
0 
Z 1 
.  641 
-10. 
-160 
0 
COOS  X  10 
-0- 
obeh  SIU  -41-AM~  51U 
sequential  activation  of  the  following  FRUs:  'Prince  Charles'  -  'Hugh  Grant'  -  'Lady 
Diana'.  'Hugh  Grant'  is  an  unrelated  intervening  item,  which  shares  nationality  with 
the  prime  and  target.  The  first  160  cycles  in  this  simulation  are  exactly  as  in  Figure 
2.3;  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  is  activated,  followed  by  80  cycles  with  no  activation. 
At  this  point,  the  FRU  of  an  unrelated  but  same  nationality  item  (Hugh  Grant)  is 
activated.  The  simulation  shows  the  effect  of  this  'intervening  item'  at  the  SlUs. 
Activation  flows  from  the  'Hugh  Grant'  FRU  to  the  PIN  to  the  'British'  SIU,  and  it 
quickly  passes  threshold.  in  fact,  the  'British'  SIU  passes  threshold  just  as  quickly  as 
it  did  in  the  previous  simulation,  when  'Lady  Diana'  followed  'Prince  Charles'.  This 
simulation  therefore  predicts  that  semantic  priming,  in  a  semantic  decision  task, 
should  survive  an  intervening  item,  as  long  as  the  intervening  item  shares  the 
property  in  question  with  the  prime  and  target  stimuli. 71 
An  interesting  aspect  of  this  simulation  is  that  it  appears  to  suggest  that 
categorially  related  stimuli  pairs  (e.  g.,  Prince  Charles  -  Hugh  Grant,  who  are  both 
'British')  should  produce  just  as  much  priming  on  to  nationality  decision,  as 
associatively  related  pairs  (e.  g.,  Prince  Charles  -  Lady  Diana,  who  share  many 
properties).  This  suggestion  appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  previous  studies  in  this 
area,  which  have  used  a  familiarity  decision  at  test.  These  experiments  have 
consistently  shown  that  stimulus  pairs  must  be  very  closely  related  in  order  for 
semantic  priming  to  occur  (e.  g.,  Barry  et  al.,  1998;  Young  et  al.,  1994;  though  see, 
Carson  &  Burton,  200  1,  for  an  alternative  view).  However,  the  debate  about  whether 
these  effects  are  mediated  by  categorial  or  associative  relationships  is  not  directly 
relevant  to  the  question  that  is  asked  in  this  chapter  and  is  not  discussed  further  at  his 
point  (this  issue  will  be  revisited  in  Chapter  4). 
SIMULATION  2.3 
Figure  2.6  shows  the  activation  levels  of  the  same  two  SIUs  (British  and 
American)  during  the  sequential  activation  of  the  following  FRUs:  'Prince  Charles'  - 
'Bruce  Willis'  -  'Lady  Diana.  'Bruce  Willis'  is  an  unrelated  intervening  item,  which 
does  not  share  nationality  with  the  prime  and  target.  Again,  the  first  160  cycles  in  this 72 
simulation  are  exactly  as  in  Figure  2.3;  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  is  activated, 
followed  by  80  cycles  with  no  activation.  At  this  point,  the  FRU  of  an  unrelated 
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different  nationality  item  (Bruce  Willis)  is  activated.  The  simulation  shows  the  effect 
of  this  'intervening  item'  at  the  SIUs.  Activation  flows  from  the  'Bruce  Willis,  FRU 
to  the  PIN  to  the  'American'  SIU.  As  the  'American'  SIU  rises,  the  'British'  SIU 
falls.  This  happens  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  there  is  no  external  activation  flowing  to 
the  'British'  SIU,  as  the  input  to  the  'Prince  Charles'  FRU  has  now  been  switched 
off.  Secondly,  in  the  absence  of  this  external  activation,  the  within-pool  inhibition 
from  the  "American"  SlU  (and  any  other  SlUs  connected  to  the  'Bruce  Willis,  PIN) 73 
drives  the  'British'  SIU  down.  In  these  circumstances  the  'British'  SIU  falls  quickly 
below  it's  resting  level. 
For  the  Burton  et  a].  model,  these  simulations  predict  that  semantic  priming  in  a 
nationality  decision  task  should  survive  an  intervening  item,  but  only  if  the 
intervening  item  shares  nationality  with  the  prime  and  target.  If  not,  then  within-pool 
inhibition  should  abolish  the  priýning  effect.  It  is  worth  emphasising  here  that  it  is  not 
within-pool  inhibition,  per  se,  which  abolishes  semantic  priming,  rather  it  is  the  effect 
of  within-pool  inhibition  in  the  absence  of  positive  activation  to  that  node  which 
relates  to  the  decision  question.  If  the  node  in  question  is  receiving  positive  input, 
from  outside  the  pool,  then  standard  inhibition,  from  within,  will  not  overcome  this. 
The  above  simulations  show,  first  of  all,  that  it  should  be  possible  to  observe 
semantic  prirrdng  on  to  a  semantic  decision.  Secondly,  they  offer  the  possibility  that 
by  using  carefully  controlled  intervening  items,  within  a  semantic  priming  paradigm, 
i  erentiate  between  the  models  of  Burton  et  al.,  and  Br6dart  et  it  may  be  possible  to  d  ff 
al.  In  general  terms,  if  semantic  information  is  stored  in  an  undifferentiated  way  (as 
Proposed  by  Burton  et  al.  )  then  any  intervening  decision  that  does  not  share  the 
decision  property  with  the  prime  and  target  might  abolish  priming.  If  semantic 
information  is  stored  in  different  pools,  as  suggested  by  Br6dart:  et  al.,  then  only  those 74 
intervening  items,  which  tap  the  same  representational  pool  (and  which  do  not  share 
the  decision  property)  as  the  prime  and  target  have  the  potential  to  abolish  the 
priming  effect. 
According  to  Burton  et  al.,  any  decision  to  an  intervening  item  which  does  not 
share  the  decision  property  with  prime  and  target  should  eliminate  (or  at  least  reduce) 
prin-ýing.  For  Brddart  et  al.,  only  those  decisions  which  are  related  to  semantic  nodes 
within  the  same  pool  as  the  prime  and  target,  should  produce  a  similar  reduction  in 
the  priming  effect. 
EXPERIMENT  2.1 
Before  looking  at  the  effects  of  an  intervening  item  on  semantic  priming  in  a 
semantic  decision  task,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  that  the  basic  semantic  priming 
exists  when  a  semantic  decision  is  used.  While  semantic  priming  has  been  reliably 
found  when  a  familiarity  decision  is  required  (e.  g.,  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1986;  Young 
et  al.,  1994),  there  are  no  data  available  relating  to  semantic  priming  using  semantic 
decisions.  Therefore,  in  the  first  experiment  we  simply  ask  whether  semantic  priming 
of  person  recognition  can  be  observed  when  a  semantic  decision  is  required  at  test.  As 
shown  earlier,  Burton  et  al.  's  IAC  model  predicts  semantic  priming  onto  a  semantic 75 
decision.  Therefore,  in  this  experiment,  a  similar  pattern  of  responding  might  be 
expected  for  semantic  decision  conditions  as  has  previously  been  reported  for 
familiarity  decisions  (Bruce  and  Valentine,  1986). 
It  is  a  well-established  property  of  semantic  priming  that  the  same  pattern  of 
results  can  be  observed  using  either  name  or  face  stimuli,  and  this  is  accommodated 
in  structural  models  by  proposing  that  the  effect  relies  on  processes  which  follow 
convergence  of  recognition  routes  for  names  and  faces.  For  simplicity,  this 
experiment  uses  name  stimuli  as  both  primes  and  targets. 
Method 
Participants 
Fourteen  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in 
the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment.  In  order  to  ensure  that  participants  were 
familiar  with  the  critical  items,  anyone  scoring  less  than  75%  correct,  in  any  cell  of 
the  design,  was  replaced. 
Materials 
The  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  the  names  of  72  famous  people 
organised  into  three  lists  of  twelve  associated  pairs  (see  Appendix  2).  Each  list  of  12 
pairs  contained  six  British  and  six  American  name  pairs.  These  lists,  combined  with  a 
further  list  of  twelve  unfamiliar  names,  were  manipulated  to  construct  familiar  targets 76 
for  associated,  familiar  (but  unrelated)  and  neutral  (i.  e.,  unfamiliar)  primes.  This 
manipulation  resulted  in  three  separate  stimulus  sets  in  which  target  items  were  fully 
counterbalanced  across  the  three  separate  prime  conditions.  Examples  of  prime/target 
stimuli  for  each  condition  are  as  follows:  associated  condition,  Paul  McCartney  / 
John  Lennon;  familiar  condition,  Tony  Blair  /  John  Lennon;  neutral  condition,  Jim 
Nolan  /  Prince  Charles.  All  stimuli  were  presented  centrally,  in  a  sans  serif  font  at 
point  size  36,  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm. 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  comprised  one  within-subjects  factor  prime  type  with  three 
levels  (associated,  familiar-unrelated  and  neutral).  Each  trial  started  with  a  fixation 
Fieure  2.6 
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cross,  which  remained  on  screen  for  10OOms.  This  was  followed  by  the  prime 
stimulus  for  a  duration  of  250ms,  followed  by  an  ISI  of  250ms,  followed  by  the  target 
stimulus  for  1500ms  (See  Figure  2.6).  Participants  were  instructed  to  respond  quickly 77 
and  accurately  to  the  second  name  in  this  sequence,  and  were  asked  to  indicate 
whether  this  name  belonged  to  a  British  or  American  person.  Participants  responded 
by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons  on  a  computer  keypad  and  response  latencies  were 
measured  from  the  onset  of  the  target  stimuli.  All  trials  were  presented  in  a  random 
order. 
Results 
Latencies  over  two  seconds  were  discarded,  as  were  outliers  exceeding  the 
participant  mean  by  two  standard  deviations  for  any  particular  condition.  This  led  to 
7.9%  of  the  data  being  excluded  overall.  Tabie  2.1.  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and 
Table  2.1 
Mean  RT  Data  for  Correct  Decisions 
In  Experiment  2.1 
prime  rvpe  mean  RT  SD 
associate  709  206 
familiar  866  203 
unfamiliar  894  149 
standard  deviations  for  the  different  conditions.  A  single  factor  ANOVA  showed  a 
main  effect  for  prime  type  F(2,26)  =  14.58,  p<0.05.  For  this  main  effect,  a  Tukey 
HSD  test  revealed  differences  between  the  following  conditions:  associated 78 
prime/familiar  prime;  and  associated  prime/neutral  prime  (p  <  0.05).  The  same  test 
revealed  no  differences  between  familiar  prime/neutral  prime  conditions. 
Discussion 
The  results,  from  the  semantic  decision  task  used,  show  reliable  facilitation  for 
associated  primes  as  compared  to  familiar  unrelated  primes,  which  themselves  do  not 
differ  from  neutral  primes.  These  results  demonstrate  for  the  first  time  that  semantic 
priming  can  be  observed  using  a  semantic  judgement,  and  are  consistent  with  the  idea 
that  the  same  mechanisms  underlie  this  priming  effect,  as  underlie  priming  in  the 
traditional  familiarity  decision  task.  Above  resting  levels  of  activation,  at  the  level  of 
the  SlUs,  offers  a  parsimonious  explanation  of  this  effect  and  is  consistent  with  the 
previous  simulations.  In  the  following  experiments  we  investigate  how  the  semantic 
prin-dng  effect  observed  in  Experiment  I  is  modulated  by  different  types  of 
intervening  items. 
EXPERIMENT  2.2 
Introduction 
In  the  experiments  that  follow,  participants  make  nationality  (British/American) 
decisions  to  the  faces  of  close  associated  pairs  of  people  (e.  g.,  Bill  Clinton  and  Hilary 79 
Clinton).  Interleaved  between  these  pairs  are  the  faces  of  other  famous  celebrities,  on 
which  either  a  nationality  or  occupation  (actor/singer)  decision  is  required. 
The  requirement  that  a  decision  be  made  to  all  items  and  not  just  the  targets  is 
included  in  this  design  to  ensure  that  the  semantic  information  of  interest  is 
sufficiently  activated.  The  following  experiments  will  rest  on  the  assumption  that 
when  a  semantic  decision  is  made,  the  semantic  node  relating  to  that  decision  has 
passed  a  particular  activation  threshold.  It  is  unimportant  that  this  threshold  may  be 
short  of  its  maximum  level  of  activation  (MLA).  What  is  important  is  the  idea  that  a 
node,  which  has  passed  threshold,  is  approaching  its  MLA,  and  should  therefore  exert 
great  downward  pressure  on  other  nodes  within  the  same  pool.  Any  node  which  is  not 
supported  by  positive  activation,  from  outside  the  pool,  should  be  driven  toward  (or 
below)  its  resting  level.  It  will  be  further  assumed  that  nodes  relating  to  decisions 
which  are  not  explicitly  made  remain  below  threshold  level.  These  nodes  will  exert 
limited  downward  pressure  on  other  nodes  within  the  same  pool.  The  following 
experiments  will  test  differential  predictions  of  the  Burton  et  al  and  Brddart  et  al. 
models.  These  differential  predictions  rest  on  acceptance  of  the  above  assumptions. 
To  recap,  if  semantic  information  is  stored  in  an  undifferentiated  way  (Burton 
et  al.  )  then  any  intervening  decision  that  does  not  share  the  decision  property  with  the 80 
prime  and  target  might  abolish  priming.  On  the  other  hand,  if  semantic  information  is 
stored  in  different  pools  (Br6dart  et  al.  ),  then  only  those  intervening  items  which  tap 
the  same  representational  pool  (and  which  do  not  share  the  decision  property)  as  the 
prime  and  target  have  the  potential  to  abolish  the  priming  effect. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated 
in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment.  In  order  to  ensure  that  participants 
were  familiar  with  the  critical  items,  anyone  scoring  less  than  75%  correct,  in  any  cell 
of  the  design,  was  replaced. 
Materials 
The  critical  stimuli  were  32  closely  related  face  pairs.  In  addition,  16  faces 
unrelated  to  these  pairs  were  used  as  intervening  items.  Each  trial  comprised  three 
stimulus  faces  presented  sequentially.  The  first  and  last  items  were  always  closely 
related  pairs  (e.  g.,  Tony  Blair/Cheri  Blair).  The  middle  stimulus  (the  intervening 
item)  was  always  unrelated  to  the  critical  pairs  (e.  g.,  David  Bowie).  For  a  full  list  of 
stimulus  items  see  Appendix  3.  The  stimuli  were  viewed  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a 
distance  of  50cm. 81 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  had  two  within-subjects  factors:  type  of  intervening  decision 
with  two  levels  (same  vs  different);  and  nationality  of  intervening  item,  with  two 
levels  (same  vs  different).  An  intervening  decision  which  taps  the  same  node  as  the 
prime  and  target  decisions  would  not  be  expected  to  reduce  the  priming  effect. 
Therefore,  the  most  interesting  comparison  will  be  between  the  different  types  of 
intervening  decision  (nationality/occupation)  when  the  nationality  of  the  intervening 
is  different  from  that  of  the  prime  and  target. 
A  trial  commenced  with  a  fixation  cross  which  remained  on  screen  for  10OOms. 
This  was  followed  by  the  prime  stimulus  for  a  duration  of  500ms,  followed  by  an  ISI 
of  10OOms,  followed  by  the  intervening  item  stimulus  for  500ms,  followed  by  an  ISI 
of  10OOms,  followed  by  the  target  stimulus  for  500ms  (See  Figure  2.7).  Participants 
were  instructed  to  respond  as  quickly  and  accurately  to  the  each  face  in  this  sequence. 
The  response  to  the  prime  and  target  was  always  British/American.  The  intervening 
response  could  be  either  British/American  or  Actor/Singer  depending  on  type  of 
intervening  decision  condition  (same  or  different).  The  same/different  decisions  were 
presented  in  separate  blocks,  and  within  each  block,  the  order  of  trials  was 
randomized.  Within  the  different  intervening  decision  block,  a  dummy  stimulus  was 
added  to  the  'prime  /  intervening-item  /  target'  sequence,  in  order  that  decision 82 
500ms 
Figure  2.7 
This  figure  shows  the  sequence  of 
events  for  one  trial  in  Experiment 
2.2.  In  the  same-intervening- 
decision  condition  the  last  two 
items  are  omitted.  These  items  are 
used  only  in  the  different- 
intervening-item  condition. 
1000ms 
always  alternated  from  one  decision  (British/American)  to  the  other  (Actor/Singer). 
Therefore,  the  sequence  of  stimuli  and  decisions  in  this  condition  always  followed  the 
pattem:  prime  item-British/American,  intervening  item-Actor/Singer,  target  item- 
British/American,  dummy-Actor/Singer.  Pilot  work  had  shown  that,  without  this 
dummy  stimulus,  the  task  was  simply  too  difficult  for  most  participants.  All  items 
were  presented  in  a  continuous  sequence  and  participants  were  unaware  of  the  status 
of  each  item  (prime,  intervening-item,  target  or  dummy).  Prime  and  test  stimuli  were 
rotated  around  the  intervening  items  between  subjects  and  block  order  was 83 
counterbalanced  between  subjects.  Participants  indicated  a  decision  by  pressing  one 
of  two  buttons  on  a  computer  keypad.  Response  latencies  to  the  prime  and  target 
items  were  measured  from  the  onset  of  the  stimuli.  The  dependent  measure  was  the 
difference  between  the  prime  and  target  response  times. 
Results 
Difference  scores  were  calculated  for  each  trial  by  subtracting  the  RT  for  the 
target  item  from  that  of  the  prime.  An  error  at  either  stage  resulted  in  the  data  from 
that  trial  being  eliminated  from  the  analysis.  Medians  of  these  difference  scores  were 
calculated,  and  means  of  these  by  condition  are  shown  in  Table  2.2.  These  difference 
scores  were  analysed  using  a  2(same-intervening-decision  vs  different-intervening- 
decision)  x  2(same-  nationality-intervening-itern  vs  different-nationality-intervening- 
item)  analysis  of  variance,  which  showed  that  the  pattern  of  responding  did  not  differ 
between  the  experimental  conditions:  main  effect  of  intervening  decision,  F(1,3  1)<  1; 
Table  2.2 
Mean  Difference  RT  scores  between 
prime  and  tarqet  items  in  Experiment  2.2 
Status  of  intervening  item  Prime  Tamet  Difference  SD(diffs) 
same-decision  /  same-nationality  891  874  17  106 
same-decision  /different-nationality  877  873  4  106 
different-decision  /  same-nationality  869  845  24  78 
different-decision  /  different-nationality  857  873  -16  101 84 
main  effect  of  intervening  nationality,  F(1,3  1)=2.12,  p>O.  1;  intervening-decision  x 
intervening-nationality  interaction,  F(1,3  1)<  1. 
Discussion 
This  experiment  was  designed  to  test  predictions  derived  from  the  models  of 
Burton  et  al  and  Brddart  et  al.  The  non-significant  difference  between  the  means  of 
the  difference  scores  in  the  various  conditions  suggests  one  of  two  conclusions. 
Firstly,  it  may  be  that  semantic  priming  is  completely  abolished  by  an  intervening 
item  irrespective  of  the  semantic  properties  of  that  item,  or  any  decision  taken  to  that 
item.  Secondly,  it  is  possible  that  the  design  employed  was  simply  not  powerful 
enough  to  detect  these  effects,  should  they  exist. 
The  first  explanation  is difficult  to  accept  within  the  framework  of  either  model, 
when  the  results  from  Experiment  2.1  are  taken  into  account.  Experiment  2.1  clearly 
shows  semantic  priming  on  to  a  semantic  decision.  Both  models  might  explain  these 
results  in  terms  of  advantage  produced  by  'above  resting'  activation  at  the  level  of  the 
SlUs.  If  this  explanation  is  correct  then  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  this 
semantic  priming  should  be  abolished  by  an  intervening  item  which  also  shares  the 
decision  property  with  the  prime  and  target.  However,  in  this  experiment  there  is  no 
difference  between  the  same-decisionlsame-nationality  condition  and  the  different- 85 
decision1different-nationality  condition.  While  this  comparison  was  not  the  primary 
focus  of  this  experiment,  it  can  be  recruited  to  demonstrate  the  weakness  of  the 
design,  because  both  models  would  clearly  predict  that  these  conditions  should  differ. 
In  this  experiment  they  do  not  differ,  so  this  experiment  fails  to  support  a  very  clear 
prediction  of  both  models.  It  therefore  seems  reasonable  to  suspect  that  this 
experiment  is  simply  not  powerful  enough  to  detect  the  type  of  effects,  which  are  the 
focus  of  this  study.  Another  reason  to  suspect  the  design  employed  here  is  evidenced 
by  the  large  standard  deviations  associated  with  the  means  of  the  difference  scores, 
indicating  an  extremely  large  variance  within  each  set. 
Given  that  the  null  effects  observed  in  this  experiment,  may  be  due  to  a  lack  of 
experimental  power,  it  is  reasonable  to  test  the  same  predictions  using  a  more 
powerful  design.  This  is  done  in  the  following  experiment. 86 
ExPERIMENT  2.3 
Introduction 
This  experiment  follows  the  logic  of  Experiment  2.2  in  that,  once  again,  we  are 
looking  at  the  effect  of  an  intervening  item  between  two  semantically  related  pairs  of 
stimuli,  this  time  using  a  more  powerful  design.  In  Experiment  2.2,  the  dependent 
measure  was  the  difference  in  RT  scores  between  the  related  prime  and  target  stimuli. 
However,  the  variance  in  these  difference  scores  proved  to  be  very  large,  as 
evidenced  by  the  SDs  reported  above.  It  is  therefore  possible,  that  the  any  effect  of 
the  intervening  item  is being  masked  in  this  somewhat  noisY  design.  In  the  current 
experiment,  the  priming  effect  is  measured  in  terms  of  an  advantage  for  targets, 
which  are  preceded  by  associated  primes,  as  compared  to  targets,  which  are  preceded 
by  familiar  (but  unrelated)  primes.  This  is  very  similar  to  the  design  used  in 
Experiment  2.1,  where  significant  priming  was  observed.  As  there  was  no  difference 
between  the  unrelated  and  neutral  prime  conditions  in  Experiment  2.1.,  the  neutral 
condition  has  been  omitted  from  the  design  used  here.  Therefore,  the  main  difference, 
between  this  experiment  and  Experiment  2.1.,  is  that  here  an  intervening  item  will  be 
presented  between  the  prime  and  target  items.  The  predictions  are  the  same  as  in 87 
Experiment  2.2.  That  is,  the  Burton  ct  al.  model  predicts  that  any  intervening  decision 
that  does  not  share  the  decision  property  with  the  prime  and  target  should  abolish,  or 
at  least  reduce,  priming.  Whereas  in  the  Br6dart  model,  only  those  intervening  items 
that  tap  the  same  representational  pool  (and  that  do  not  share  the  decision  property)  as 
the  prime  and  target,  should  reduce  the  priming  effect. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in 
the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment.  , 
Materials 
The  critical  stimuli  were  32  closely  related  face  pairs.  In  addition,  16  faces 
unrelated  to  these  pairs  were  used  as  intervening  items.  Each  trial  comprised  of  three 
stimulus  faces  presented  sequentially.  The  first  and  last  items  where  always  closely 
related  pairs  (e.  g.,  Tony  Blair/Cheri  Blair).  The  middle  stimulus  (the  intervening 
item)  was  always  unrelated  to  the  critical  pairs  (e.  g.,  David  Bowie).  For  a  full  list  of 
stimulus  items  see  Appendix  4.  The  stimuli  were  viewed  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a 
distance  of  50cm. 88 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  had  two  within-subjects  factors:  type  of  intervening  decision, 
with  two  levels  (same  vs  different);  nationality  of  intervening  decison,  with  two 
levels  (same  vs  different).  The  dependent  measure  was  the  difference  in  mean  RTs 
scores  between  targets  primed  by  an  associate  and  targets  primed  by  an  unrelated 
item.  Prime  and  test  stimuli  were  fully  rotated  around  the  intervening  items,  within 
subjects,  such  that  each  stimulus  appeared  an  equal  number  of  times  as  both  prime 
and  target,  in  each  cell  of  the  design. 
A  trial  commenced  with  a  fixation  cross  which  remained  on  screen  for  1000ms- 
This  was  followed  by  the  prime  stimulus  for  a  duration  of  500ms,  followed  by  an  ISI 
Of  10OOms,  followed  by  the  intervening  item  stimulus  for  500ms,  followed  by  an  ISI 
of  10OOms,  followed  by  the  target  stimulus  for  5OOms  (See  Figure  2.7).  Participants 
were  instructed  to  respond  as  quickly  and  accurately  to  the  each  face  in  this  sequence. 
The  response  to  the  prime  and  target  was  always  British/American,  therefore  the 
intervening  response  could  be  either  British/American  or  Actor/Singer  depending  on 
type  of  intervening  decision  condition  (same  or  different).  Each  different  type  of 
intervening  decision  was  presented  in  separate  blocks,  and  within  each  block  the 
order  of  trials  was  randomised.  Within  the  different  intervening  item  block,  a  dummy 
stimulus  was  added  to  the  prime-intervening  item-target  sequence,  in  order  that 89 
decision  always  alternated  from  one  decision  (British/American)  to  the  other 
(Actor/Singer).  Therefore,  the  sequence  of  stimuli  and  decisions  in  this  condition 
always  followed  the  pattern:  prime  item-British/American,  intervening  item- 
Actor/Singer,  target  item-  British/American,  dummy-Actor/Singer.  As  in  Experiment 
2.2,  pilot  work  had  shown  that,  without  this  dummy  stimulus,  the  task  was  simply  too 
difficult  for  most  participants.  All  items  were  presented  in  a  continuous  sequence  and 
participants  were  unaware  of  the  status  of  each  item  (prime,  intervening  item,  target 
or  dummy)  Participants  indicated  a  decision  by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons  on  a 
computer  keypad.  Response  latencies  to  the  prime  and  target  items  were  measured 
from  the  onset  of  the  stimuli. 
Results 
A  score  representing  the  amount  of  priming  for  each  condition  was  calculated 
by  subtracting  the  mean  RTs  for  the  associated  primes  from  the  mean  RTs  of  the 
unrelated  primes.  Means  of  these  difference  scores,  by  condition,  are  shown  in  Table 
2.3.  These  difference  scores  were  analysed  using  a  2(same-intervening-decision  vs 
different-intervening-decision)  x  2(same-nationality-intervening-item  vs  different- 
nationality-intervening-item)  analysis  of  variance,  which  showed  that  the  pattern  of 90 
responding  did  not  differ  between  the  experimental  conditions:  main  effect  of 
intervening  decision,  F(1,39)<I;  main  effect  of  intervening  nationality,  F(1,39)=2.57, 
p>0.1;  intervening-decision  x  intervening-nationality  interaction,  F(1,39)<I. 
Table  2.3 
Mean  Difference  RT  scores  between 
unrelated  and  associated  items  in  Experiment  2.3 
Status  of  intervenino  item  Unrelated  Associated  Difference  SD(diffs) 
same-decision  /  same-nationality  762  720  42  84 
same-decision  /different-nationality  748  762  14  80 
different-decision  /  same-nationality  915  954  39  109 
different-decision  /  different-nationality  926  911  15  96 
Discussion 
Once  again,  there  is  a  non-significant  difference  between  the  levels  of  priming 
for  the  different  experimental  conditions  in  this  experiment,  indicating  that  semantic 
prin-ýing  on  to  a  semantic  decision  does  not  survive  when  a  semantic  decision  is 
required  to  an  item  that  intervenes  between  the  prime  and  target.  The  failure  to  find 
any  priming  effects  here  appears  to  confirm  the  findings  from  Experiment  2.2.  These 
results  do  not  allow  any  formal  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the  Burton  et  al.  and 
Brddart  ct  al.  models.  However,  the  trends  in  the  pattern  of  responding  are  very 
similar  to  those  found  in  Experiment  2.2.  These  trends  are  suggestive  of  the  type  of 
effects  that  were  predicted  and  are  discussed  more  fully  below. 91 
GENERAL  DISCUSSION 
This  Chapter  reports  three  new  simulations  and  three  experiments  which  seek  to 
illuminate  the  nature  of  semantic  priming  effects  on  to  a  semantic  decision  when 
modulated  by  different  types  of  intervening  item.  The  first  simulation  simply  predicts 
that  semantic  priming  should  be  found  on  to  a  semantic  decision.  Experiment  2.1 
verified  this  prediction  showing  an  advantage  for  a  semantic  decision 
(British/American)  to  a  target  item  preceded  by  an  associate  item  as  compared  to 
unrelated  items,  which  did  not  differ  from  neutral  items.  This  is  the  first  time  that 
such  a  priming  effect  has  been  reported. 
Using  the  above  semantic  priming  technique,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
differentiate  between  two  popular  models  in  this  area.  Simulations  2.4  and  2.5 
suggested  that  semantic  priming  on  to  a  semantic  decision  should  survive  an 
intervening  item  in  certain  circumstances.  However,  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3  fail  to 
verify  the  predictions  drawn  from  these  simulations,  and  in  fact  appear  to  indicate 
that  this  priming  effect  does  not  survive  when  a  semantic  decision  is  required  to  an 
intervening  item 
The  results  from  Experiment  2.1  are  encouraging,  in  that  this  new  technique 
(semantic  priming  onto  a  semantic  decision)  appears  to  offer  a  way  into  exploring  the 92 
structure  of  the  semantic  system  (an  area  which  has  largely  been  neglected  to  date). 
HOwever,  when  this  technique  was  used  in  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3,  which  included 
an  intervening  item,  the  results  proved  disappointing. 
However,  the  failure  to  find  any  reliable  effects,  in  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3, 
was  somewhat  surprising,  given  the  predictions  drawn  from  simulations  using  the 
Burton  et  al.  model,  which  were  presented  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter.  How  are 
we  to  interpret  the  absence  of  prin-ýing  effects  in  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3?  One 
reasonable  conclusion  is  that  an  intervening  item  abolishes  priming  for  semantic 
decisions,  just  as  it  does  for  familiarity  decisiofts  (Bruce,  1986).  However,  a  common 
problem  with  prin-ýing  methodology  (and  hypothesis  testing  in  general)  is  that  it  is 
impossible  to  establish  that  a  particular  effect  does  not  exist,  simply  because  a 
particular  experimental  manipulation  fails  to  find  it.  It  may  be  that  the  experimental 
manipulation  in  question  was  simply  not  powerful  enough  to  reveal  the  effect. 
If  we  look  at  the  trends  in  the  patterns  of  responding,  in  Experiments  2.2  and 
2.3,  we  find  that  these  trends  are  similar  in  both  experiments.  Unsurprisingly,  there  is 
advantage  for  same  nationality  over  different  nationality  intervening  items,  when 
he  intervening  decision  is  nationality  (13ms  in  Experiment  2.2;  28ms  in  Experiment 
J).  However,  in  both  experiments,  there  is  an  advantage  for  same  nationality,  over 93 
different  nationality  intervening  items,  even  when  an  occupation  decision  intervenes 
between  two  nationality  decisions  (40ms  in  Experiernnt  2.2.  and  25ms  in 
Experiemnet  2.3),  suggesting  that  the  nationality  of  the  intervening  item  may  be 
predictive,  irrespective  of  the  type  of  decision  taken  to  the  intervening  item. 
Secondly,  there  is  no  suggestion  that  decision  type  influences  the  levels  of 
priming  found.  Both  experiments  demonstrate  only  a  very  small  advantage  for  same 
decisions  over  different  decisions,  when  nationality  of  the  intervening  item  is  the 
same  as  the  prime  and  target  (7ms  in  Experiment  2.2.,  and  3ms  in  Experiment  2.3). 
Again,  there  is  no  suggestion  of  an  advantage  for  same  decisions  over  different 
decisions,  when  nationality  of  the  intervening  item  is different  (I  ms  difference  in 
Experiment  2.3).  There  is  a  20ms,  difference  between  these  conditions  in  Experiment 
2.2.  but  this  difference  is  particularly  spurious  as  it  relies  on  the  prime  items  being 
responded  to  faster  than  the  targets  items.  The  rotation  of  the  prime  and  target  items 
(described  fully  in  the  methods  section)  should  prohibit  such  a  pattern  of  responding, 
so  this  trend  should  be  viewed  with  particular  scepticism. 
Taken  together  these  trends  suggest  that  decision  type  (nationality  or 
occupation)  does  not  influence  the  magnitude  of  the  priming  effect.  This  is  consistent 
with  the  Burton  et  al.  account,  inasmuch  that  it  suggests  that  both  a  nationality  and  an 94 
occupation  decision,  intervening  between  two  nationality  decisions,  produce 
equivalent  effects.  Also,  in  Experiment  2.3  there  appears  to  be  no  difference  between 
the  same-decision/  different-nationality  and  different-decision/different-nationality 
conditions  (I  ms,  difference),  which  was  a  specific  prediction  of  this  model.  Br6dart  et 
al.,  in  contrast,  would  predict  that  there  should  be  a  difference  between  these 
conditions.  However,  it  is  acknowledged  that  this  suggestion  is  tenuous  given  there 
are  no  significant  effects. 
However,  all  of  these  interpretations  rest  on  the  assumptions  set  out  in  the 
introduction  to  Experiment  2.1.  These  were:  (1)  that  nodes  relating  to  decisions  which 
are  made  are  approaching  their  MLA  and  should  therefore  exert  great  downward 
pressure  on  other  nodes  within  the  same  pool,  and  (2)  that  nodes  relating  to  decisions 
which  are  not  explicitly  made  remain  below  threshold  level,  and  therefore  exert 
limited  downward  pressure  on  other  nodes  within  the  same  pool.  In  the  absence  of 
any  indication  that  decision  type  modulates  these  priming  effects,  this  assumption 
may  have  to  be  reviewed.  If  these  assumptions  prove  incorrect,  then  both  models 
would  provide  an  adequate  explanation  of  the  trends  reported  above. 
While  the  data  from  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3  do  not  permit  any  formal 
conclusions  to  be  drawn,  the  fact  the  trends  in  both  experiments  are  so  similar 95 
suggests  that  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  further  investigate  these  effects  using  a 
different  type  of  experimental  approach.  This  is  achieved  in  Chapter  3,  which 
investigates  the  structure  of  semantic  memory  using  an  interference  technique  instead 
of  priming  paradigm  that  was  employed  here. 96 
CHAPTER  THREE 
ExPloring  Interference  Effects 
OVERVIEW 
The  previous  Chapter  looked  at  the  organisation  of  semantic  memory  for 
farn.  iliar  people  by  comparing  two  broad  models  in  this  area  (Burton  et  al.,  1990; 
Valentine,  Moore,  &  Br6dart,  1995).  In  this  chapter,  a  second  attempt  is  made  to 
differentiate  between  these  competing  accounts,  using  an  interference  technique 
instead  of  the  semantic  prin-ýng  technique  employed  in  the  previous  chapter. 
While  this  technique  has  been  used  extensively  to  probe  other  psychological 
phenomena  (Glasser  &  Ddngelhoff,  1984;  Rosinski,  Golinkoff,  &  Kukish,  1975), 
there  are  few  examples  of  its  use  in  the  area  of  person  recognition.  In  this  area,  this 
technique  was  first  used  by  Young,  Ellis,  Flude,  McWecny  and  Hay  (1986).  These 
authors  presented  participants  with  stimuli  which  were  composed  of  a  famous  face 
(either  politician  or  pop  star)  from  which  extended  a  speech  bubble,  which  contained 
a  famous  person's  narne  (again,  belonging  to  either  a  politician  or  pop  star).  Their 
findings  suggest  that  subjects  were  unable  to  prevent  semantic  categorisation  of  face 
and  name  stimuli  under  certain  experimental  conditions.  Specifically,  they  found  that, 
when  presented  simultaneously,  faces  interfered  with  name  classification  (politician 97 
Or  Pop  star),  and  that  names  interfered  with  face  classification  (again,  politician  or 
POP  star),  although  to  a  lesser  extent  (Young  et  al.,  Experiment  4).  The  important 
Point,  as  far  as  the  present  study  is  concerned,  is  that  the  patterns  of  interference 
observed  can  be  interpreted  as  being  determined  by  semantic  properties  of  the  stimuli. 
Essentiafly,  when  the  face  and  name  are  incongruent  in  respect  of  occupation  (e.  g., 
Mick  Jagger  /  Neil  Kinnock)  an  occupation  decision  was  slower  than  when  they  were 
congruent  (e.  g.,  Mick  Jagger  /  Paul  McCartney). 
Interactive  activation  and  competition  models  of  person  recognition  (i.  e., 
Burton  et  aL,  1990;  Br6dart  et  al,  1995),  can  account  for  these  findings  by  appealing 
to  the  speed  at  which  activation  levels  rise  at  certain  SlUs.  For  example,  stimuli  that 
are  congruent  in  respect  of  occupation  (e.  g.,  Mick  Jagger  and  Paul  McCartney)  will 
both  activate  the  'pop  star'  sJU.  This  double  hit  at  'the  pop  star'  SIU  may  allow  this 
SIU  to  reach  its  threshold  faster,  and  could  provide  a  parsimonious  explanation  of  any 
RT  advantage  found.  Stimuli  that  are  incongruent  in  respect  of  occupation  (e.  g.,  NEck 
Jagger  and  Neil  Kinnock),  will  produce  activation  simultaneously  at  the  'pop  star, 
and  'politicain'  nodes.  In  these  circumstances,  each  node  will  impede  the  rise  in 
activation  at  the  other,  via  the  mechanism  of  within-POOl  inhibition.  This  within-pool 
inhibition  (explained  in  detail  in  the  previous  chapter)  can  also  be  recruited  to  explain 98 
the  interference  found  in  this  condition  of  the  Young  et  a].  study.  It  is  therefore 
possible  that  both  of  these  factors  contribute  to  the  RT  advantage  for  the  semantically 
congruent  stimuli  over  the  semantically  incongruent  stimuli.  However,  Young  et  a]. 
(1986)  showed  that  a  speech  bubble  containing  the  name  of  the  simultaneously 
presented  face,  and  a  speech  bubble  containing  the  name  of  a  person  from  the  same 
occupational  category  as  the  face,  produced  equivalent  responses  on  to  an  occupation 
decision  to  the  face  (Experiment  4).  In  fact,  there  was  no  difference  between  these 
conditions  and  the  condition  in  which  faces  were  presented  alone  (i.  e.,  with  empty 
speech  bubbles).  This  evidence  would  appear  to  rule  out  the  'double  hit'  hypothesis 
and  suggests  that  within-pool  inhibition  is  the  major  contributor  to  the  observed 
effects. 
In  summary,  the  findings  from  Young  et  al.  (1986)  suggest,  firstly,  that 
semantic  classification  of  distractor  stimuli  occurs  automatically  and  is  unstoppable. 
Further,  stimuli  that  are  semanticallY  incongruent  produce  reliable  interference  effects 
when  a  semantic  decision  is  required.  It  is  this  interference  effect  that  will  be 
recruited  in  the  following  experiments. 
Following  Young  et  al.  (1986)  faces  will  again  be  presented  simultaneously 
with  distractor  stimuli,  which  may  be  semantically  congruent  or  incongruent  with 99 
semantic  properties  of  the  face.  However,  this  time  the  distractors  will  be  icons  (e.  g., 
an  American  flag)  as  opposed  the  name  stimuli  utilised  by  Young  et  al.  (1986).  In 
theory,  a  distractor  icon  which  is  incongruent  with  a  property  of  the  face  should 
produce  interference  when  a  semantic  decision  to  the  face  is  required.  For  example, 
an  American  flag  distractor  should  interfere  with  a  British  decision  to  the  face. 
An  extension  of  this  logic  provides  a  new  way  to  discriminate  between  the 
models  under  investigation.  Clearly  a  'American'  distractor  should  interfere  with  a 
'British'  decision  and  both  models  would  predict  this.  However,  will  an  'American' 
distractor  interfere  with  a  'pop  star'  decision?  The  Burton  et  al.  model  predicts  that  it 
should,  whereas  the  Brddart  et  A  model  predicts  that  it  should  not.  The  reasoning, 
which  supports  these  predictions,  is  as  follows.  In  the  Br6dart  et  a].  model,  activation 
at  the  'pop  star'  node  should  produce  some  within  pool  inhibition,  but  only  within  the 
occupation  pool.  This  should  have  no  effect  within  the  nationality  pool,  and  should 
therefore  not  impede  the  rise  in  activation  at  the  'American'  node.  However,  in  the 
Burton  et  al.  model  all  semantic  information  is  stored  in  one  large  pool.  In  this  case, 
activation  at  the  'pop  star'  node  should  impede  the  rise  in  activation  at  the 
'American'  node  and  interference  should  be  observed. 100 
EXPERIMENT  3.1 
Introduction 
The  target  stimuli  in  the  following  experiments  are  faces  with  certain  semantic 
properties  (British,  American,  film  star,  pop  star).  These  faces  will  be  presented 
combined  with  icons,  which  also  represent  these  properties.  The  patterns  of 
interference  observed  will  be  assessed  within  the  competing  frameworks  of  the 
Burton  et,  al.  and  Brddart  et  al.  models. 
Detailed  predictions  of  both  models  are  now  considered.  If  the  decision 
required  to  the  face  is  compatible  with  the  icon  (Al  Pacino  with  an  'American'  flag) 
then  both  models  might  predict  that  a  nationality  decision  would  be  facilitated,  in 
these  circumstances.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  'American'  SIU  is  receiving 
activation  from  two  sources.  In  the  normal  way  activation  will  flow  from  the  'Al 
Pacino'  FRU  to  the  PIN  to  the  'American'  SIU.  At  the  same  time,  this  'American' 
SW  should  receive  activation  from  the  'American'  flag,  either  directly,  or  perhaps 
indirectly,  via  links  to  an  object  recognition  system.  Whether  or  not  this  'American' 
node  receives  this  activation  directly  (implying  that  face  and  object  recognition 
systems  share  the  same  semantic  store),  or  indirectly,  is  not  important  to  the  argument 
made  here.  The  point  is  that  it  will  receive  activation  simultaneously  from  two 101 
sources.  Compare  this  with  the  situation  where  the  icon  is  incompatible  with  the 
nationality  of  the  face  (A]  Pacino  with  'British'  flag).  Here  one  might  expect  that  the 
British  flag  would  activate  the  'British'  SIU  and  that  rising  activation  at  this  node 
Would  inhibit  the  rise  in  activation  at  the  'American'  SIU,  making  it  slower  to  reach 
its  activation  threshold.  So  far,  both  models  would  predict  the  same  outcome  in  both 
of  the  situations  described  above,  as  the  distractor  icon,  which  produces  the 
facilitation  or  interference  effect,  is  contained  within  the  same  pool  as  the  'American, 
node.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  Young  et  al.  (1986)  study  indicated  that  congruent 
distractors  do  not  produce  facilitation,  and  it  is  unclear  whether  or  not  observable 
facilitation  will  occur  in  the  circumstances  just  described.  hTespective  of  this, 
however,  the  interference  effect  should  be  detectable,  and  both  models  predict 
interference  in  these  circumstances- 
Now  let  us  consider  what  ýnight  happen  if  congruent  occupation  icons  are 
Presented  alongside  the  faces  when  a  nationality  decision  is  required.  Let  us  say  that 
the  face  of  Al  Pacino  is  presented  alongside  a  'film  star'  icon  and  that  a  nationality 
decision  is  required. 
In  the  Burton  ct  a].  model,  we  have  one  pool  of  semantic  information,  therefore 
Lny  node  which  is  active  within  this  pool  should  inhibit  any  other  node.  Vierefore,  an 102 
active  'film  star'  node  should  impede  the  rise  in  activation  at  the  'American'  node. 
However,  as  Al  Pacino  is  a  film  star,  this  'film  star'  node  will  already  be  receiving 
activation  in  the  normal  way,  from  the  face,  via  the  usual  route  (FRU  >  PIN  >  film 
star'  SIU).  So  the  question  is,  should  extra  activation  at  this  'film  star'  node  (from  the 
film  star  icon)  produce  a  measurable  inhibitory  effect  at  the  'American,  SIU?  This 
question  can  be  answered  by  appealing  to  the  'double  hit'  hypothesis  assessed  earlier 
in  this  Chapter.  If  extra  activation  from  a  shared  property  at  a  given  node  does  not 
Produce  a  measurable  facilitation  effect  (which  it  does  not,  Young  et  aL,  1986),  then 
there  is  no  principled  reason  to  suppose  that  it  should  produce  a  measurable 
inhibitory  effect. 
However,  consideration  of  Young  et  al.  's  results,  highlight  a  potential  problem 
with  the  Burton  et  a].  account.  This  problem  has  been  already  been  pointed  out  by 
Other  authors  (Valentine  et  aL,  1995)  and  can  be  summarised.  as  follows.  If  we  know 
many  things  about  a  person,  then  within-pool  inhibition  should  make  it  more  difficult 
to  retrieve  an  individual  property  of  that  person.  This  anomaly  is  easily  resolved  by 
Icknowledging  that  SIUS  are  connected  not  only  through  inhibitory  links,  but  also 
ndirectly  through  excitatory  links  to  the  PINs  which  share  these  particular  properties. 
Wrton,  Bruce  and  Hancock  (1999)  point  out  that  it  is  entirely  feasible  that  two 103 
semantic  units  that  are  both  properties  of  the  person  in  question  may  have  a  net 
connectivity  which  is  positive,  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  a  single  within-pool 
inhibitory  link  connecting  them  directly.  This  proposition  suggests  that  'shared 
properties'  should  not  inhibit  one  another  (as  net  connectivity  will  be  positive)  and  is 
consistent  with  the  Young  et  al.  data. 
In  summary,  the  Burton  et  al.  model  predicts  that  there  should  be  no  observable 
interference,  on  to  nationality  decision,  when  the  face  of  'AL  Pacino'  is  presented 
alongside  an  icon  representing  the  property  of  'film  star'.  Deriving  a  prediction  for 
this  condition  in  the  Br6dart  et  al.  model  is  simpler.  Any  inhibitory  effect  of  the  'film 
star'  icon  will  be  contained  within  the  occupation  pool,  so  no  interference  effects 
should  be  observed  on  to  a  nationality  decision. 
Potentially  more  revealing  is  the  situation,  where  a  'pop  star,  icon  is  presented 
alongside,  say,  A]  Pacino,  when  a  nationality  decision  is  required.  In  this  situation,  an 
additional  node,  and  one  that  is  not  associated  with  a  property  of  the  person  in 
question,  is  being  activated.  it  is  important  to  note  here  that  net  connectivity  between 
the  'Pop  star'  and  'American  nodes  cannot  be  positive  in  this  case,  as  'pop  star,  is  not 
a  property  of  'Al  Pacino'.  In  the  Burton  et  al.  model,  inhibition  from  this  unrelated 
4  pop  star'  node  should  impede  the  rise  in  activation  at  the  'American'  node. 104 
Therefore,  one  might  expect  interference  effects  in  these  circumstances.  If  we 
Compare  this  with  the  predictions  of  the  Br6dart  et  al.  model,  we  notice  a  different 
Outcome.  The  nodes  associated  with  icons  that  are  unrelated  to  the  nationality  of  the 
face,  should  not  impede  the  rise  in  activation  at  the  nationality  node,  as  they  are  not 
contained  within  the  same  pool.  Therefore,  the  Brddart  model  predicts  no  interference 
from  the  semantic  properties  associated  with  the  icons  under  these  circumstances.  In 
this  condition,  the  Burton  et  al.  and  Br6dart  et  al.  models  should  therefore  predict 
different  patterns  of  interference. 
An  advantage  of  this  current  methodology  is  that  the  icons  should  activate 
essentially  only  one  semantic  node.  In  the  experiments  in  the  previous  chapter,  the 
effect  of  the  intervening  person  was  felt  not  only  at  the  node  associated  with  the 
decision,  but  also  at  other  nodes  associated  with  any  particular  property  of  that 
person.  So,  in  the  previous  experiments,  in  order  to  claim  that  the  models  made 
differential  predictions  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  assumption  that  some  nodes  (the 
decision  nodes)  Oxert  more  downwards  pressure  than  others  (the  non-decision  nodes). 
This  assumption  was  cafled  into  question  in  the  discussion  section  in  Chapter  I-  No 
such  assumption  is  necessary  here  because  the  icons  activate  one  node  only.  That  is,  a 
'British  Flag'  will  activate  only  the  'British'  node.  Of  course  some  activation  will 105 
flow  from  this  node  to  other  British  people  and  may  subsequently  cause  activation  to 
flow  back  to  other  semantic  units,  which  are  related  to  these  particular  individuals. 
However,  this  second  order  activation  should  have  a  relatively  minor  effect  in 
comparison  to  the  first  order  activation  from  SIU  related  to  the  icon  itself 
In  summary,  the  most  interesting  comparison,  in  terms  of  comparing  the 
predictions  of  the  models,  is  between  the  decision-congruent  and  decision- 
incongruent  conditions  when  the  stimuli  are  incongruent:  Br6dart  et  a].  predicts  a 
difference  between  these  conditions,  whereas  Burton  et  al.  does  not. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  Participated  in 
the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Materials 
The  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  the  faces  of  32  famous  people.  This  list 
Comprised  of  8  British  pop  stars,  8  British  film  stars,  8  American  pop  Stars,  and  8 
American  film  stars.  Each  face  was  paired  with  one  four  different  icons,  which  could 
be  compatible  or  incompatible  with  their  nationality  or  occupation.  Examples  of 
stimuli  are  shown  below  in  Figure  3.1.  All  face  images  were  edited  to  remove 
background  material  and  clothing,  leaving  only  the  face  and  hair.  Images  were 106 
Figure  3.1 
This  figure  shows  examples  of  the  stimuli  used  in  Experimant  3.1 
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standardised  to  have  height  6cm,  pasted  centrally  onto  the  icon  background,  and 
viewed  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm. 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  tested  both  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  across  two 
within-subjects  factors.  The  decision  taken  to  the  target  face  could  be  either 
congruent  or  incongruent  to  the  distractor  icon,  and  the  target  face  itself  could  be 
either  congruent  or  incongruent  with  the  distractor  icon.  This  first  factor  is  therefore 
labelled  decision  and  it  has  two  levels  (congruent  vs  incongruent);  the  second  factor 
is  labelled  stimuli,  with  two  levels  (congruent  vs  incongruent).  Each  of  these 
conditions  (illustrated  in  Fig  3-IJ  were  paired  with  a  nationality  or  occupation 
decision,  producing  eight  experimental  conditions  in  total.  Each  trial  started  with  a 
fixation  cross,  which  remained  on  screen  for  10OOms.  This  was  followed  by  the 
stimulus,  which  remained  on  screen  until  a  decision  was  made,  followed  by  an  ISI  of 107 
10OOms.  Participants  were  instructed  to  ignore  the  background  icon  and  respond  as 
quickly  and  as  accurately  as  possible  to  the  face.  Participants  made  nationality  or 
occupation  decisions  to  each  face  depending  on  condition.  They  responded  by 
pressing  one  of  two  buttons  on  a  computer  keypad  and  response  latencies  were 
measured  from  the  onset  of  the  stimuli.  Nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were 
Presented  within  separate  blocks,  with  block  order  counterbalanced  between  subjects. 
All  trials  were  presented  in  a  random  order  within  each  block. 
Results 
Table  3.1a  and  3.1b  show  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
conditions.  In  this  and  in  subsequent  experiments  latencies  over  two  seconds  were 
Table  3.1a 
This  table  shows  the  mean  response  latencies,  standard  deviations  and 
errror  rates  for  the  different  conditions  for  the  nationality  decisions  in  Experiment  3.1 
Decision  Congruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  831  90  10 
876  112  12  Decision  Congruent  /  Stimuli  Incongruent  L7 
Decision  Incongruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  844  96  11 
Decision  Incongruent  /  Stimuli  Incongruent  838  104 108 
Table  3.1b 
This  table  shows  the  mean  response  latencies,  standard  deviations  and 
errror  rates  for  the  different  conditions  for  the  occuaption  decisions  in  Experiment  3.1 
condition  mean  RT  SD  error  rate 
Decision  Congruent  Stimuli  Congruent  804  98  10 
Decision  Congruent  Stimuli  Incongruent  801  92  13 
RFIMUF-- 
DN§Q9MML-- 
Decision  Incongruent  Stimuli  Congruent  843  98  13 
Decision  Incongruent  Stimuli  Incongruent  853  104  13 
discarded,  as  were  outliers  exceeding  the  participant  mean  by  two  standard 
deviations,  for  any  particular  condition.  This  led  to  2.9%  of  the  raw  data  being 
excluded.  Incorrect  responses  accounted  for  a  further  11.5  %  of  the  total  data.  The 
error  rate  data  for  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were  analysed  separately, 
using  a2  (decision-congruent  vs  decision-incongruent)  x  2(stimuli-congruent  vs 
stimuli-incongruent)  ANOVA,  which  showed  that  the  error  pattern  did  not  differ 
between  the  experimental  conditions.  For  nationality  decisions,  the  main  effect  of 
decision  was  non-significant,  F(1,19)  <  1,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  stimuli,  F(1,19)  = 
1.10,  p>0.1,  as  was  the  decision  x  stimuli  interaction,  F(I,  19)  =  2.67,  p>0.1.  For 
occupation  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision,  was  non-significant  F(1,19)  =  2.22, 
p>0.1,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  stimuli,  F(1,19)  =  2.59,  p  >  0.1,  as  was  the  decision 109 
x  stimuli  interaction,  F(l,  19)  =  1.08,  p>0.1.  These  error  rates  will  not  be  discussed 
further. 
RT  data  for  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were  analysed  separately, 
using  a2  (decision-congruent  vs  decision-incongruent)  x  2(stimuli-congruent  vs 
stimuli-incongruent)  ANOVA.  For  the  nationality  decisions,  the  main  effect  of 
decision  was  non  significant,  F(I.  19)  =  1.37,  p>0.1,  as  was  the  main  effect  of 
stimuli,  F(I,  19)  =  1.72,  p>0.1.  The  decision  x  stimuli  interaction  was  significant 
F(l.  19)  =  8.42,  p<0.05.  An  analysis  of  simple  main  effects  showed  a  significant 
difference  (45ms)  between  stimuli-congruent  and  stimuli-incongruent  items,  when 
the  decisions  were  congruent,  F(1,19)  =  4.54,  p<0.05.  There  was  also  a  significant 
difference  between  decision-congruent  and  decision-incongruent  items  when  the 
stimuli  were  incongruent,  F(1,19)  =  6.3  1,  p<0.05.  There  was  no  difference  between 
stimuli-congruent  and  stimuli-incongruent  items  when  the  decision  was  incongruent 
F(1,19)  <  1.  Also,  there  was  no  difference  between  decision-congruent  and  decision- 
incongruent  when  the  stimuli  were  congruent  F(1,19)  <  1. 
For  the  occupation  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision  was  significant, 
F(I.  19)  =  15.34,  p<0.05.  The  main  effect  of  stimuli  was  non  significant  F(I,  19)  <  1, 
as  was  the  decision  x  stimuli  interaction  F(I,  19)  =  0.20,  p>0.1. 110 
Discussion 
Like  Experiments  2.2  and  2.3,  the  current  experiment  was  designed  to  test 
predictions  derived  from  the  models  of  Burton  et  al.  and  Brddart  et  al.  For  nationality 
decisions,  the  faster  responding  when  the  stimuli  are  congruent,  as  opposed  to 
incongruent,  when  the  decisions  are  congruent,  indicates  that  an  opposing  flag  does 
indeed  cause  interference,  and  both  models  predicted  this  outcome.  However,  the 
slower  responding,  for  decision-congruent  items  over  decision-incongruent  items, 
when  the  stimuli  were  incongruent  is  more  interesting.  This  result  appears  to  offer 
tentative  support  for  the  Brddart  et  al.  model,  as  an  incongruent  flag  icon  appears  to 
produce  more  interference  than  an  incongruent  occupation  icon,  when  the  decision  is 
nationality.  The  Burton  et  al.  model,  with  its  undifferentiated  semantics,  predicts  that 
interference  should  be  equivalent  in  both  conditions.  This  conclusion  is  further 
supported  by  the  lack  of  any  difference  between  congruent  and  incongruent  items 
when  the  decision  was  incongruent.  Here  participants  are  making  a  nationality 
decision  to  a  face,  which  is  accompanied  by  an  congruent  or  incongruent  occupation 
icon.  For  the  Br6dart  et  al  model,  increased  activation  levels  within  the  occupation 
pool  should  not  effect  activation  levels  in  the  nationality  pool.  However,  according  to 
Burton  et  al.,  an  incongruent  occupation  icon  should  produce  more  interference  than  a III 
congruent  occupation  icon,  especially  on  to  a  nationality  decision,  as  the  incongruent 
icon  should  produce  additional  within  pool  inhibition. 
The  results  from  the  occupation  decision  condition  show  a  main  effect  of 
decision,  with  congruent  decisions  being  reacted  to  faster  than  incongruent  decisions, 
in  the  absence  of  a  stimuli  main  effect  and  a  decision  x  stimuli  interaction.  This 
finding  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  results  from  the  nationality  decision 
condition.  Firstly,  these  results  show  that  responding  is  faster  when  decisions  are 
congruent  as  opposed  to  incongruent.  In  the  absence  of  other  effects,  these  results 
indicate  that  congruent  and  incongruent  stimuli  produce  equivalent  effects  for  both 
congruent  and  incongruent  decisions.  This  pattern  of  responding  is  inconsistent  with 
the  predictions  of  both  models.  Further,  the  clear  difference  between  decision- 
congruent  items  and  decision-incongruent  items,  when  the  stimuli  were  incongruent 
is  in  the  opposite  direction  to  difference  found  between  the  same  conditions  in  the 
nationality  condition.  Here  an  incongruent  nationality  icon  is  producing  more 
interference  on  to  an  occupation  decision,  than  an  incongruent  occupation  icon.  This 
pattern  of  responding  is  again  inconsistent  with  the  predictions  of  both  models,  but  is 
particularly  difficult  to  explain  within  the  Brddart  et  al.  framework.  Why  should  a 112 
concept  that  is  stored  in  the  occupation  pool  produce  inhibition  on  to  a  decision 
which  relies  on  activation  levels  within  the  nationality  pool? 
Overall,  the  patterns  of  responding  in  this  experiment  are  inconsistent  and  fail 
to  offer  reliable  evidence  in  support  of  either  model.  A  final  attempt  will  be  made  in 
the  following  experiment  to  distinguish  between  these  models,  this  time  using  a 
design  that  is  very  similar  to  that  used  by  Young  et  al  (1986). 
EXPERIMENT  3.2 
Introduction 
In  the  following  experiment,  faces  with  certain  semantic  properties  (British, 
American,  actor,  singer),  will  be  presented  combined  with  'speech  bubbles'  (instead 
of  the  icons  used  in  Experiment  3.1)  which  indicate  these  properties.  The  logic  here  is 
exactly  the  same  as  in  Experiment  3.1.  The  only  difference  is  that  a  speech  bubble 
containing  words  which  represent  the  semantic  properties  will  be  used  instead  of  the 
icons,  which  were  used  in  Experiment  3.1.  Congruent  and  incongruent  speech 
bubbles  are  expected  to  produce  the  same  pattern  of  responding  as  was  expected  in 
Experiment  3.1. 113 
The  Burton  et  al.  model,  with  its  undifferentiated  semantics  predicts  that 
occupation  'speech  bubbles'  that  are  incongruent  with  the  face  should  produce  just  as 
much  interference  on  to  a  nationality  decision  as  a  different  nationality  'speech 
bubble'  (and  vice  versa).  This  is because  the  effect  of  the  'speech  bubble'  will  be  felt 
equally,  by  the  appropriate  nationality  node,  in  both  conditions.  The  Br6dart  et  al. 
model  predicts  that  different  nationality  'speech  bubbles'  should  produce  more 
interference,  on  to  a  nationality  decision,  than  incongruent  occupation  'speech 
bubbles'.  This  is  because  the  effect  of  the  different  nationality  'speech  bubble'  will  be 
felt  within  the  nationality  pool,  and  the  effect  of  the  incompatible  occupation  'speech 
bubble'  will  be  felt  only  within  the  occupation  pool.  Interference,  which  occurs 
within  the  occupation  pool,  should  have  no  effect  within  the  nationality  pool  and 
should  not  impair  the  processing  of  a  nationality  decision. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in 
the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 114 
Matetials 
The  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  the  faces  of  32  famous  people.  This  list 
comprised  of  8  British  Pop  Stars,  8  British  Film  Stars,  8  American  Pop  Stars,  and  8 
American  Film  Stars.  Each  face  was  paired  with  one  four  different  speech  bubbles, 
which  could  be  compatible  or  incompatible  with  their  nationality  or  occupation. 
These  speech  bubbles  were  presented,  an  equal  number  of  times,  both  right  and  left  of 
iAmeri  British  Hm  Star  -79,  (pop  Star 
Speech  bubble  Speech  bubble  Speech  bubble  Speech  bubble 
congruent  with  incongruent  with  congruent  with  incongruent  with 
nationality  nationality  occupation  occupation 
Figure  3.2 
This  figure  shows  examples  of  the  stimuli  used  in  Experiment  3.2.  Please  note  that  while 
the  'speech  bubble'  is  shown  on  the  left-hand  side  of  the  face  in  these  examples,  it  appears 
equally  often  on  the  right-hand  side  within  the  experiment. 
the  target  faces.  All  face  images  were  edited  to  remove  background  material  and 
clothing,  leaving  only  the  face  and  hair.  Images  were  standardised  to  have  height 
6cm,  and  viewed  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm.  Examples  of  the 
stimuli  are  shown  in  Figure  3.2. 115 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  tested  both  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  across  two 
within-subjects  factors.  Ile  decision  taken  to  the  target  face  could  be  either 
congruent  or  incongruent  with  the  speech  bubble,  and  the  target  face  itself  could  be 
either  congruent  or  incongruent  with  the  speech  bubble.  This  first  factor  is  therefore 
labelled  decision  and  it  has  two  levels  (congruent  vs  incongruent);  the  second  factor 
is  labelled  stimuli,  with  two  levels  (congruent  vs  incongruent).  Therefore,  this  design 
produces  a  total  of  eight  experimental  conditions.  Each  trial  started  with  a  fixation 
cross,  which  remained  on  screen  for  10OOms.  This  was  followed  by  the  stimulus, 
which  remained  on  screen  until  a  decision  was  made,  followed  by  an  ISI  of  10OOms. 
Participants  were  instructed  to  ignore  the  'speech  bubble'  and  respond  as  quickly  and 
as  accurately  as  possible  to  the  face.  Participants  made  nationality  or  occupation 
decisions  to  each  face  depending  on  condition.  They  responded  by  pressing  one  of 
two  buttons  on  a  computer  keypad  and  response  latencies  were  measured  from  the 
onset  of  the  stimuli.  Nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were  presented  within 
separate  blocks,  with  block  order  counterbalance  between  subjects.  All  trials  were 
presented  in  a  random  order  within  each  block. 116 
Results 
Tables  3.2a  and  3.2b  show  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
conditions.  In  this  and  in  subsequent  experiments  latencies  over  two  seconds  were 
discarded,  as  were  outliers  exceeding  the  participant  mean  by  two  standard 
deviations,  for  any  particular  condition.  This  led  to  1.2%  of  the  raw  data  being 
excluded.  Incorrect  responses  accounted  for  a  further  10.6%  of  the  total  data.  The 
error  rate  data  for  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were  analysed  separately, 
using  a2  (decision-congruent  vs  decision-incongruent)  x  2(stimuli-congruent  vs 
stimuli-incongruent)  ANOVA.  For  nationality  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision 
was  non  significant  F(1,17)  =  1.23,  p>0.1,  as  was  the  dccision  x  stimuli  intcraction. 
The  main  effect  of  stimuli  was  only  marginally  significant,  F(l.  17)  =  4.45,  p=0.049. 
For  the  occupation  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision  was  non  significant,  F(1,17) 
1.  as  was  the  main  effect  of  stimuli,  F(I.  17)  <  1,  as  was  the  decision  x  stimuli 
interaction  F(l,  17)  =  1.17,  p<0.1.  These  error  rates  wiH  not  be  discussed  further.  RT 
data  for  nationality  and  occupation  decisions  were  analysed  separately,  using  a2 
(decision-congruent  vs  decision-incongruent)  x  2(stimuli-congruent  vs  stimuli- 
incongruent)  ANOVA.  For  the  nationality  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision  was 
non  significant,  F(1,19)  <  1.  The  main  effect  of  stimuli  was  significant,  F(1,17)  = 
11.57,  p<0.5.  The  decision  x  stimuli  interaction  was  also  significant  F(I,  17)  =  11.58, 117 
Table  3.2a 
This  table  shows  the  mean  response  latencies,  standard  deviations  and 
errror  rates  for  the  different  conditions  for  the  nationality  decisions  in  Experiment  3.2 
condition  mean  RT  SD  error  rate  (%) 
IM 
Congruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  708  98  11 
I'M 
n  Congruent  /  Stimuli  Incongruent  757  116  14 
ision  Incongruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  727  102  14 
Jor  4M  star 
ýý 
A 
a> 
I  ýec.  ision  Incongruent  I  Stimuli  Incongruent  734  103  13 
.  1k.  p top  stwwr 
Table  3.2b 
This  table  shows  the  mean  response  latencies,  standard  deviations  and 
errror  rates  for  the  different  conditions  for  the  occuaption  decisions  in  Experiment  3.2 
condition  mean  RT  SD  error  rate  (%) 
n  Congruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  744  101  8 
Congruent  /  Stimuli  Incongruent  773  113  9 
Incongruent  /  Stimuli  Congruent  762  113  8 
Decision  Incongruent  /  Stimuli  Incongruent  758  115  8 
<  0.5.  An  analysis  of  simple  main  effects  showed  a  significant  difference  between 
stimuli-congruent  and  stimuli-incongruent  items,  when  the  decisions  were  congruent, 118 
F(l,  17)  =  17.92,  p<0.05.  There  was  also  a  significant  difference  between  decision- 
congruent  and  decision-incongruent  items  when  the  stimuli  were  incongruent, 
F(I.  17)  =  5.60,  p<0.05.  There  was  no  difference  between  stimuli-congruent  and 
stimuli-incongruent  items  when  the  decision  was  incongruent  F(1,17)  <  1.  Also,  there 
was  no  difference  between  decision-congruent  and  decision-incongruent  when  the 
stimuli  were  congruent  F(I,  17)  =  3.77,  p>0.05. 
For  the  occupation  decisions,  the  main  effect  of  decision  was  non  significant, 
F(1,17)  <  1,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  stimuli,  F(I,  17)  =  3.44,  p>0.05.  The  decision 
x  stimuli  interaction  was  significant  F(l,  17)  =  10.79,  p<0.05.  An  analysis  of  simple 
main  Wects  showcd  a  significant  differencc  bctwccn  stimuli-congruent  and  stimuli- 
incongruent  items.  when  the  decisions  were  congruent,  F(l,  17)  =  9.35,  p<0.05.  All 
other  simple  main  effects  were  non  significant. 
Discussion 
Like  the  previous  experiments,  the  current  experiment  was  designed  to  test 
predictions  derived  from  the  models  of  Burton  et  al.  and  Br6rdart  ct  al.  Looking  first 
at  the  nationality  decisions,  the  faster  responding  when  the  face  and  speech  bubble 
are  congruent  as  opposed  to  incongruent,  and  when  the  decisions  are  congruent, 119 
indicates  that  an  incongruent  nationality  speech  bubble  does  indeed  cause 
interference  on  to  a  nationality  decision,  and  both  models  would  predict  this. 
Again,  however,  the  slower  responding  for  decision-congruent  items,  over 
decision-incongruent  items,  when  the  stimuli  were  incongruent  is  more  interesting. 
This  result  is  again  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  Br6dart  et  al  model,  as  an 
incongruent  nationalitY  speech  bubble  appears  to  produce  more  interference  than  an 
incongruent  occupation  speech  bubble,  when  the  decision  is  nationality.  The  Burton 
et  al.  model,  with  its  undifferentiated  semantics,  predicts  that  interference  should  be 
equivalent  in  both  conditions.  This  conclusion  is  again  supported  by  the  lack  of  any 
difference  between  congruent  and  incongruent  items  when  the  decision  was 
incongruent.  According  to  Burton  et  al.,  an  incongruent  occupation  'speech  bubble' 
should  produce  more  interference  than  a  congruent  occupation  'speech  bubble'  on  to 
a  nationality  decision,  as  the  incongruent  icon  should  produce  additional  within  pool 
inhibition. 
The  results  from  the  occupation  decision  condition,  when  the  decision  is 
congruent,  show  faster  responding  when  the  face  and  speech  bubble  are  congruent,  as 
opposed  to  incongruent,  indicating  that  an  incongruent  occupation  speech  bubble 120 
does  indeed  cause  interference  on  to  a  occupation  decision.  Once  again,  this  is  a 
prediction  of  both  models. 
This  time  however  there  is  no  advantage  for  decision-congruent  items,  over 
decision-incongruent  items,  when  the  stimuli  are  incongruent.  For  clarity,  when 
participants  are  asked  to  make  an  occupation  decision  to  'Al  Pacino',  the  presence  of 
'British'  or  'Pop  star'  speech  bubbles  produce  equivalent  interference.  This  result  is 
consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  Burton  et  al  model.  In  this  model,  all  semantic 
infonnation  is  contained  within  the  same  pool,  so  activation  at  any  node  which  does 
not  represent  a  property  of  the  person  in  question,  should  impede  the  rise  in  activation 
at  any  node,  which  does  represent  a  property  of  the  person  (in  this  instance  the  'film 
star'  SIU). 
GENERAL  DISCUSSION 
Once  again,  the  data  reported  do  not  provide  strong  support  for  either  model. 
The  starting  point  for  this  research  was  that  current  models  of  semantic  memory  for 
familiar  people  are  unsatisfactory.  An  attempt  to  differentiate  between  two  popular, 
and  competing,  models  has  been  made  over  the  course  of  four  experiments  (2.2,2.3, 
3.1  an  3.2).  These  experiments  have  failed  to  find  reliable  support  for  either  model 
and  have  failed  to  produce  any  real  new  insights  into  how  this  information  is 121 
structured.  It  may  well  be  that  these  experiments  lacked  the  experimental  power 
necessary  to  reveal  the  differential  effects  which  were  sought.  However  an  alternative 
explanation  for  inconsistent  pattern  of  results  may  be  found  in  the  stroop/response 
conflict  literature.  A  key  feature  underlying  such  accounts  is  the  idea  of  differential 
relative  automaticity;  that  is,  processing  that  is  'more'  automatic  occurs  faster  than 
'less'  automatic  processing.  The  assumption  made  in  previous  experiments  was  that 
processing  of  the  target  and  distracter  stimuli  proceeds  automatically  and  at  the  same 
rate.  It  is  possible  however  that  processing  of  highly  salient  icons 
,  such  as  flags,  is 
more  highly  autornized  than  processing  the  occupation  icons.  Support  for  this 
suggestion  comes  from  MacLeod  and  Dunbar  (1988)  who  found  that  initial  patterns 
of  interference  between  certain  stimuli  could  be  reversed  as  a  result  of  training.  Such 
an  explanation  is  consistent  with  the  findings  (in  Experiment  3.1)  which  used 
nationality  distractors  (British  and  American  flags)  and  occupation  distractors, 
(musical  staves  and  film  reels).  When  the  flag  icons  were  used  the  nationality  of  the 
flag  clearly  modulated  a  nationality  decision  to  the  target  face  (83  1  ms  when  the  flag 
was  congruent,  876ms  when  the  flag  was  incongruent).  However  the  occupation  icons 
did  not  modulate  an  occupation  decision  to  the  face  (804ms  when  the  occupation  icon 
was  congurent,  801  ms  when  it  was  incongruent).  In  fact,  for  these  occupation 122 
decisions,  an  incongruent  occupation  icon  produced  less  interference  than  both  flags 
(843  for  congruent  flag,  853  for  incongruent  flag).  The  fact  the  occupation  words  (in 
experiment  3.2)  do  modulate  the  occupation  decision  to  a  face  (in  a  manner  very 
similar  to  that  found  for  the  flag  icons)  is  again  consistent  with  this  idea,  as  there  is 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  distractor  words  are  processed  differentially  in  tenns  of 
relative  automaticity. 
Notwithstanding  the  above  interpretation  an  overarching  assumption  in 
Chapters  2  and  3  was  that  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  would  be  at  the  heart  of 
any  semantic  priming  or  interference  effects  that  were  found.  In  light  of  the  above 
results,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  assumption  may  be  wrong.  If  the  locus  of 
these  effects  is  not  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs,  then  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  a  set  of 
experiments  designed  to  probe  the  system  at  this  level  failed  to  detect  the  predicted 
effects.  In  fact,  if  the  assumption  is  wrong  then  the  predictions  based  on  this 
assumption  become  untenable. 
In  light  of  this  possibility,  the  following  Chapter  will  take  a  step  backwards  and 
attempt  to  build  on  Experiment  2.1,  which  successfully  showed  semantic  priming  on 
to  a  semantic  decision  for  the  fast  time.  Establishing  the  true  locus  of  this  semantic 123 
priming  effect  may  allow  us  to  better  understand  the  inconsistency  in  the  semantic 
priming  and  interference  effects  reported  above. 124 
CHAPTER  FOUR 
77ze  Locus  of  Semantic  Priming  Effects 
OVERVIEW 
This  chapter  will  attempt  to  build  on  the  success  of  experiment  2.1,  which 
showed  semantic  priming  on  to  a  semantic  decision  for  the  first  time.  Based  on  this 
result  and  on  the  previous  simulations,  the  assumption  was  made  that  the  semantic 
priming  effect  was  mediated  by  activation  levels  within  the  SlU  pool.  However,  the 
results  from  Experiments  2.2,2.3,3.1  and  3.2  have  called  this  assumption  into 
question.  Failure  to  find  the  expected  priming  and  interference  effects  in  these 
experiments  may  mean  that  this  assumption  is  wrong.  This  chapter  will  attempt  to 
determine  the  true  locus  of  this  effect  by  systematically  comparing  familiarity 
decisions  and  semantic  decisions  in  a  semantic  priming  paradigm.  It  has  already  been 
established  that  above  resting  levels  of  activation  at  the  level  of  the  PINs  mediates 
priming  on  to  a  familiarity  decision.  So,  by  observing  the  pattern  of  interaction 
between  the  decision  types  (familiarity  and  semantic)  and  different  prime  types  (Le, 
associated,  familiar  and  unfamiliar),  it  should  be  possible  to  illuminate  the  true  nature 
of  the  semantic  priming  effect.  For  instance,  one  might  expect  an  interaction  between 
decision  type  and  prime  type  if  semantic  priming  is  indeed  mediated  by  SIU 125 
activation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  SIU  activation  levels  are  not  implicated  in  this  effect 
then  one  might  expect  to  see  no  interaction  between  these  conditions. 
ExPERIMENT  4.1 
Introduction 
In  this  first  experiment,  we  replicate  Experiment  2.1,  and  add  a  new  condition. 
We  use  the  design  normally  used  to  demonstrate  priming  with  a  familiarity  decision, 
and  add  conditions  in  which  subjects  are  asked  to  make  a  semantic  decision  about  the 
target  (in  this  case  whether  the  person  is  British  or  American).  We  anticipate  that 
using  a  familiarity  judgement,  we  will  replicate  the  standard  pattern  of  semantic 
priming  (e.  g.,  as  reported  by  Young,  et  al.,  1994).  Items  primed  by  a  associated 
person  (e.  g.  John  Lennon  preceded  by  Paul  McCartney)  will  be  judged  familiar  faster 
than  items  primed  by  an  unrelated  person  (e.  g.,  John  Lennon  preceded  by  Bill 
Clinton),  or  by  a  neutral  (i.  e.,  unfamiliar)  person  (John  Lennon  preceded  by  Jim 
Nolan),  and  that  these  last  two  conditions  will  not  differ.  Posner  and  Snyder  (1975) 
distinguished  automatic  (associated  <  neutral  =  unrelated)  from  strategic  (associated 
<  neutral  <  unrelated)  patterns  of  priming,  the  pattern  anticipated  in  the  current 
clearly  fits  the  'automatic'  description. 126 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  IAC  model  predicts  semantic  priming  onto  a  semantic 
decision.  Therefore,  in  this  experiment,  a  similar  pattern  of  responding  might  be 
expected  across  the  semantic  decision  conditions,  as  has  previously  been  reported  for 
familiarity  decisions. 
This  experiment  uses  name  stimuli,  as  both  primes  and  targets.  In  later 
experiments  face  stimuli  are  introduced. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in 
the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment.  In  order  to  ensure  that  participants  were 
familiar  with  the  critical  items,  anyone  scoring  less  than  75%  correct  in  any  cell  of 
the  design  was  replaced,  and  this  criterion  was  applied  to  all  subsequent  experiments 
in  this  Chapter. 
Materials 
The  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  the  names  of  72  famous  people 
organised  into  three  lists  of  twelve  associated  pain  (see,  Appendix  5).  Each  list  of  12 
pairs  contained  six  British  and  six  American  name  pairs.  These  lists,  combined  with  a 
further  list  of  twelve  unfamiliar  names,  were  manipulated  to  construct  familiar  targets 
for  associated,  familiar  (but  unrelated)  and  neutral  primes.  This  manipulation  resulted 127 
in  three  separate  stimulus  sets  in  which  target  items  were  fully  counterbalanced 
across  the  three  separate  prime  conditions.  Examples  of  primettarget  stimuli  for  each 
condition  are  as  follows:  associated  condition,  Paul  McCartney  /  John  Lennon; 
familiar  condition,  Tony  Blair  /  John  Lennon;  unfamiliar  condition,  Jim  Nolan  / 
Prince  Charles.  The  same  stimuli  were  used  in  both  the  familiarity  judgement  and 
semantic  judgement  conditions.  In  order  to  provide  unfamiliar  target  names  for  the 
familiaritY  judgement  condition  a  further  list  of  36  unfamiliar  names  was  constructed. 
These  unfamfliar  name  targets  were  paired  with  36  famous  prime  names  mirroring 
the  nationality  pattern  described  above.  All  name  stimuli  were  presented  centrally,  in 
a  sans  serif  font  at  point  size  36,  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm. 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  experiment  comprised  two  within-subjects  factors:  judgement  type  with 
two  levels  (familiarityjudgcment  and  semantic  judgement),  and  prime  type  with  three 
levels  (associated,  farniliar-unrelated  and  unfamiliar). 
Each  trial  started  with  a  fixation  cross,  which  remained  on  screen  for  10OOms. 
This  was  followed  by  the  prime  stimulus  for  a  duration  of  250ms,  followed  by  an  ISI 
of  250ms,  followed  by  the  target  stimulus  for  1500ms  (see  Figure  4.1).  Subjects  were 
instructed  to  respond  quickly  and  accurately  to  the  second  name  in  this  sequence.  In 
the  familiarityjudgemcnt  condition,  they  were  asked  to  indicate  whether  the  second 128 
name  was  familiar  or  unfamiliar.  In  the  semantic  judgement  condition,  they  were 
asked  to  indicate  whether  the  second  name  was  British  or  American.  In  both  cases 
subjects  responded  by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons  on  a  computer  keypad  and 
response  latencies,  for  both  decisions,  were  measured  from  the  onset  of  the  target 
stimuli. 
Figure  4.1  11500ms 
250ms  John  Lennon 
250ms  target 
11000ms  Paul  McCartney  is! 
+  prime 
fixation  cross 
In  total  there  were  72  trials  in  the  familiarity  judgement  condition  (half  of  these 
trials  contained  unfamiliar  targets,  from  which  the  data  were  discarded)  and  36  in  the 
semantic  judgement  condition.  All  trials  were  presented  in  a  random  order  within 
each  judgement  type  block,  with  block  order  counterbalanced  across  subjects. 129 
Results 
In  this  and  all  subsequent  experiments  latencies  over  two  seconds  were 
discarded,  as  were  outliers  exceeding  the  participant  mean  by  two  standard 
deviations,  for  any  particular  condition.  This  led  to  7.9%  of  the  data  being  excluded 
overall.  Table  4.1.  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
TABLE  4.1 
Mean  RT  Data  for  Correct  Decisions 
in  Experiment  4.1 
mean  RT  SD  error  rate 
familiarity  judgemnet 
associate  558  81  4.2 
familiar  646  100  6.0 
unfamiliar  641  85  10.6 
semantic  judgemnet 
associate  730  128  7.4 
familiar  794  105  8.8 
unfamiliar  804  83  10.2 
conditions.  The  RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity  vs  semantic  judgement) 
x3  (associated  vs  familiar  vs  neutral  prime)  analysis  of  variance.  The  main  effect  of 
judgement  type  was  significant,  F(l,  17)  =  52.97,  p<0.05,  as  was  the  main  effect  of 
prime  type,  F(2,34)  =  25.76,  p<0.05.  There  was  no  judgement  type  x  prime  type 
interaction,  F(2,34)  <  1.  For  the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  a  Tukey  HSD  test  revealed 130 
differences  between  the  following  conditions:  associated  prime/familiar  prime;  and 
associated  prime/unfamiliar  prime  (p  <  0.05).  The  same  test  revealed  no  differences 
between  familiar  prime/unfamiliar  prime  conditions. 
Discussion 
Ile  results,  using  a  familiarity  decision,  show  reliable  facilitation  for  associated 
primes  as  compared  to  familiar  unrelated  primes,  which  themselves  do  not  differ  from 
unfamiliar  primes.  Ilese  results  are  entirely  consistent  with  the  literature  on 
associative  priming.  While  slower  overall,  the  semantic  judgement  task  shows  an 
exactly  similar  pattern  of  results.  The  comparative  slowness  in  this  condition  is 
consistent  with  the  processing  time  course  outlined  in  Chapter  1.  That  is,  familiarity 
decisions  arc  always  faster  than  semantic  decisions.  The  non-significant  interaction 
for  judgement  type  shows  quite  clearly  that  the  pattern  of  responding  for  the  two 
tasks  is  equivalent.  In  conjunction  with  the  results  from  Experiment  2.1,  we  take  this 
to  be  good  early  evidence  that  semantic  priming  can  be  observed  using  a  semantic 
judgement.  Importantly,  it  appears  that  the  same  mechanisms  underlie  this  priming, 
as  underlie  priming  in  the  traditional  familiarity  decision  task.  However,  before 
drawing  this  strong  conclusion,  it  is  necessary  to  explore  the  effect  more  thoroughly, 
and  this  is  done  in  the  following  experiments. 131 
ExPEFJMENT  4.2 
Introduction 
In  this  experiment,  Experiment  4.1  is  replicated,  this  time  using  face  stimuli 
instead  of  names.  It  is  a  well-established  property  of  semantic  priming  that  the  same 
pattern  of  results  can  be  observed  using  either  type  of  stimuli,  and  this  is 
accommodated  in  structural  models  by  proposing  that  the  effect  relies  on  processes 
which  follow  convergence  of  recognition  routes  for  narnes  and  faces.  A  clear 
prediction  from  this  style  of  theorising  is  that  the  same  pattern  will  hold  for  faces,  in 
this  experiment.  as  was  found  in  Experiment  4.1  for  names.  As  in  Experiment  4.1,  we 
examine  priming  for  both  familiarity  and  semantic  decisions  within  the  same  study. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow 
participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Materials 
Ile  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  the  faces  of  48  famous  people  organised 
into  three  lists  of  eight  associated  pairs  (see  Appendix  6).  Each  set  of  eight  pairs 
contained  four  British  and  four  American  pairs.  These  three  sets,  combined  with  a 
further  set  of  eight  unfamiliar  faces,  were  manipulated  to  construct  familiar  targets  for 132 
associated,  familiar  (but  unrelated)  and  unfamiliar  primes.  This  manipulation  resulted 
in  three  separate  stimulus  sets  in  which  target  items  were  fully  counterbalanced 
across  the  three  separate  prime  conditions.  These  stimuli  were  used  in  both  the 
familiarity  judgement  and  semantic  judgement  conditions.  In  order  to  provide 
unfamiliar  target  faces  for  the  familiarity  judgement  condition,  images  of  a  further  set 
of  24  unfamiliar  faces  were  taken  from  a  database  of  photographic  portraits.  These 
unfamiliar  targets  were  paired  with  famous  primes  mirroring  the  nationality  divisions 
described  above. 
All  face  images  were  edited  to  remove  background  material  and  clothing, 
leaving  only  the  face  and  hair.  Images  were  standardised  to  have  height  6cm,  and 
were  then  pasted  centrally  onto  an  8cm  square  grey  background.  The  stimuli  were 
viewed  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm. 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  design  and  procedure  for  this  experiment  was  the  same  as  for  Experiment 
1,  except  that  face  stimuli  were  used  instead  of  names.  Examples  of  stimuli  are 
show  in  Figure  4.2. 133 
Figure  4.2 
Results 
Table  4.2  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
conditions.  The  criteria  for  errors  was  the  same  as  in  Experiment  1,  and  this  led  to 
12.8%  of  the  data  being  excluded.  The  RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity 
vs  semantic  judgement)  x3  (associated  vs  familiar  vs  unfamiliar  prime)  ANOVA. 
The  main  effect  of  judgement  type  was  significant,  F(1,23)  =  44.05,  p<0.05,  as  was 
the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  F(2,46)  =  14.5  1,  p<0.05.  There  was  no  interaction 
between  the  two  factors,  F(2,46)  <  1.  For  the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  a  Tukey  HSD 
test  revealed  differences  between  the  following  conditions:  associated  prime/familiar 134 
prime;  and  associated  prime/unfamiliar  prime  (p  <  0.05).  The  same  test  revealed  no 
differences  between  familiar  prime/unfan-iiliar  prime  conditions. 
TABLE  4.2 
Mean  RT  Data  for  Correct  Decisions 
in  Experiment  4.2 
mean  RT  SD  error  rate 
familiarity  judgemnet 
associate  683  123  12.0 
familiar  767  132  14.6 
unfamiliar  755  141  16.7 
semantic  judgemnet 
associate  824  141  6.8 
familiar  907  150  12.0 
unfamiliar  919  118  15.1 
Discussion 
The  results  here  show  a  clear  semantic  priming  effect,  with  facilitation  in  the 
associated  condition  as  compared  to  the  unrelated  and  neutral  prime  conditions, 
which  themselves  do  not  differ.  As  with  Experiment  4.1,  the  pattern  of  priming  is 
identical  regardless  of  whether  subjects  make  a  familiarity  or  a  semantic  judgement. 
The  semantic  judgements  are  reliably  slower  than  familiarity  judgements,  and  this  is 
again  consistent  with  Experiment  4.1. 
The  results  from  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2  could  relatively  simply  be 
accommodated  either  by  a  structural  or  an  episodic  account  of  semantic  priming.  As 135 
discussed  earlier,  an  IAC  account  necessarily  requires  activation  of  semantic 
properties  for  semantic  priming  to  occur.  Similarly,  co-occurrence  theories  might 
easily  predict  that  people  seen  together  share  some  semantic  properties,  and  so 
evidence  of  facilitation  can  be  observed  when  probing  these  properties. 
A  fuller  discussion  of  these  issues  will  be  postponed  until  the  general 
discussion  section  of  this  chapter.  However,  consideration  of  the  shared  semantic 
properties  of  people  who  co-occur  highlights  a  potential  confound  in  Experiments  4.1 
and  4.2.  In  both  experiments  subjects  were  required  that  make  nationality  decisions 
to  familiar  people,  preceded  by  an  associate,  ak  unrelated  familiar  person,  or  a  neutral 
person.  The  nature  of  this  particular  decision  is  that  related  pairs  of  people  are  likely 
to  share  the  same  nationality,  and  indeed  all  pairs  in  these  experiments  do  so. 
Although  subjects  are  not  required  to  make  a  nationality  decision  to  the  prime  face,  it 
is  possible  that  they  could  use  this  compatibility  to  make  the  subsequent  decision  to 
the  prime.  For  this  reason,  all  primes  and  targets  in  the  familiar  unrelated  conditions 
in  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2  were  constructed  to  be  compatible  in  respect  of 
nationality.  So,  all  familiar  targets  were  preceded  by  a  prime  of  the  same  nationality, 
whether  related  or  noL  This  makes  for  a  fair  comparison  between  associated  and 
unrelated  conditions.  However,  it  makes  it  difficult  to  argue  that  unrelated  familiar 136 
items  behave  in  the  same  way  as  neutral  items  in  these  experiments,  because  it  is  not 
possible  to  assign  a  nationality  to  the  neutral  items.  In  the  following  experiments,  we 
split  the  unrelated  condition  into  two  sub-conditions,  such  that  the  nationality  of  the 
primes  can  be  either  compatible  or  incompatible  with  the  targets. 
ExPERINIENT  4.3 
This  experiment  uses  name  stimuli,  at  prime  and  test,  and  is  very  similar  to 
Experiment  4.1.  The  difference  is  that  a  second,  unrclatcd-familiar  prime  type, 
condition  has  been  added  in  order  to  investigate  possible  effects  of  compatibility 
between  prime  and  target.  In  this  additional  familiar  condition,  prime/target  pairs  are 
of  different  nationalities.  It  is  predicted  that,  as  in  previous  experiments,  there  will  be 
a  facilitation-dominant  effect  of  the  associated  prime.  Further,  if  the  effect  observed 
in  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2  is  due  to  the  general  relatedness  of  the  prime  and  target 
items,  then  no  difference  should  be  observed  between  the  unfamiliar-same- 
nationality.  unfamiliar-different-nationality  and  neutral  conditions  in  this  experiment. 
However,  if  the  effect  is  based  on  response  compatibility  (i.  e.,  same  nationality)  then 
a  difference  might  be  expected  between  these  three  conditions,  with  faster  responding 
in  the  unfamiliar-same-nationality  condition. 137 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated 
in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Materials 
The  critical  stimuli  were  sixteen  pairs  of  closely  associated  people,  who  were 
well  known  to  the  student  population  at  the  time  of  the  experiment.  The  names  of 
these  people  were  organised  into  four  separate  lists  of  eight  associated  pairs  (see 
Appendix  7)  such  that  each  member  of  each  pair  appeared  as  both  prime  and  target 
items  on  different  occasions.  Each  list  of  eight  pairs  contained  four  British  and  four 
American  pairs.  These  lists,  combined  with  a  further  list  of  eight  unfamiliar  names, 
were  manipulated  to  construct  familiar  targets  for:  related,  unrelated-same- 
nationality,  unrelated-different-nationality,  and  neutral  primes.  This  manipulation 
resulted  in  four  separate  stimulus  sets  in  which  target  items  were  fully 
counterbalanced  across  the  four  prime  conditions.  The  stimuli  were  used  in  both  the 
familiarity  judgement  and  semantic  judgement  conditions.  In  order  to  provide 
unfamiliar  target  names,  for  the  familiarity  judgement  condition,  a  further  list  of  32 
unfamiliar  names  was  constructed.  These  unfamiliar  name  targets  were  paired  with 
primes  (including  24  famous  names  and  8  unfamiliar  names)  from  another  list, 138 
mirroring  the  nationality  pattern  described  above.  The  viewing  conditions  ere  the 
samc  as  in  Expcrimcnt  4.1. 
Design  and  Procedure 
7lie  experiment  had  two  within-subjects  factors:  judgement  type  with  two 
levels  (familiarity  vs  semantic  judgement);  and  prime  type,  with  four  levels 
-  (associated,  unrelated-same-nationality,  unrelated-different-nationality  and  neutral 
primes). 
In  total  there  were  72  trials  in  the  familiarity  judgement  condition  (half  of 
which  contained  unfamiliar  targets)  and  36  in  the  semantic  judgement  condition.  The 
critical  stimulus  sets  were  identical  for  familiarity  and  semantic  decisions  and  were 
fully  rotated  around  the  prime  type  conditions,  between  subjects.  All  trials  were 
presented  in  a  random  order  within  each  judgement  type  block,  with  block  order 
counterbalanced  across  subjects. 
Stimulus  presentation  and  experimental  procedures  were  the  same  as  in 
Experiments  4.1  and  4.2. 
Results 
Table  4.3.  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
conditions.  In  this  experiment,  and  in  the  subsequent  experiments  in  this  Chapter, 
latencies  over  two  seconds  were  discarded,  as  were  outliers  exceeding  the  participant 139 
mean  by  two  standard  deviations,  for  any  particular  condition.  This  led  to  2.9%  of  the 
raw  data  being  excluded.  Incorrect  responses  accounted  for  a  further  8.3%  of  the  total 
data.  Ilese  error  rates  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity  vs  semantic  judgement)  x 
4  (related  vs  unrelated-same-nationality  vs  unrelated-different-nationality  vs  neutral 
prime)  ANOVA,  which  showed  that  the  error  pattern  did  not  differ  between  the 
experimental  conditions:  main  effect  of  judgement  type,  F(1,3  1)  <  1;  main  effect  of 
prime  type.  F(3,93)  <  1;  judgement  type  x  prime  type  interaction,  F(3,93)  =  1.62,  p> 
0.1. 
RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity  vs  semantic  judgement)  x4 
(related  vs  unrelated-same-nationality  vs  unrelated-different-nationality  vs  neutral 
prime)  ANOVA.  Ile  main  effect  of  judgement  type  was  significant,  F(1,3  1)  =  75.53, 
p<0.05,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  F(3,93)  =  7.4  1,  p<0.05.  The 
judgement  type  x  prime  type  interaction  was  non  significant  F(3,93)  <  1.  For  the  main 
effect  of  prime  type,  a  Tukey  HSD  test  (p  <  0.05)  revealed  differences  between  the 
related  prime  condition  and  each  of  the  other  three  conditions.  No  other  differences 
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TABLE  4.3 
Mean  FIT  Data  for  Correct  Decisions 
in  Experiment  4.3 
prime  rvpe  mean  RT  SD  error  rate  M 
familiarity  judgement 
associate  681  108  6.0 
fantiliar-same-nationality  730  115  11.7 
farailiar-different-nationality  735  121  7.7 
unfamiliar  731  125  7.7 
semantic  judgement 
associate  844  129  8.5 
fanriiliar-same-nationality  900  133  8.5 
fanOiar-diffcrent-nationality  907  151  8.5 
unfamiliar  894  135  8.1 
(Unfamilair  targets.,  mean  RT,  916ms;  error  rateA  6%) 
Discussion 
The  results  here  confirm  the  priming  effects  found  in  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2. 
For  both  familiarity  and  semantic  decisions,  associated  primes  give  an  advantage  over 
unrelated  or  neutral  primes,  and  none  of  these  differ.  Once  again,  while  slower 
overall,  the  semantic  judgement  leads  to  exactly  the  same  pattern  of  RTs  as  is 
normally  found  for  a  familiarity  judgement.  The  non-significant  interaction  for 
judgement  type  confirms  that  the  pattern  of  responding  for  the  two  tasks  is 
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Most  importantly,  there  is  no  difference  between  responses  to  unrelated-same- 
nationality  primes  and  unrelated-different-nationality  primes,  suggesting  that  the 
effects  observed  here  are  based  on  the  relatedness  of  primes  and  targets,  rather  than 
on  response  compatibility. 
ExPERIAIENT  4.4 
Introduction 
In  this  experiment,  we  replicate  Experiment  4.3  using  face  stimuli  instead  of 
names.  The  data  already  reported  in  this  chapter  suggest  that  the  pattern  of 
responding  in  the  current  experiment,  using  face  stimuli,  should  be  equivalent  to  the 
pattern  found  in  Experiment  4.3,  which  used  names.  That  is,  there  will  be  a 
facilitation-dominant  priming  effect  of  the  associated  prime  and  no  differences 
between  the  other  conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow 
participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 142 
Materials 
The  critical  experimental  stimuli  were  sets  of  faces  constructed  from  the  same 
lists  as  were  used  in  Experiment  4.3,  although  some  minor  changes  were  made  due  to 
the  availability  of  suitable  face  images  of  certain  familiar  people  (see  Appendix  8). 
The  method  used  to  construct  the  critical  stimulus  sets  was  exactly  the  same  as  that 
used  in  Experiment  4.3.  The  stimulus  sets  for  unfamiliar  judgements,  in  the 
familiarity  judgement  condition,  were  prepared  in  the  same  way  as  in  Experiment  4.3, 
this  time  using  faces  instead  of  names.  Stimulus  preparation  and  presentation  were 
the  same  as  in  Experiment  4.2. 
Design  and  Procedure 
The  design  and  procedure  for  this  experiment  was  the  same  as  for  Experiment 
4.3,  except  that  faces  were  used  instead  of  names. 
Results 
Table  4.4  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  for  the  different 
conditions.  Using  the  same  outlier  criteria  as  Experiment  3,2.1  %  of  the  data  were 
excluded  from  the  analysis.  Incorrect  responses  accounted  for  a  further  9.0%  of  the 
total  data.  These  error  rates  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity  vs  semantic 
judgement)  x4  (related  vs  unrelated-same-nationality  vs  unrelated-different- 
nationality  vs  neutral  prime)  ANOVA,  which  showed  that  the  error  pattern  did  not 143 
differ  between  the  experimental  conditions:  main  effect  of  judgement  type,  F(1,23)  = 
1.88,  p  >  0.1;  main  effect  of  prime  type,  F(3,69)  =  2.01,  p  >  0.1;  judgement  type  x 
primc  typc  intcraction,  F(3,69)  <  1. 
TABLE  4.4 
Mean  RT  Data  for  Correct  Decisions 
in  Experiment  4.4 
prime  tvpe  mean  RT  SD  error  rate 
famitiarily  judgement 
associate  670  112  7.8 
familiar-same-nationality  719  119  6.3 
famifiar-diffcrent-nafionality  737  147  9.4 
unfamiliar  741  147  9.4 
semanticjudgement 
associate  793  129  7.8 
familiar-same-nationality  865  156  8.3 
familiar-differcnt-nationality  841  135  14.1 
unfamiliar  832  162  9.4 
(UnfamiLair  targeu:  mean  RT,  887ms.  .  error  rate, 
RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (familiarity  vs  semantic  judgement)  x4 
(related  vs  unrelated-same-nationality  vs  unrelated-different-nationality  vs  neutral 
prime)  ANOVA.  Ile  main  effect  ofjudgement  rype  was  significant,  F(1,23)  = 
28.97.  p<0.05,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  F(3,69)  =  5.58,  p<0.05.  The 
judgement  type  x  prime  type  interaction  was  non  significant  F(3,69)=  1.88,  p>0.05. 
For  the  main  effect  of  prime  type,  a  Tukey  HSD  test  (p  <  0.05)  revealed  differences 144 
between  the  related  prime  condition  and  each  of  the  other  three  conditions.  No  other 
differences  were  significanL 
Discussion 
The  results  here  are  very  similar  to  those  reported  in  Experiment  4.3,  once 
again  showing  a  clear  semantic  priming  effect  for  close  associates  when  a  semantic 
judgernent  is  called  for.  There  is  reliable  facilitation  in  the  associated  condition  as 
compared  to  all  the  remaining  three  conditions,  which  thcrnselves  do  not  diffcr. 
Familiarity  judgements  are  again  reliably  faster  than  the  semantic  judgements,  but  the 
non-signif  icant  interaction  demonstrates  that  the  pattern  of  responding  is  the  same  for 
both  judgenicnt  types. 
Again,  there  is  no  difference  between  responses  to  unrelated-same-nationality 
primes  and  unrclated-different-nationality  primes.  This  supports  the  conclusion 
drawn  in  Experiment  43  that  the  effects  observed  here  are  based  on  the  relatedness  of 
primes  and  targets,  rather  than  on  response  compati  1  ity. 
A  fuller  discussion  of  the  implications  of  Experiments  4.1  to  4.4  will  be 
presented  in  the  General  Discussion,  but  before  doing  so  a  final  experiment  is 
conducted,  in  which  subjects  are  asked  to  make  a  different  decision  at  test.  Sex 
judScmcnts  have  commonly  been  used  in  studies  of  face  recognition,  and  current 145 
theoretical  views  hold  that  judgement  of  sex  takes  place  in  parallel  to  judgements  of 
familiarity  (Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling,  &  Young,  1987).  Sex  judgements  have  previously 
been  found  not  to  give  rise  either  to  repetition  priming  (e.  g.,  Ellis  et  al.,  1990)  or  to 
semantic  priýning  (Young  et  al.,  1994)  -  Structural  theories  of  person  recognition 
generally  accommodate  these  findings  by  suggesting  that  prin-ýng  takes  place  in  the 
system  responsible  for  processing  a  person's  identity,  and  not  in  the  system 
processing  other  facets  such  as  the  sex  or  expression  of  a  face.  By  these  accounts, 
priming  onto  a  sex  judgement  would  not  be  expected  in  the  types  of  experimental 
designs  used  in  this  chapter.  However,  since  ýve  have  found  exactly  the  same  pattern 
of  priming  for  two  rather  different  decisions  (familiarity  and  nationality),  across  four 
different  experiments,  and  across  names  and  faces,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  whether 
the  effects  reported  here  hold  for  any  decision  participants  might  make  about  a  person 
in  this  type  of  design. 
EXPERIMENT  4.5 
Introduction 
In  the  final  experiment  in  this  Chapter,  we  ask  subjects  to  make  sex  decisions  to 
target  stimuli.  Our  aim  is  to  establish  whether  personal  association  gives  rise  to 140 
facilitation  of  any  judgement,  or  whether,  as  in  previously  published  research,  the 
same  items  which  provide  priming  on  one  type  of  decision  fail  to  show  priming  using 
a  different  type  of  decision.  As  no  difference  was  found  between  RTs  to  items  primed 
by  unrelated-same-nationality  and  unrelated-different-nationality  conditions  in  either 
Experiments  4.3  or  4.4,  these  separate  conditions  are  collapsed  into  one  unrelated- 
prime  condition  for  this  experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow 
participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Materials 
The  critical  stimuli  were  the  faces  of  eighteen  pairs  of  closely  associated 
people,  who  were  well  known  to  the  student  population  at  the  time  of  the  experiment. 
Many  of  these  stimulus  pairs  were  identical  to  those  used  in  Experiment  4.4.  These 
pairings  always  comprised  one  female  and  one  male.  These  people  were  organised 
into  three  separate  lists  of  twelve  associated  pairs  (see  Appendix  9)  such  that  each 
member  of  each  pair  appeared  as  both  prime  and  target  items  on  different  occasions. 
These  lists,  combined  with  a  further  list  of  twelve  unfamiliar  faces,  were  manipulated 
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manipulation  resulted  in  three  separate  stimulus  sets  in  which  target  items  were  fully 
counterbalanced  across  the  three  prime  conditions.  Equal  numbers  of  male/male  and 
female/female  filler  items  were  added  to  the  stimulus  sets,  making  it  impossible  to 
predict  the  sex  of  the  target  from  the  sex  of  the  prime.  Stimulus  preparation  and 
viewing  conditions  were  identical  to  previous  experiments. 
Design  and  Procedure 
A  single  factor  within  subjects  design  was  used,  with  three  levels  (associated, 
unrelated  and  neutral  prime  types).  Stimulus  presentation  and  experimental 
procedures  were  the  same  as  in  the  previous  experiments.  The  only  difference  was 
that  a  sex  decision  (male/female)  was  required  to  the  target  stimuli.  Items  were  fully 
rotated  around  conditions. 
Results 
Sex  decisions  are  very  easy  for  subjects,  and  only  0.35%  of  responses  were 
excluded  by  the  usual  outlier  criteria.  Incorrect  responses  accounted  for  a  further 
2.6%  of  the  total  data  and  did  not  give  rise  to  any  significant  differences  between 
conditions,  F(2,46)  <  1.  Table  1.5  shows  the  mean  correct  RTs  and  error  rate  by 
condition.  A  single  factor  ANOVA  showed  no  significant  effect  of  prime  type, 
F(2,46)  =  1.53,  p>0.2. 148 
TABLE  4.5 
Mean  RT  Data  for  Correct  Sex  Decisions 
in  Experiment  4.5 
prime  type  mean  RT  SD  error  rate 
associate  612  86  2.6 
familiar  625  75  3.6 
unfamiliar  608  69  2.6 
Discussion 
There  is  no  evidence  of  priming  using  the  sex  decision.  Although  one  should  be 
careful  not  to  argue  that  the  null  hypothesis  has  been  proven,  it  is  certainly  the  case 
that  we  have  failed  to  show  priming  in  an  experimental  context  where  it  was  observed 
using  different  decisions  (Experiments  4.1  to  4.4).  These  results  show  that  semantic 
relatedness  does  not  produce  priming  for  any  arbitrary  decision.  Instead,  it  seems  to 
rely  on  decisions  that  require  the  perceiver  uniquely  to  identify  the  person  shown. 
Both  familiarity  and  semantic  judgements,  of  the  type  used  in  Experiments  4.1  to  4.4, 
require  access  to  processes  underlying  identity,  and  it  is  in  these  circumstances  that 
priming  is  evident.  A  judgement  that  can  be  made  without  accessing  personal 
information  (and  which  can  easily  be  made  for  unfamiliar  faces)  shows  no  priming. 149 
GENERAL  DISCUSSION 
The  experiments  in  this  Chapter  show  the  following:  First,  semantic  priming 
has  been  demonstrated,  for  the  first  time,  using  a  semantic  decision  to  target  items; 
Second,  the  pattern  of  this  semantic  priming  is  identical  to  priming  normally 
observed  with  a  familiarity  decision,  and  this  pattern  is  the  same  regardless  of 
whether  subjects  make  decisions  to  name  or  face  stimuli;  Third,  this  pattern  does  not 
hold  for  any  arbitrary  decision,  because  it  is  not  observed  when  using  a  sex  decision 
with  the  same  design  and  similar  items. 
As  we  described  in  the  Introduction,  the  IAC  model  of  person  recognition 
(Burton  et  al.,  1990,1999),  rests  on  the  proposal  that  there  is  a  pool  of  semantic 
nodes  (so  called  SIUs)  which  is  accessed  after  classification  of  the  person  as  familiar 
(at  the  PIN  level,  see  Figure  1).  Furthermore,  the  account  of  semantic  priming  relies 
on  the  notion  that  these  semantic  units  are  shared  between  people,  so  two  associated 
known  people  (say,  Paul  McCartney  &  John  Lennon)  share  in  conunon  units 
representing  "musician",  "Beatle"  and  so  forth.  Highly  associated  people  will  share 
many  units,  and  so  activation  spreading  along  connecting  links  will  cause  some 
activation  to  accumulate  in  the  PIN  of  a  close  associate  of  a  recognised  person. ISO 
This  architecture  necessarily  implies  that  evidence  of  semantic  priming  should 
be  observed  in  the  semantic  system  itselL  Since  semantic  priming  is  held  to  rest  on 
activation  in  this  system,  it  should  be  possible  to  observe  it  by  asking  subjects  to 
make  semantic  decisions.  Furthermore,  evidence  of  semantic  priming  should  be 
observable  for  an  arbitrary  semantic  decision,  since  activation  is  held  to  flow  from  a 
PIN  to  all  connected  SfUs.  In  these  experiments  we  have  used  a  nationality  decision, 
but  note  that  it  is  not  the  nationality  of  the  stimuli  which  links  together  the  associated 
people.  We  know  that  both  John  Lennon  and  Paul  McCartney  are  British,  but  it  is  not 
only  their  nationality  which  links  them,  rather  the  many  attributes  they  share  in 
common.  Furthermore,  the  priming  seems  to  rely  on  the  close  association  of  two 
people  (putatively  through  sharing  many  SIUs),  rather  than  on  them  sharing  just  the 
same  nationality.  In  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2,  there  was  no  RT  difference  between 
items  primed  by  unrelated  familiar  items  with  the  same  or  different  nationalities.  This 
strongly  suggests  that  the  effects  observed  here  are  based  on  the  relatedness  of  primes 
and  targets,  rather  than  response  compatibility. 
The  evidence  presented  here  is  consistent  with  the  IAC  account  of  semantic 
priming  insofar  as  we  have  detected  evidence  of  this  priming  within  the  semantic 
system  itselL  We  now  explore  the  theoretical  mechanisms  that  might  account  for 151 
these  effects:  why  does  semantic  priming  occur  for  semantic  decisions?  One  possible 
solution  would  be  to  propose  a  mechanism,  by  which  SIUs  rise  faster  to  some 
decision  threshold  when  primed,  thus  allowing  faster  semantic  decision.  The 
experiments  in  Chapters  2  and  3  were  built  on  this  proposal.  However,  this  solution 
now  seems  implausible.  In  Experiments  4.1  and  4.2.  there  was  a  clear  difference  in 
reaction  time  between  items  primed  by  a  related  person  and  those  primed  by  an 
unrelated  but  same  nationality  person.  In  both  of  these  cases,  the  prime  item 
presumably  activates  a  nationality  SIU,  and  this  is  shared  by  the  target.  When  the 
target  is  shown  very  shortly  afterwards,  this  nationality  SIU  is  presumably  either  still 
active,  or  only  marginally  sub-threshold,  making  it  difficult  to  account  for  the  clear 
behavioural  difference  between  these  two  cases. 
We  propose  that  the  locus  of  semantic  prin-ýing  observed  here  is  in  fact  the  same 
locus  as  proposed  for  priming  onto  a  familiaritY  judgement,  that  is,  it  is  an  effect 
based  on  sub-threshold  activation  of  PINs  for  primed  items.  Consider  the  task  of 
deciding  that  a  person  is  British.  In  order  to  do  this,  one  must  have  simultaneously 
active  an  SIU  ("British")  and  also  a  PIN  (this  person).  If  the  SIU  is  already  active,  the 
decision  still  cannot  be  made  until  the  relevant  PIN  crosses  the  familiarity  threshold. 
So,  if  we  see  Paul  MacCartney's  face,  his  PIN  and  SIUs  become  active,  and  this 152 
causes  some  activation  in  John  Lennon's  PIN.  When  Lennon's  face  is  presented,  his 
PIN  will  reach  familiarity  threshold  faster  than  normal  (i.  e.  had  he  been  preceded  by 
someone  who  does  not  share  many  SIUs),  and  so  the  ability  to  make  the  judgement 
that  his  PIN  and  the  "'British"  SIU  are  simultaneously  active  will  be  speeded. 
This  proposal  is  completely  consistent  with  previous  work  suggesting  a  single 
locus  for  semantic  priming.  Young  et  al.  (1994)  showed  the  same  advantage  for 
semantic  priming  regardless  of  whether  the  task  was  familiarity  or  naming.  The 
authors  argued  that  this  implies  a  common  locus  of  priming,  and  proposed  that  PIN 
level  is  the  most  consistent  theoretical  proposal.  We  concur  with  this  conclusion,  and 
believe  it  can  be  recruited  easily  to  fit  the  data  here.  Of  course,  there  are  problems 
which  this  account  cannot  address.  First,  why  is  a  semantic  decision  slower  than  a 
familiaritY  judgement,  if  it  is  at  heart  reliant  on  rising  activation  in  the  PINs? 
Although  we  have  not  spelled  out  a  mechanism  for  establishing  that  two  units  (a  PIN 
and  an  SIU)  are  simultaneously  above  threshold  it  nevertheless  seems  reasonable  that 
this  will  require  more  processing,  and  hence  be  slower,  than  making  this  decision  for 
a  single  unit,  as  in  a  familiarity  decision.  Furthermore,  our  suggestion  does  not  solve 
the  binding  problem.  If  Paul  McCartney's  PIN  is  active  simultaneously  with  the 
"British"  SIU,  how  do  we  establish  that  these  refer  to  the  same  person?  In  fact,  the 153 
IAC  architecture  allows  simultaneous  presentation  of  more  than  one  person,  and  so 
SlUs  could  simultaneously  be  active  that  apply  to  one  and  only  one  of  the  input 
people.  The  experiments  reported  here  are  certainly  not  able  to  resolve  such  complex 
issues,  and  so  we  must  acknowledge  them  as  outstanding.  Here  we  simply  note  that 
the  explanation  ig  consistent  with  the  observed  behaviour,  and  that  the  model  has 
previously  been  used  to  capture  interference  effects  in  which  more  than  one  person  is 
presented  simultaneously  (e.  g.,  those  reported  by  Young,  Ellis,  Flude,  McWceny  & 
Hay,  1986).  Such  experiments  show  that  when  asked  to  make  a  semantic 
categorisation  to  a  person's  name,  a  simultaneously  presented  face  from  a  competing 
category  slows  the  decision.  This  suggests  that  there  is  some  cost  to  binding  a  PIN  to 
SIUs  when  these  are  in  competition.  However,  the  nature  of  the  binding  process  itself 
seems  unlikely  to  be  captured  in  a  model  as  simple  as  the  one  used  here. 
We  should  also  consider  whether  these  results  have  implications  for  alternative 
accounts  of  priming.  As  we  described  in  Chapter  1,  one  view  of  semantic  priming  is 
that  it  relies  on  the  co-occurrence  of  related  items  (pairs  of  people  here).  This  view 
seems  broadly  compatible  with  the  more  general  episodic  view  of  priming  advanced 
by  some  researchers  (e.  g.,  Jacoby  &  Brooks,  1984;  Roediger,  Wcldon,  &  Challis, 
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It  is  not  straightforward  to  use  a  co-occurrence  style  of  account  to  explain  the 
data  presented  in  this  chapter.  The  semantic  property  used  here  (nationality)  is 
presumably  not  invoked  explicitly  every  time  one  sees  a  familiar  person.  It  is 
therefore  not  easy  to  imagine  how  this  could  form  part  of  the  episode  of  seeing 
someone.  If  one  has  often  seen  Lennon  and  McCartney  together,  one  might  naturally 
expect  seeing  Lennon  to  act  as  a  cue  for  recognising  McCartney,  but  why  should  it 
act  as  a  cue  for  retrieving  McCartney's  nationality?  On  the  other  hand,  if  people's 
attributes  all  form  part  of  the  episode  of  seeing  them,  then  it  is  not  clear  why  some  of 
their  characteristics  (e.  g.,  their  nationality)  should  give  rise  to  priming,  while  others 
(e.  g.,  their  sex)  do  not.  For  this  pattern  of  results  to  hold,  one  needs  to  make  a 
functional  distinction  between  semantic  and  sex  decisions.  Although  it  would 
probably  be  feasible  to  make  such  a  distinction  within  an  episodic  account,  this  seems 
to  require  more  theoretical  work  than  is  required  in  appealing  to  the  structural 
account.  This  pattern  of  results  was  not  used  to  construct  models  such  as  IAC,  but  it 
nevertheless  seems  to  emerge  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  proposed  structure  of 
person  recognition. 
Of  course,  major  theoretical  debates  are  very  unlikely  to  be  settled  on  the  basis 
of  a  simple  set  of  experiments  such  as  we  have  presented  here.  However,  converging 155 
evidence  for  person  recognition  (e.  g.,  Ellis  et  al.,  1996;  Burton  ct  al.,  1999)  does 
seem  to  favour  structural  over  episodic  accounts,  and  the  present  data  appear 
consistent  with  this  converging  evidence.  Whatever  the  eventual  resolution  of  this 
debate,  the  data  we  have  presented  here  constrain  future  models  of  person 
recognition,  and  will  need  to  be  incorporated  within  them. 156 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
Sex  as  a  semantic  decision 
OVERVIEW 
This  chapter  looks  at  the  normal  absence  of  repetition  priming  on  to  sex 
decisions,  in  the  area  of  person  recognition.  Traditionally  such  decisions  are  thought 
to  be  based  on  structural  type  codes,  that  are  processed  independently  from  the  type 
of  codes  that  specify  identity  information  (Ellis  et  al.,  1990).  This  chapter  takes  a 
novel  approach  to  this  issue,  by  forcing  participants  to  treat  sex  as  semantic  decision. 
In  the  experiments  that  follow,  participants  will  be  forced  to  use  their  memory  in 
order  to  make  sex  judgements.  In  all  previous  experiments  in  this  area,  participants 
have  been  able  to  use  superficial  aspects  of  the  face  stimuli  to  make  this  type  of 
decision.  The  proposition  here  is  that  when  memory  is  accessed  in  order  to  make  such 
decision,  repetition  priming  should  be  evident. 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  1,  repetition  priming  in  person  recognition  is  a  well- 
established  phenomenon  (e.  g.,  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985).  In  a  typical  experiment, 
subjects  are  shown  a  set  of  face  images  and  asked  to  make  a  judgements  about  each 
(e.  g.,  familiar/unfamiliar).  Some  time  later  they  are  shown  a  further  set  of  faces, 
some  of  which  appeared  in  the  earlier  phase,  and  again  asked  to  make  a  decision 157 
about  each.  In  this  second  phase,  subjects  are  faster  to  respond  to  those  faces  which 
were  seen  at  the  prime  stage.  In  this  type  of  experiment,  the  interval  between  prime 
and  test  phases  is  normally  in  the  order  of  minutes,  but  priming  has  been  shown  to 
last  much  longer,  and  persists  even  when  the  image  or  viewing  context  is  changed 
between  prime  and  test  phases  (e.  g.,  Bruce,  Carson,  Burton,  &  Kelly,  1998). 
This  is  very  well  researched  area,  and  the  characteristics  of  this  effect  are 
relatively  uncontentious.  For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  the  key  findings  in  the  area 
are  as  follows: 
1.  Using  faces  as  stimuli,  and  a  familiarity  judgement  in  the  test  phase,  any  prior 
decision  will  produce  priming.  For  example,  tasks  as  diverse  as  familiarity 
judgements,  nationality  judgements,  expression  judgements  and  sex 
judgements,  have  all  been  shown  to  prime  a  subsequent  familiarity  judgement 
to  a  face  (Ellis,  Young,  &  Flude,  1990). 
2.  Using  familiarity  judgements  at  both  prime  and  test  phases,  the  effect  does  not 
cross  stimulus  domains.  So,  names  prime  names,  and  faces  prime  faces,  but 
they  do  not  prime  each  other  (Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985;  Burton  et  al.,  1998; 
Ellis  et  al.,  1996). 
3.  The  effect  does  cross  stimulus  domains  when  a  semantic  decision  (e.  g., 
British/American)  is  used  at  prime  and  test  phases.  Furthermore,  names  and Is& 
faces  prime  one  another  even  when  a  different  semantic  decision  is  used  at 
prime  and  test  phases,  for  example,  dead/alive  followed  by  British/American 
(Burton  et  al.,  1998). 
4.  Priming  is  never  observed  onto  faces  when  a  sex  decision  is  required  at  test, 
even  when  the  prime  phase  task  is  exactly  the  same  sex  judgement  (Ellis  et  al., 
1990;  though  see  Goshen-Gottstein  &  Gannel,  2000,  which  showed  repetition 
priming  effects  using  part  faces). 
These  results  have  been  interpreted  as  support  for  a  class  of  structural  models  of 
person  recognition,  broadly  captured  in  Figure  5.1  (Ellis  et  al,  1996;  Burton  ct  al, 
Figure  5.1.  This  figure  provides  an  overview  of  the  implemented  model  of  familiar 
face  recognition  (Burton  et  aL,  1990),  which  was  described  in  detail  in  Chapter  1. 
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1998).  Repetition  priming  is  held  to  operate  within  the  system  for  recognising  the 
identity  of  a  person,  and  to  reflect  changes  due  to  repeated  use  of  particular 
recognition  routes.  Processes  underlying  face  and  name  recognition  are  held  to 
converge  at  the  point  where  a  familiarity  judgement  is  made.  Subsequent  access  to 
personal  information  is  independent  of  the  route  by  which  the  person  was  recognised. 
Hence,  we  would  expect  recognising  a  face  asfamiliar  will  strengthen  Pathway  A 
(see  Fig  5.1),  and  facilitate  subsequent  recognition  of  that  face,  but  not  of  that 
person's  narne  (as  Pathway  B  has  not  been  strengthened).  However,  accessing 
semantic  information  about  a  person  requires  that  Pathway  C  is  used,  regardless  of 
whether  the  person  is  recognised  by  face  or  name,  hence  the  cross-domain  priming  of 
semantic  judgements.  Figure  5.1  captures  the  essence  of  this  account  for  the  purpose 
of  this  chapter,  and  provides  an  overview  of  the  implemented  model  of  familiar  face 
recognition  which  has  already  been  described  in  Chapter  1.  This  model  has  been 
developing  over  many  years  (for  details  see  Bruce  &  Young,  1986;  Burton,  Bruce  & 
Johnston,  1990;  Burton,  Bruce  &  Hancock,  1999;  Young  &  Burton,  1999). 
This  class  of  structural  account  has  been  contrasted  with  cpisode-based 
accounts  of  priming  which  emphasise  the  similarity  of  processing  between  prime  and 
test  phases  (e.  g.,  Blaxton,  1989;  Jacoby,  1983a).  In  these  accounts,  facilitation  of 160 
processing  is  optimised  by  the  similarity  of  stimuli  and/or  task,  between  the  two 
phases.  Although  it  is  very  difficult  formally  to  distinguish  between  the  two  classes 
of  account,  converging  evidence  appears  to  favour  structural  accounts  when 
considering  person  recognition.  So,  for  example,  it  is  hard  to  use  an  episode-based 
account  to  explain  why  the  same  decision  to  the  same  stimulus  can  fail  to  produce 
priming  (e.  g.,  when  making  a  sex  judgement  to  a  face  at  both  prime  and  test), 
whereas  a  different  decision  to  a  different  stimulus  can  show  priming  (e.  g., 
British/American  to  a  face,  followed  by  dead/alive  to  a  name). 
Here  we  ask  why  priming  is  never  observed  onto  a  sex  decision.  Previous 
research  has  suggested  that  this  is  because  priming  occurs  within  the  person 
recognition  system,  to  which  access  is  not  needed  in  order  to  judge  someone's  sex 
(Ellis  et  al,  1990,1996).  For  example,  Bruce  et  al.  (1987)  showed  that  sex 
judgements  are  independent  of  identity  judgements,  as  the  speed  and  accuracy  of  one 
process  are  unaffected  by  the  other.  Indeed,  we  are  perfectly  accurate  in  judging  a 
person's  sex  from  a  face  image,  regardless  of  whether  we  know  them,  showing  that 
the  decision  can  be  taken  on  the  superficial  aspects  of  the  stimulus,  rather  than  relying 
on  access  to  stored  information.  The  experiments  here  start  with  the  observation  that 
we  can  also  make  a  sex  judgement  from  stored  information.  For  example,  if  exposed 161 
to  the  name  "Tyson"  (an  American  boxer,  very  well  known  to  the  participant 
population  at  the  time  of  this  study),  one  would  have  no  difficulty  determining  that 
the  sex  of  this  person  is  male,  based  on  stored  knowledge.  So,  it  seems  reasonable 
that  we  do  store  the  fact  that  Mike  Tyson  is  a  man  along  with  all  the  other  things  we 
know  about  him,  despite  the  fact  that  we  can  recognise  his  face  as  a  man's  without 
accessing  this  knowledge.  This  gives  rise  to  the  following  prediction.  If  we  can  force 
subjects  to  make  a  sex  judgement  by  accessing  their  memories,  rather  than  reading 
the  surface  characteristics  of  a  stimulus,  then  we  should  observe  priming.  In  other 
words,  it  will  be  possible  to  ask  whether  sex  judgements  are  themselves  somehow 
special  (as  evidenced  by  their  apparent  immunity  to  priming),  or  whether  the  normal 
absence  of  priming  simply  reflects  the  locus  in  the  system  at  which  the  decision  is 
normally  taken. 
EXPERJMENT  5.1 
Introduction 
This  experiment  examines  repetition  priming  of  personal  information,  using  a 
semantic  decision  (British/American)  to  a  face  at  prime  phase,  and  a  sex  decision  at 
test.  We  used  three  different  types  of  item  in  the  test  phase,  though  the  subjects'  task 162 
was  always  a  speeded  male/female  decision.  In  one  condition,  we  present  faces  at 
test.  This  maximises  the  similarity  of  prime/test  stimuli,  but  previous  literature  (e.  g., 
Ellis  et  al.,  1990)  suggests  there  will  be  no  priming.  In  a  further  condition,  we  present 
the  full  names  of  celebrities  (e.  g.  "Mike  Tyson").  Here  it  is  more  difficult  to  make  a 
prediction.  Perhaps  subjects  will  be  able  to  use  surface  characteristics  to  make  the 
decision,  because  "Mike"  is  male  name,  on  the  other  hand,  they  could  retrieve  male 
from  their  semantic  knowledge  of  this  individual.  In  the  final  condition  we  presented 
sumames  only  (e.  g.  "Tyson").  The  people  selected  as  stimuli  were  sufficiently  well 
known  to  be  identifiable,  by  the  target  population,  by  their  surname  alone  (e.  g., 
Tyson,  Geldof,  Aguillera).  In  this  surname  condition,  subjects  must  access  their 
semantic  store  to  make  the  sex  decision,  because  the  name  alone  could  equally  well 
refer  to  a  man  or  a  woman. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in  the 
experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Stimuli  and  apparatus 
Experimental  stimuli  were  the  names  and  faces  of  forty-eight  famous  people, 
chosen  to  be  familiar  to  the  participant  population.  The  names  and  faces  were 163 
presented  centrally  on  a  computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm.  Names  were 
presented  at  point  size  32.  Greyscale  face  images  were  edited  to  remove  background 
material  and  clothing.  These  images  were  standardised  to  a  height  of  6cm  and  were 
pasted  centrally  onto  an  8cm  square  grey  background.  All  stimuli  were  viewed  on  a 
computer  monitor  at  a  distance  of  50cm. 
Design  and  procedure 
The  experiment  had  one  within  subjects  factor:  priming  status,  with  two  levels 
(primed  and  unprimed),  and  one  between  subjects  factor:  test  stimulus  type,  with 
three  levels  (surname,  full-name  and  face).  In  the  first  phase  of  the  experiment, 
subjects  were  shown  the  faces  of  half  of  the  48  critical  items,  in  a  continuous 
sequence.  Each  stimulus  was  presented  for  500ms,  and  participants  were  asked  to 
make  a  speeded  semantic  decision  (British/American),  by  pressing  one  of  two 
buttons,  using  the  index  and  middle  fingers  of  their  left  hand.  This  was  followed  by 
an  unrelated  task,  which  lasted  for  5  minutes.  In  the  second  phase,  items  from  the 
prime  phase  were  presented  again,  this  time  embedded  among  novel  items  (i.  e.,  the 
remaining  half  of  the  stimuli).  Participants  were  randomly  allocated  to  one  of  three 
groups,  to  be  tested  on  surnames,  full-names  or  faces.  Each  stimulus  was  again 
presented  for  500ms.  Participants  were  asked  to  make  a  speeded  sex  decision 
(male/female),  to  all  test  items,  by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons,  using  the  index  finger 164 
and  thumb  of  their  right  hand.  Response  latencies  were  measured  from  the  onsct  of 
the  target  stimuli.  Trials  were  presented  in  a  random  order  for  each  subject,  and  the 
subset  of  items  used  in  the  priming  phase  was  counterbalanced  across  subjects. 
Results 
Median  RTs  for  correct  responses  were  calculated  for  each  subject,  and  means 
of  these  by  condition  are  shown  in  Table  5.1.  Error  rates  were  small  overall  (5.3%) 
and  did  not  differ  significantly  between  conditions.  The  error  data  were  analysed 
using  a2  (primed  vs  unprimed)  x3  (surnames  vs.  full-names  vs.  faces)  mixed 
analysis  of  variance.  There  was  no  main  effect  of  prime  status,  F(1,45)  <  1,  and  no 
main  effect  test  stimulus  type  F(2,45)  =  2.33,  p  >  0.1  The  test  stimulus  type  x  prime 
status  interaction  was  also  non  significant,  F(2,45)  =  1.2  1,  p>0.1. 
TABLE  5.1 
Mean  RTs  for  sex  decisions  in  Experiment  5.1 
Condition  Unprimed  Primed 
Surnames  948  905 
SD  179  153 
Full-names  651  645 
SD  104  113 
Faces  588  585 
SD  90  82 165 
RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (primed  vs  unprimed)  x3  (surnames  vs.  full- 
names  vs.  faces)  mixed  analysis  of  variance.  The  main  effect  of  prime  status  was 
significant,  F(1,45)  =  6.8  1,  p<0.05,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  test  stimulus  type, 
F(2,45)  =  34.87,  p<0.05.  These  main  effects  were  modified  by  a  significant  Priming 
Status  x  Test  Stimulus  Type  interaction,  F(2,45)  =  3.95,  p<0.05.  Analysis  of  simple 
main  effects  showed  a  significant  difference  between  primed  and  unprimed  items  for 
surnames,  (F(1,45)  =  14.4,  p<0.05),  but  no  difference  between  primed  and  unprimed 
items,  for  either  faces  or  full  names  (F(1,45)  <I  in  each  case). 
Discussion 
This  experiment  shows  that  a  sex  decision  to  a  famous  person's  surname  is 
facilitated  by  a  previous  nationality  decision  made  to  a  picture  of  that  person's  face. 
To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  demonstration  of  priming  onto  a  sex  decision, 
using  the  names  of  familiar  people  as  targets.  The  effect  seems  to  rely  on  the  fact  that 
subjects  must  make  this  decision  on  the  basis  of  personal  knowledge  of  the  targets, 
and  is  therefore  consistent  with  the  notion  that  priming  has  its  locus  within  the  system 
responsible  for  computing  someone's  identity.  The  experiment  also  replicates 
previous  findings,  which  show  no  priming  onto  sex  decisions,  when  the  test  items  arc 
faces.  The  absence  of  priming  in  the  full-name  condition  is  interesting,  and  is 166 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  decisions  in  this  condition  are  based  on  processing  the 
first  name  only.  As  the  first  name  defines  (by  convention)  the  sex  of  the  person,  therc 
is  no  need  to  access  semantic  information  related  to  that  person  in  order  to  make  a 
decision.  These  data  indicate  that  sex,  accessed  as  a  semantic  property,  shows  the 
same  pattern  of  repetition  priming  as  any  other  semantic  decision. 
EXPERIMENT  5.2 
Introduction 
Episodic  theories  predict  that  priming  should  be  maximised  when  stimuli  and 
processing  at  prime  and  test  phases  are  most  similar.  In  this  experiment,  we  examine 
repetition  priming  of  personal  information,  using  a  sex  decision  to  a  full-namc  at 
prime,  and  a  sex  decision  to  a  full-name  or  a  surname  at  test.  Theories  emphasising 
the  similarity  of  prime  and  test  phases  might  predict  maximum  priming  when  stimuli 
and  test  are  identical  (sex  decision  to  full  names  in  both  phases).  However,  results 
from  Experiment  5.1  suggest  that  sex  decisions  can  be  taken  on  the  superficial 
characteristics  of  full  names,  and  these  do  not  support  priming.  Therefore,  a 
structural  theory  emphasising  access  to  personal  information  might  predict  that 
priming  will  be  maximised  when  the  task  at  test  requires  access  to  personal 167 
information  (i.  e.,  sex  decision  to  a  surname  only),  even  though  the  task  at  prime 
phase  is  different  (sex  decision  to  full  name). 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  participated  in  the 
experiment  in  return  for  a  small  payment. 
Stimuli  and  apparatus 
Stimuli  were  the  names  of  the  same  fortY-eight  famous  people  used  in 
Experiment  5.1. 
Design  and  procedure 
The  experimental  procedure  was  identical  to  Experiment  5.1,  except  that  at 
prime  phase  subjects  made  a  sex  decision  to  a  full-name.  At  test  phase,  half  the 
subjects  made  sex  decisions  to  a  full-name,  and  half  made  sex  decisions  to  surnames. 
Subjects  were  allocated  to  test  conditions  at  random,  and  the  subset  of  items  used  in 
the  prime  phase  was  counter-balanced  across  subjects. 
Results 
Median  RTs  for  correct  responses  were  calculated  for  each  subject,  and  means 
of  these  by  condition  are  shown  in  Table  5.2.  The  error  data  were  small  overall 
(6.3%)  and  were  analysed  using  a2  (primed  vs  unprimed)  x2  (surnames  vs.  full- 168 
names)  mixed  analysis  of  variance.  The  main  effect  of  prime  status  was  significant, 
F(1,30)  =  6.19,  p<0.05.  The  main  effect  of  test  stimulus  type  was  non  significant, 
F(1,30)  <  1,  as  was  the  Priming  Status  x  Test  Stimulus  Type,  F(1,30)  =  3.86,  p 
0.05.  As  there  was  no  main  effect  of  test  stimulus  type  and  no  interaction  for  these 
errors,  these  effects  were  not  analysed  further. 
TABLE  5.2 
Mean  RTs  for  sex  decisions  in  Experiment  5.2 
Condition  Unprimed  Primed 
Sumames  810  745 
SD  97  96 
Full-names  646  625 
SD  100  85 
RT  data  were  analysed  using  a2  (primed  vs  unprimed)  x2  (surnames  vs.  full- 
names)  mixed  analysis  of  variance.  The  main  effect  of  prime  status  was  significant, 
F(1,30)  =  28.56,  p<0.05,  as  was  the  main  effect  of  name  type,  F(1,30)  =  20.06, 
0.05.  These  main  effects  were  modified  by  a  significant  Prime  Status  x  Name  Type, 
F(1,30)  =  5.96,  p<0.05.  Analysis  of  simple  main  effects  showed  a  significant 
difference  between  primed  and  unprimed  items  for  surnames,  F(1,30)  =  30.3  1,  p 
0.05,  and  for  full-names  F(1,30)  =  4.21,  p=0.049. 169 
Discussion 
This  experiment  shows  a  large  printing  effect  (65ms)  when  a  sex  decision  to  a 
famous  person's  surname  is  preceded  by  a  previous  sex  decision  made  to  that 
person's  full-name.  In  contrast,  a  sex  decision  taken  on  a  full-name  facilitates  the 
same  sex  decision  to  the  same  full-name  to  a  much  smaller  extent  (2  1  ms).  This  result 
is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  priming  is  a  result  of  changes  within  the  system 
responsible  for  computing  identity.  It  appears  that  requiring  subjects  to  access  this 
route  is  a  more  powerful  method  of  inducing  priming  than  is  holding  prime  and  test 
processes  constant. 
Although  small,  the  significant  effect  of  full-name  to  full-name  priming  is 
interesting  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  demonstrates  priming  of  a  very  fast  response, 
suggesting  that  failure  to  observe  priming  onto  full  names  in  Experiment  5.1  is  not 
due  to  a  floor  effect.  RTs  to  full  names  are  similar  in  both  experiments,  but  while 
Experiment  5.2  gives  significant  priming,  there  is  no  hint  of  priming  in  Experiment 
5.1.  Second,  the  full-name  to  full-name  priming  does  suggest  some  evidence  for 
episode-based  processing  in  this  task.  Since  this  task  can  be  carried  out  on  the  surface 
characteristics  of  the  stimuli  (i.  e.  "Nfike"  is  conventionally  male),  one  does  not  need 
to  access  one's  knowledge  about  the  stimulus  name.  Nevertheless,  some  priming  is 
observed,  and  it  seems  plausible  that  this  reflects  processes  separate  from  the  person- 170 
identity  system.  An  episode-based  account  of  priming  is  a  natural  candidate  to 
account  for  this  effect.  However,  such  an  account  is  harder  to  reconcile  with  the 
larger  priming  effect  observed  in  the  surname-only  condition,  in  which  stimuli  were 
changed  between  prime  and  test  phases.  Structural  accounts  seem  more  naturally  to 
fit  that  effect. 
GENERAL  DiscusSION 
In  sum,  we  have  demonstrated,  for  the  first  time,  that  sex  decisions  can  show 
priming  on  to  the  names  of  familiar  people.  Facilitation  is  observed  onto  judgements 
of  sex  when  subjects  are  required  to  take  those  decisions  on  the  basis  of  their 
semantic  knowledge  about  people.  In  this  regard,  sex  is  not  somehow  a  "special" 
semantic  category,  but  behaves  like  any  other  semantic  category,  which  has  been 
studied  in  the  literature.  These  effects  seem  to  follow  naturally  from  existing 
structural  models  of  person  recognition  (e.  g.,  Burton  et  al,  1990,1999),  although  such 
models  were  not  developed  to  account  for  these  effects.  On  the  other  hand,  a  simple 
episode-based  theory  seems  more  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  whole  pattern  of 
results  presented  here.  We  have  observed  some  suggestion  of  an  episodically- 
mediated  effect  in  Experiment  5.2,  but  it  seems  difficult  to  apply  this  to  the  remainder 
of  the  results.  Therefore,  parsimony  and  converging  evidence  from  a  number  of 171 
different  experimental  investigations  currently  make  structural  accounts  of  person 
recognition  very  attractive. 
However,  recent  work  by  Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel,  (2000).  has  cast  doubt 
on  the  theoretical  plausibility  of  structural  models  of  the  IAC  type.  These  authors 
advocate  a  move  backward,  towards  an  earlier  unimplemented  model,  such  as  that 
proposed  by  Bruce  and  Young  (1986).  In  this  model,  semantic  information  is 
accessed  via  modality-specific  FRUs,  rather  than  via  the  modality-free  PINs,  as 
suggested  by  later  models  (Burton  et  al.,  1999;  Burton  et  al.,  1990).  Goshen-Gottstein 
and  Gannel,  (2000),  based  this  proposal  on  a  set  of  five  experiments  exploring 
repetition  priming  of  sex  decisions. 
One  measure  of  the  utility  of  any  theoretical  framework  is  the  amount  of 
empirical  data  that  it  can  account  for.  We  have  already  established  that  the  data 
reported  here  (Experiments  5.1  and  5.2)  can  be  readily  accommodated  within  the  IAC 
framework  and  that  an  episodic  style  account  of  this  phenomenon  provides  a  less 
satisfactory  explanation.  We  now  ask,  can  the  framework  proposed  by  Goshen- 
Gottstein  and  Gannel  (2000)  accommodate  these  findings?  In  their  study,  repetition 
priming  was  shown  on  to  sex  decisions  under  certain  experimental  conditions.  The 
crucial  manipulation,  in  this  set  of  experiments,  was  the  removal  of  the  hair  from 172 
faces  in  certain  conditions,  leaving  only  the  internal  features.  Intelligence  judgements 
to  both  edited  (internal  features  only)  and  complete  faces,  at  study,  primed 
subsequent  sex  decisions  to  edited  faces  at  test.  However,  no  priming  was  found  on 
to  complete  faces  at  test  priming  (Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel,  2000,  experiments  2 
and  3).  These  authors  interpreted  these  findings  by  appealing  to  the  truncated- 
processing  hypothesis  (e.  g.,  Roediger  &  McDermott,  1993)  which  suggests  that 
abstract  perceptual  records  cannot  be  reactivated  unless  the  repeated  stimulus  is 
processed  in  its  entirety,  as  a  perceptual  whole. 
Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel  (2000)  propose  that  participants  adopt  a  hairstyle 
heuristic  when  making  a  sex  decision  and  ignore  the  internal  features  of  the  face.  It  is 
claimed  that  this  heuristic  can  operate  at  both  study  and  test  to  mediate  priming 
effects.  If  it  operates  at  study  (when  the  task  is  a  sex  decision  to  complete  face),  the 
internal  features  are  not  processed  (at  least  to  the  required  depth)  and  therefore  do  not 
support  subsequent  priming  (Goshen-Gottstein  &  Gannel,  2000,  experiment  3).  If 
participants  use  this  heuristic  at  test,  the  internal  features  do  not  need  to  be  processed, 
so  it  is  irrelevant  whether  or  not  these  features  have  been  primed  during  the  study 
phase.  The  argument  here  is  that  priming  should  not  occur  in  this  condition,  as 
processing  is  truncated  prior  to  any  advantage,  which  might  accrue  from  the  prior 173 
processing  episode  (Goshen-Gottstein  &  Gannel,  2000,  experiment  2).  This 
truncated-processing  hypothesis  could  feasibly  be  recruited  to  fit  some  of  data 
reported  in  Experiment  5.1  and  Experiment  5.2.  However  when  the  data  set  is 
considered  as  whole  this  type  of  account  proves  unsatisfactory. 
In  Experiment  5.1  a  semantic  decision  (British/  American)  is  required  at  study 
to  a  face,  so  there  is  no  obvious  heuristic  that  could  be  adopted  to  make  this  decision. 
Presumably  then,  the  faces  in  the  study  phase  are  processed  in  their  entirety  and 
should  support  priming  on  to  an  appropriate  test  task.  If  Goshen-Gottstien  and  Gannel 
(2000)  are  correct,  priming  should  not  be  evident  when  the  target  item  is  a  face,  as 
participants  can  use  the  hair  heuristic  and  need  not  process  the  internal  features  of  the 
face.  So  this  account  has  little  difficulty  accommodating  the  data  from  Experiment 
5.1,  when  the  test  stimuli  is  a  face.  Again,  the  lack  of  priming  in  the  full-name 
condition  can  easily  accommodated  within  this  framework.  If  repetition  priming  of 
faces  is  produced  by  reactivation  of  domain  specific  FRUs  (as  these  authors  suggest) 
then  there  is  no  reason  to  presume  that  presentation  of  a  stimulus  in  another  domain 
(i.  e.,  a  written  name)  at  test  should  produce  priming.  Alternatively,  it  might  be  argued 
that  the  participants  simply  use  a  local  'first  name'  heuristic  here,  analogous  to  the 
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However,  using  their  proposition  to  account  for  the  prin-ýng  effect  on  to 
surnames  is  more  difficult.  Following  the  logic  suggested  by  Goshen-Gottstien  and 
Gannel  (2000),  one  might  presume  that  the  surname  activates  a  domain-specific 
Name  Recognition  Unit  (NRU),  in  much  the  same  way  that  a  face  activates  an  FRU. 
According  to  the  memory  systems  account,  which  these  authors  favour,  domain- 
specific  perceptual  representation  systems  are  modified,  by  stimulus  encounters, 
which  leave  perceptual  records  that  facilitate  subsequent  processing  (e.  g., 
Moscovitch,  Goshen-Gottstein,  &  Vriezen,  1993).  In  order  to  use  this  type  of  theory 
to  account  for  the  prin-drig  in  the  surname  condition  one  would  have  to  argue  that  a 
perceptual  record  stored  in  a  face-specific  representation  system  facilitates  processing 
in  a  name-specific  representation  system.  On  the  other  hand,  IAC  style  models 
accommodate  cross-domain  repetition  priming  effects  in  a  straightforward  way  (see, 
Burton,  Bruce  &  Kelly,  1998). 
In  Experiment  5.2,  a  sex  decision  is  required  at  study,  to  a  full-name,  so  in 
terms  of  the  Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel  proposal,  it  could  be  argued  that 
participants  use  a  'first  name'  heuristic  to  processes  this  decision.  If  such  a  strategy  in 
indeed  adopted  then  this  'truncated  processing',  at  the  study  phase,  should  not 
support  subsequent  priming  on  to  a  sex  decision  to  the  same  person's  surname  at  test. 175 
The  reason  for  this  becomes  clear  when  we  examine  the  locus  of  these  effects,  as 
proposed  by  these  authors.  Put  simply,  their  claim  is  that  processing  a  face  in  its 
entirety  either  produces  or  modifies  an  FRU,  and  reactivation  of  this  FRU  is  the  locus 
of  the  repetition  priming  effect.  Following  this  logic,  processing  a  person's  name  in 
its  entirety  should  create  or  modify  an  NRU,  which  may  support  subsequent  priming. 
However  if  the  name  is  not  processed  in  its  entirety,  then  an  NRU  should  not  be 
created  or  modified  and  priming  would  not  be  predicted.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  one 
assumes  that  the  study  name  is  processed  in  its  entirety,  then  one  should  surely  expect 
more  priming  on  to  this  same  full-name  than  on  to  a  part  name  (i.  e.,  surname). 
However,  Experiment  5.2  shows  a  much  larger  priming  effect  for  surnames  over  full- 
names  when  the  study  item  is  a  full-  name.  it  is  acknowledged  that  the  Goshen- 
Gottstein  and  Gannel  proposal  could  account  for  the  small  priming  effect,  for  full- 
name  in  Experiment  5.2,  if  this  effect  is  viewed  in  isolation.  However,  when  viewed 
alongside  the  much  larger  effect  for  the  surname  condition  this  account  does  not 
provide  an  adequate  description  of  the  data. 
Therefore,  having  considered  alternative  explanations,  it  appears  that  structural 
models  of  the  IAC  type  (Burton  et  al.,  1999;  Burton  et  al.,  1990)  provide  the  most 
parsimonious  description  of  the  data  reported  in  these  experiments.  It  is  worth  noting 176 
that  this  model  was  not  devised  specifically  to  test  the  predictions  generated  in  the 
above  experiments.  In  fact,  its  structure  is  highly  constrained,  due  to  the  fact  that  it 
has  been  devised  and  extended  to  account  for  many  effects  that  are  well  known  in  the 
person  recognition  literature.  These  include:  repetition  priming,  semantic  priming, 
distinctiveness  effects  (Burton  et  al  (1990),  covert  recognition  in  prosopagnosia 
(Burton,  Young,  Bruce,  Johnston,  and  Ellis,  199  1),  name  retrieval  (Burton  and  Bruce, 
1991),  learning  new  faces  (Burton  1994),  cross-domain  repetition  priming  (Burton  et 
al.,  1998),  and  categorial  priming  (Carson  and  Burton,  2001).  The  step  backward  that 
Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel  (2000,  p212)  propose  may  account  for  the  data  in  their 
particular  study,  however,  such  a  model  would  clearly  fail  to  adequately  describe 
many  of  the  above  effects,  including  those  reported  in  Experiments  5.1  and  5.2. 177 
CHAPTER  SIX 
Summary,  Evaluations  and  Further  Research 
SUMMARY  OF  MAIN  FINDINGS 
Chapter  2  attempted  to  disambiguate  the  structure  of  semantic  memory  by 
comparing  the  models  of  Burton  et  al.  and  Brddart  et  al.  using  a  semantic  priming 
technique.  Support  here  for  either  model  would  have  allowed  future  research  to  focus 
on  the  favoured  framework.  Unfortunately,  the  data  from  the  experiments  in  this 
chapter  did  not  provide  unequivocal  support  for  either  model. 
This  chapter  began  by  reporting  the  results  of  three  new  simulations  using  the 
Burton  et  al  framework.  The  first  simulation  (Figure  2.2)  simply  predicts  that 
semantic  priming  should  be  observed  on  to  a  semantic  decision.  Experiment  2.1 
verified  this  prediction.  Using  the  names  of  famous  people  as  stimuli,  this  experiment 
indicated  that  it  was  indeed  possible  to  observe  this  type  of  priming.  Above  resting 
levels  of  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  was  offered  as  a  parsimonious  explanation 
of  this  effect. 
Experiments  2.2  and  2.3  attempted  to  build  on  this  finding  by  introducing  an 
intervening  item  between  the  prime  and  target  items.  Simulations  2  and  3  (Figures  2.3 
and  2.4)  predicted  that  this  semantic  priming  effect  should  survive  an  intervening 178 
item  in  certain  circumstances.  Further,  the  Burton  et  al.  and  Brddart  et  al.  models 
predicted  different  outcomes  using  this  intervening  item  paradigm,  and  it  was  hoped 
that  the  results  here  would  favour  one  or  other  model.  Put  simply,  Burton  et  al.,  with 
its  undifferentiated  semantics,  predicts  that  an  occupation  decision  intervening 
between  two  nationality  decisions  should  eliminate  prin-ýng,  whereas  in  the  Brddart  et 
al.  model  only  nationality  decisions  should  interfere.  However,  Experiment  2.2, 
which  manipulated  the  semantic  decision  required  to  the  intervening  item  in  relation 
to  the  semantic  decision  required  to  prime  and  target  items,  failed  to  verify  even  the 
basic  prediction  from  the  simulations,  showing  no  differential  priming  effects 
between  the  various  conditions.  Of  course,  these  null  effects  mean  that  these 
experiments  also  failed  in  their  primary  objective  of  discriminating  between  the 
models  in  question.  These  results  appear  to  show  that  priming  does  not  survive  an 
intervening  item.  If  this  type  of  priming  does  not  exist,  clearly  it  cannot  be  recruited 
to  differentiate  between  the  models.  However,  the  trends  in  the  data  did  offer  some 
support  for  the  basic  idea  that  semantic  priming  should  survive  an  intervening  item. 
Using  what  was  thought  to  be  a  powerful  design,  Experiment  2.3  again  failed  to 
confirm  even  the  basic  prediction  from  the  simulations.  Formally  the  findings  here 
support  the  conclusion  above,  and  suggest  that  semantic  priming  does  not  survive  an 179 
intervening  item.  However,  the  trends  in  the  data  from  this  experiment  were  very 
similar  to  those  found  in  Experiment  2.2.  This  similarity  suggested  that  it  might  be 
worthwhile  to  investigate  these  effects  further  using  a  different  type  of  experimental 
approach. 
This  new  approach  was  taken  in  Chapter  3,  using  an  interference  paradigm.  In 
Experiment  3.1  participants  were  asked  to  make  semantic  decisions  to  faces  in  the 
presence  of  semantically  congruent  or  incongruent  distractors  icons.  One  perceived 
benefit  of  using  these  icons  over  the  face  stimuli  used  in  Experiments  in  Chapter  2  is 
that  these  icons  activate  essentially  only  one  semantic  property,  whereas  the  face 
stimuli  activate  all  semantic  properties  associated  with  that  face.  The  overall  pattern 
of  responding  in  the  different  conditions  of  this  experiment  was,  however,  again 
inconsistent  and  again  failed  to  offer  convincing  support  for  either  model.  A  final 
attempt  was  made  to  distinguish  between  these  competing  frameworks  in  Experiment 
3.2 
This  experiment  used  stimuli  very  similar  to  those  used  by  Young  et  al  (1986). 
This  time  the  participants  made  semantic  decisions  to  faces  in  the  presence  of 
semantically  congruent  or  incongruent  speech  bubbles.  In  Young  et  al.  's  study  these 
speech  bubbles  contained  the  names  of  distractor  people.  Here  words  representing  the ISO 
semantic  properties  under  investigation  where  used  (i.  e.  "film  star"  /  "pop  star", 
"British"  /  "American").  Again,  it  was  assumed  that  these  words  would  activate 
essentially  only  one  semantic  property.  Once  again,  however,  the  data  did  not  provide 
strong  support  for  either  model. 
Guided  by  the  failure  of  Experiments  2.2,2.3,3.1  and  3.2,  Chapter  4  takes  a 
step  backwards  and  attempts  to  build  on  Experiment  2.1  which  successfully  showed 
semantic  priming  on  to  a  semantic  decision  for  the  first  time.  The  experiments  in 
Chapter  4  were  designed  to  explore,  in  more  detail,  the  nature  of  this  effect.  This  was 
achieved  over  the  course  of  five  experiments,  which  systematically  compared 
semantic  decisions  with  other  types  of  decision  (i.  e.,  familiarity  decisions  and  sex 
decisions). 
Experiment  4.1  replicates  the  design  of  Experiment  2.1  in  which  participants 
are  asked  to  make  semantic  decisions  (British/American)  to  target  names  which  were 
preceded  by  the  names  of  by  associated,  familiar,  or  unfamiliar  people.  An  important 
new  condition  is  added,  which  requires  that  familiarity  decisions  be  made  to  the  same 
items.  This  was  done  in  order  that  the  patterns  of  responding  for  both  decision  types 
may  be  compared.  The  results  here  showed  that,  while  slower  overall,  semantic 
decisions  showed  exactly  the  same  pattern  of  responding  as  familiarity  decisions:  that 181 
is,  reliable  priming  in  the  associated  condition  as  compared  to  the  familiar  unrelated 
primes,  which  did  not  differ  from  the  unfamiliar  primes.  This  provided  the  first 
indication  that  the  same  mechanism  might  underlie  this  priming  effect  for  both 
familiarity  and  semantic  decisions.  It  has  previously  been  established  that  the 
semantic  prin-ýing  effect  for  familiarity decisions  relies  on  above  resting  levels  of 
activation  at  the  PINs  (e.  g.,  Burton  et  al.,  1990).  The  suggestion  here  is  that  semantic 
priming  for  semantic  decisions  may  share  the  same  locus  (this  is,  of  course, 
inconsistent  with  the  main  assumption  which  underlies  the  experiments  in  Chapters  2 
and  3). 
Experiment  4.2  replicates  the  findings  of  Experiment  4.1,  but  this  time  using 
face  stimuli  instead  of  names.  The  results  show  the  same  pattern  of  responding  as  was 
observed  in  Experiment  4.1,  thus  extending  the  generality  of  the  conclusion  drawn 
above. 
In  order  to  rule  out  a  possible  confound  of  nationality,  Experiments  4.3  and  4.4 
split  the  familiar  unrelated  condition  into  two  sub-conditions.  For  both  name  stimuli 
(Experiment  4.3)  and  face  stimuli  (Experiment  4.4),  only  the  associated  primes 
showed  reliable  facilitation;  no  difference  was  found  between  the  familiar-same- 
nationality  and  familiar-different-nationality  conditions,  which  did  not  differ  from  the 182 
neutral  condition.  These  findings  effectively  ruled  out  the  possible  confound  of 
nationality  in  these  experiments,  and  provides  further  evidence  that  activation  at  the 
level  of  the  SIUs  does  not  play  a  significant  role  in  the  observed  effect.  This 
reinforces  the  idea  that  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  is  not  a  primary  determiner 
of  the  effects  that  were  sought  in  the  experiments  in  Chapters  2  and  3.  These  results 
again  point  to  the  PINs  as  the  locus  of  these  effects. 
Using  face  stimuli,  Experiment  4.5  found  no  evidence  of  priming  on  to  sex 
decisions,  indicating  that  semantic  relatedness  alone  does  not  produce  priming  for 
any  arbitrary  decision. 
Two  important  conclusions  were  drawn  from  the  data  in  this  Chapter.  First, 
when  taken  as  a  whole  these  data  appeared  to  fit  structural  style  accounts  better  than 
episodic  style  accounts.  Secondly,  when  interpreted  within  a  structural  framework, 
such  as  IAC,  these  results  appear  to  indicate  that  the  locus  of  semantic  priming  effects 
is  at  the  level  of  the  PINs  rather  than  at  the  level  of  the  SlUs,  as  previously  suggested 
in  Chapters  2  and  3. 
In  Chapter  5  participants  are  forced  to  treat  sex  as  a  semantic  decision.  This  was 
achieved  by  using  the  surnames  of  famous  people  at  the  test  phase.  Experiment  5.1 
shows  that  a  sex  decision  to  a  famous  person's  surname  is  facilitated  by  a  previous 183 
nationality  decision  to  a  picture  of  that  person's  face.  In  contrast,  no  priming  was 
found,  in  same  circumstances,  on  to  either  faces  or  full-names.  This  is  the  first 
demonstration  of  priming  on  to  a  sex  decision,  using  the  names  of  familiar  people  as 
targets.  Experiment  5.2  shows  a  large  priming  effect  when  a  sex  decision  to  a  famous 
person9s  surname  is  preceded  by  a  previous  sex  decision  to  that  person's  full-name. 
However,  when  the  target  stimuli  was  the  same  full-name,  a  much  smaller  priming 
effect  was  observed.  The  data  from  these  experiments  were  assessed  within 
competing  theoretical  accounts  of  person  recognition  and  it  was  suggested  that 
structural  accounts  such  as  IAC  provided  the  most  parsimonious  description. 
EVALUATION  OF  MAIN  FINDINGS 
This  thesis  began  by  acknowledging  that  current  models  of  person  recognition 
inadequately  describe  the  semantic  structure  of  personal  information.  In  Chapters  2 
and  3  predictions  generated  by  two  models  in  this  area  are  compared  (Burton  et  al., 
1990,  and  Brddart  et  al.,  1995).  The  objective  here  was  to  find  out  if  semantic 
infonnation  was  stored  in  an  undifferentiated  way,  in  one  large  pool  (Burton  et  al., 
1990),  or  differentially  by  attribute  (e.  g.,  nationality,  occupation,  etc.  ),  in  smaller 184 
pools  (Brddart  et  al.  1995).  An  assumption  was  made  in  these  experiments  that 
activation,  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs,  would  mediate  any  observed  priming  effects. 
However  a  series  of  four  experiments  (Experiments  2.2,2.3,3.1  and  3.2)  failed 
to  provide  support  for  either  model.  In  fact,  these  experiments  failed  to  support  the 
basic  idea  that  priming  should  survive  an  intervening  item.  There  are  two  possibilities 
that  might  account  for  the  failure  of  these  experiments.  The  first  has  already  been 
discussed  in  detail  in  Chapters  2  and  3  and  relates  to  the  power  of  the  experimental 
manipulations  within  the  experiments  reported.  The  second  explanation  is  more 
profound.  It  may  be  that  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SlUs  is  not  the  primary 
detemiinant  of  these  effects. 
This  possibility  was  examined  in  detail  in  Chapter  4,  which  indicated  that  the 
primary  locus  of  these  effects  was  not  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs,  but  instead  at  the  level 
of  the  PINs.  The  overall  pattern  of  responding  in  the  experiments  in  Chapter  4  offers 
no  support  for  the  idea  that  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  may  contribute  to  these 
effects.  This  assertion  is  based  on  the  following  argument.  It  has  already  been 
established  that  the  locus  of  semantic  priming  for  familiarity  decisions  is  at  he  level 
of  the  PINs  (Burton  et  al.,  1990).  If  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs,  contributes  to 
tWs  effect  for  semantic  decisions,  then  one  would  expect  to  see  a  Decision  Type  x 185 
Prime  Type  interaction  in  experiments  that  test  both  types  of  decision.  That  is,  one 
would  expect  to  see  an  additional  advantage  for  same  nationality  items  over  different 
nationality  items  (or  indeed  unfamiliar  items)  when  a  semantic  decision  is  required, 
as  compared  to  when  a  familiarity decision  is  required.  There  is  no  hint  of  a  Decision 
Type  x.  Prime  Type  interaction  across  the  four  experiments  (Experiments,  4.1,4.2, 
4.3,4.4)  reported  in  Chapter  4.  This  finding,  coupled  with  the  null  effects  reported  in 
Chapters  2  and  3,  suggests  that  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SlUs  is  not  a  primary 
determinant  of  these  effects.  The  conclusion  that  must  be  drawn  here  is  that  the 
experiments  in  Chapter  2  and  3  failed  because  the  assumption  on  which  they  were 
built  subsequently  proved  to  be  incorrect.  In  light  of  the  proposal  that  these  effects  are 
primarily  determined  by  activation  levels  at  particular  PINs,  it  is  hardly  surprising 
that  a  set  of  experiments  designed  to  manipulate  activation  levels  at  particular  SIUS 
failed  to  find  significant  effects. 
The  finding  that  these  effects  are  primarily  determined  by  activation  at  the  PINs 
has  important  implications  for  IAC  style  models  in  terms  of  their  ability  to  describe 
the  semantic  structure  of  personal  information.  The  only  way  to  disambiguate  what  is 
happening  at  the  semantic  level  is  to  probe  the  system  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs.  Such 
an  attempt  was  made  in  Chapter  2,  which  demonstrated  the  futility  of  this  exercise 186 
when  face  stimuli  are  used  at  test.  The  test  face  in  question  must  be  recognised  prior 
to  a  semantic  decision  being  made.  This  of  course  relies  on  a  particular  PIN  passing 
its  recognition  threshold.  Only  when  this  node  passes  threshold  can  any  advantage 
from  prior  activation  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  accrue.  However,  any  potential 
advantage  due  to  increased  activation  at  a  particular  SIU  is  unlikely  to  be  observed, 
because  this  same  node  is being  driven  upwards  via  activation  from  the  associated 
PIN.  By  the  time  that  the  PIN  has  reached  threshold,  any  advantage  of  prior 
activation  at  a  particular  SIU  will  have  been  lost.  This  argument  applies  equally  well 
to  previously  activated  nodes  that  are  not  a  property  of  the  target  person.  Such  nodes 
will  be  driven  downwards  (via  within-pool  inhibition)  as  activation  flows  from  the 
PIN  of  the  target  to  the  semantic  properties  that  are  associated  with  it.  This  proposal 
effectively  describes  the  data  in  Experiments  2.2,2.3,4.1,4.2,4.3  and  4.4. 
In  the  experiments  reported  in  Chapter  3  the  interfering  stimuli  are  presented 
simultaneously  rather  than  sequentially,  but  the  above  arguments  also  hold  for  this 
type  of  presentation.  The  person  has  to  recognised  before  a  semantic  decision  is 
taken,  so  the  differential  effect  of  increased  activation  at  the  node  representing  the 
icon  property,  would  be  mediated  by  activation  passed  from  the  relevant  PIN  to  its 
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see  how  the  semantic  system  (as  described  by  these  models)  might  be  effectively 
probed  when  face  or  name  stimuli  are  used  at  test. 
It  should  therefore  be  acknowledged  that  IAC  models  as  currently  formulated 
are  unlikely  to  deliver  new  insights  into  how  the  semantic  system  is  structured. 
Activation  levels  at  the  level  of  the  SIUs  can  only  be  assessed  after  a  fan-dliarity 
decision  has  been  taken.  However,  in  the  time  that  it  takes  to  make  this  decision,  any 
prior  advantage  at  a  particular  SlU  is  likely  to  have  been  eliminated. 
By  definition,  the  IAC  model  is  a  model  of  familiar  person  recognition.  At 
present  the  only  way  to  observe  how  activation  flows  in  the  semantic  part  of  this 
model  is  to  present  a  familiar  face  (or  name)  and  let  activation  flow  in  the  normal 
way  (FRU  >  PIN  >  SIU).  However,  a  familiar  face  or  name  will  always  produce 
activation  at  the  PINs.  It  now  appears  that  activation  flowing  from  these  PINs  (as 
they  rise  towards  their  recognition  threshold)  to  associated  SlUs  will  always  swamp 
previous  activation  levels  at  the  SIU  level,  thus  eliminating  any  prior  advantage  that 
might  exist.  It  seems  then  that  if  we  are  to  observe  the  effects  of  prior  processing  at 
the  level  of  the  SlUs  then  we  must  probe  this  system  without  activating  the  PINs. 
How  this  might  be  achieved  in  a  model  in  which  semantics  are  accessed  exclusively 
via  the  PINs  is  unclear. Iss 
The  primary  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  find  new  evidence  that  might  help  to 
illuminate  the  semantic  structure  of  personal  information.  Little  progress  has  been 
made  in  this  respect.  The  experiments  reported  here  bring  us  little  closer  to 
understanding  how  this  information  may  be  structured.  What  is  now  perhaps  more 
evident  is  the  difficulty  of  such  an  undertaking  using  the  models  that  are  currently 
available.  Of  course,  one  important  function  of  any  model  is  to  account  for  the 
empirical  data  in  a  particular  field  and  the  IAC  model  has  continued  to  perform 
remarkably  well  in  this  respect.  All  of  the  data  reported  in  thesis  can  be  explained 
within  this  framework.  However,  perhaps  even  more  importantly,  a  model  should 
generate  new  and  testable  predictions.  As  currently  formulated  the  IAC  model 
provides  access  to  the  semantic  system  exclusively  via  the  PINs.  As  activation  levels 
build  up  at  the  PIN,  activation  is  Passed  to  associated  SIUs.  This  activation  (passing 
from  the  PIN  to  associated  SlUs,  as  the  PIN  approaches  its  threshold)  effectively 
eliminates  any  prior  advantage  at  the  SlU  level.  This  means  that  it  any  predictions 
that  might  be  generated  by  appealing  to  activation  levels  within  the  semantic  system 
itself  are  untestable.  This  must  be  viewed  as  a  major  shortcoming  of  IAC  type  models 
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Chapter  5  forced  participant  to  process  sex  as  a  semantic  decision.  Using  a 
repetition  priming  technique,  these  experiments  showed  that  when  sex  is  accessed  as 
a  semantic  property  it  behaves  exactly  like  any  other  semantic  property  that  has  been 
studied  in  this  area.  While  perhaps  unsurprising,  these  new  data  once  again  offer 
support  for  IAC  style  models.  This  style  of  model  managed  to  account  for  all  of  the 
data  reported  in  this  experiment.  Episodic  style  theories  accounted  for  some  but  not 
all  of  the  data.  The  recent  framework  proposed  by  Goshen-Gottstein  and  Gannel 
similarly  accounted  for  some  but  not  all  of  the  data. 
In  conclusion,  all  of  the  new  empirical  findings  reported  in  this  thesis  have  been 
readily  accommodated  within  the  IAC  framework.  In  fact,  the  record  of  this  model  in 
terms  of  accommodating  new  findings  during  the  last  twelve  years  or  so  has  been 
very  impressive.  However,  as  noted  earlier,  this  positive  aspect  of  this  model  must  be 
seen  in  the  context  of  its  ability  to  generate  new  predictions.  An  important  next  step  if 
we  are  to  truly  understand  the  process  of  person  identification  is  to  better  understand 
how  personal  information  might  be  structured.  The  experiments  in  Chapter  4  of  this 
thesis  demonstrate  that  the  limitations  of  the  IAC  model  in  terms  of  generating  new 
predictions  in  the  area. 190 
In  conclusion,  the  data  from  the  above  experiments  can  be  readily 
accommodated  within  an  IAC  style  framework,  but  the  limitation  of  specific  models 
within  this  area  has  also  been  highlighted.  As  currently  formulated  the  IAC  style 
models  which  were  tested  above  are  clearly  under-specified  at  the  level  of  semantic 
representation,  and  fail  to  offer  the  possibility  of  new  testable  predictions  regarding 
how  personal  information  is  structured.  If  these  models  are  to  be  useful  in  promoting 
our  understanding  of  how  personal  information  is  represented  then  they  must  be  more 
rigorously  specified  in  this  important  area. 
FuTuRE  RESEARCH 
Chapter  4  has  shown  us  that  when  a  semantic  decision  is  made  to  a  face  at  test, 
prior  activation  at  the  level  of  the  PINs  deterniines  the  level  of  priming  found.  Of 
course,  there  must  be  some  mechanism  that  binds  the  process  of  identification  and 
retrieval  of  a  particular  piece  of  semantic  information.  At  present,  it  is  unclear  how 
such  a  mechanism  might  operate.  However  one  way  to  circumvent  the  difficulty, 
which  arises  due  to  this  activation  at  the  PINs,  is  to  use  target  stimuli  that  are  not 
faces.  Clearly,  such  stimuli  would  not  produce  direct  activation  at  the  level  of  the 
PINs.  By  using  icons,  similar  to  those  used  in  Experiments  3.1  and  3.2,  as  target 191 
items  (rather  than  as  distractors)  one  might  be  able  to  observe  patterns  of  interference 
at  the  level  of  the  semantic  system  itself  without  the  confounding  influence  of 
identity  processing.  Preliminary  findings  reported  by  Terry,  Kay  and  Brennen  (2001) 
suggest  that  such  an  approach  may  prove  fruitful.  In  a  series  of  six  experiments,  these 
authors  demonstrate  priming  between  faces  and  objects  (and  vice  versa)  for  both 
familiarity  and  semantic  decisions.  In  particular  they  show  that  the  face  of,  say,  David 
Seaman  (presented  for  250ms)  facilitates  a  subsequent  semantic  decision  relating  to  a 
pair  of  goalkeeping  gloves  (is  this  item  associated  with  sport  or  not?  ).  This  result 
suggests  that  it  may  be  possible  to  use  items  of  this  nature  at  test,  to  observe 
interference  at  the  level  of  the  semantic  system.  A  line  of  enquiry  following  this 
methodology  may  allow  us  to  begin  to  tease  apart  the  effects  that  proved  elusive  in 
Chapters  2  and  3. 192 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix  I  (Relates  to  simulations  2.1,2.2,2.3) 
The  IAC  simulations  reported  here  were  run  using  the  Rochester  Connectionist 
Simulator  (Goodard,  et  al.,  1989).  The  unit  update  function  was  the  standard  IAC 
update;  see  McClelland  and  Rumelhart  (1988,  p.  13)  for  equations. 
The  Hebb-like  rule  used  for  learning  was  taken  from  Burton  (1994)  and  is  as  follows: 
lf  aaj  >  0,  Aw#  =  Xaa,  (1  -  w#) 
Otherwise  AwV  =  Xaa,  (I  +  w#) 
where  X  is  a  global  leaming  rate  parameter. 
Global  parameters  were  set  as  follows  for  all  simulations. 
Maximum  unit  activation  1.0 
Minimum  unit  activation  -.  2 
Rest 
Decay  rate 
External  strength  =.  4 
Alpha 
X= 
.  75 
In  each  of  the  simulations  all  excitatory  and  inhibitory  connections  had  strength  .8 
and  -  .8  respectively. 206 
APPENDIX  2 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  2.1 
Set  I 
Ronnie  Barker/  Ronnie  Corbett 
Sarah  Ferguson  /  Prince  Andrew 
Bob  Geldof  /  Paula  Yates 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones  /  Prince  Edward 
Jennifer  Saunders  /  Dawn  French 
Hugh  Laurie  /  Stephen  Fry 
Pamela  Anderson  /  Tommy  Lee 
Doctor  Spock  /  Captain  Kirk 
Nicole  Kidman  /  Tom  Cruise 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
Jackie  Onnasis  /  John  F.  Kennedy 
Kurt  Cobain  /  Courtney  Love 
Set  2 
Prince  Charles  /  Lady  Diana 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
John  Lennon  /  Paul  McCartney 
Nicholas  Lyndhurst  /  David  Jason 
Richard  Maddely  /  Judy  Finnegan 
Eric Morcombe  /  Ernie  Wise 
Paul  Simon  /  Art  Garfunkel 
Carole  Hathaway  /  Doug  Ross 
Bing  Crosby  /  Bob  Hope 
Mia  Farrow  /  Woody  Allen 
Andre  Aggassi  Brooke  Shields 
Ginger  Rogers  Fred  Astaire 
Set  3 
Elaine  C.  Smith  /  Rab  C.  Nesbitt 
Posh  Spice  /  David  Beckham 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Bob  Mortimer  /  Vic  Reeves 
Fred  McCauley  /  Ali  McCoist 
Peter  Cook  /  Dudley  Moore 
Kenny  Rogers  /  Dolly  Parton 
Bobby  Brown  /  Whitney  Houston 
Joe  Dimaggio  /  Marilyn  Monroe 
Lois  Lane  /  Clark  Kent 
Jerry  Lewis  /  Dean  Martin 
Stan  Laurel  /  Oliver  Hardy 207 
APPENDIX  3 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  2.2 
List  I 
Prime 
Prince  Edward 
Frank  Butcher 
Tommy  Lee 
Tom  Cruise 
Liz  Hurley 
Lady  Diana 
Courtney  Love 
Demi  Moore 
List  2 
Prime 
Hugh  Grant 
Prince  Charles 
Kurt  Cobain 
Bruce  Willis 
Posh  Spice 
The  Oueen 
Jennifer  Anniston 
Rosanne  Barr 
Int  Item 
Rab  C.  Nesbit 
Frank  Sinatra 
Clint  Eastwood 
David  Bowie 
Bianca  Butcher 
Madonn  a 
Julia  Roberts 
Annie  Lennox 
Target 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones 
Peggy  Butcher 
Pamela  Anderson 
Nicole  Kidman 
Hugh  Grant 
Prince  Charles 
Kurt  Cobain 
Bruce  Willis 
Int  Item 
Sean  Connery 
Bob  Dylan 
Danny  Devito 
George  Michael 
Joanna  Lumley 
Tina  Turner 
Brooke  Shields 
Geri  Halliwell 
Target 
Liz  Hurley 
Lady  Diana 
Courtney  Love 
Deml  Moore 
David  Beckham 
Pnnce  Philip 
Brad  Pitt 
John  Goodman 
Filler 
Rab  C.  Nesbit 
Frank  Sinatra 
Clint  Eastwood 
David  Bowie 
Bianca  Butcher 
Madonn  a 
Julia  Roberts 
Annie  Lennox 
List  3 
Prime 
David  Beckham 
Prince  Philip 
Brad  Pitt 
John  Goodman 
Cheri  Blair 
Patsy  Kensit 
Dana  Scully 
Hilary  Clinton 
Int  Item 
Sean  Connery 
Bob  Dylan 
Danny  Devito 
George  Michael 
Joanna  Lumley 
Tina  Turner 
Brooke  Shields 
Geri  Halliwell 
Target 
Posh  Spice 
The  Queen 
Jennifer  Anniston 
Rosanne  Barr 
Tony  Blair 
Liam  Gallagher 
Fox  Mulder 
Bill  Clinton 
List  4 
Prime 
Tony  Blair 
Liam  Gallagher 
Fox  Mulder 
Bill  Clinton 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones 
Peggy  Butcher 
Pamela  Anderson 
Nicole  Kidman 
Int  Item 
Rab  C.  Nesbit 
Frank  Sinatra 
Clint  Eastwood 
David  Bowie 
Bianca  Butcher 
Madonn  a 
Julia  Roberts 
Annie  Lennox 
Target 
Cheri  Blair 
Patsy  Kensit 
Dana  Scully 
Hilary  Clinton 
Prince  Edward 
Frank  Butcher 
Tommy  Lee 
Tom  Cruise 
Filler 
Sean  Connery 
Bob  Dylan 
Danny  Devito 
George  Michael 
Joanna  Lumley 
Tina  Turner 
Brooke  Shields 
Geri  Hall1well 208 
APPENDIX  4 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  2.3 
Porne  "Item  Target  Fier 
Prince  Edward  Rob  C.  Nesbit  Sophe  Rhys-Jones  Madonna 
Prince  Philip  David  Boine  ThoCksw  Julia  Roberts 
David  Beckhern  sow  Connery  Pool  Spica  Tina  Tumor 
Frank  Butcher  George  Michael  Peggy  Butcher  Brooks  Shields 
Tony  Blair  Bianca  Butcher  Chen  Blair  Clint  Eastwood 
Lam  Gallogtheir  Anme  Lennox  Patsy  Kensh  Frank  Sinatra 
Prince  Chad"  Joanne  Lurnloy  Lady  Dan&  Danny  Devito 
Hugh  Grant  God  Haffiwoll  Liz  KA&y  Clint  Eastwood 
Dana  Scully  CAird  Eastwood  Fox  Mukier  Bianca  Butcher 
Hilary  Clenton  Frank  Sinatra  B&N  CAxiton  Annis,  Lennox 
Jervirler  Anniston  Dariny  Devito  Brad  Pitt  Joanna  Lurnley 
Rosanne  Barr  CWd  Eastwood  John  Goodman  Gad  Halkwell 
Pamela  Anderson  Madonna  Tommy  Lee  Rab  C.  Nesbit 
Nicole  KKkTian  Juba  Roberts  Tom  Cruise  David  Bowie 
Courtney  Love  Tina  Tumor  Kurt  Cobaln  Sean  Connery 
Derni  Moore  Brooks  Shield$  Bruce  Wdhs  .  George  Michael 
Fox  Mulder  Rab  C.  No"  Dana  Scully  Madonna 
gin  Chnion  David  Bow*  Hilary  Clinton  Julia  Roberts 
Brad  Pitt  SOW  Connery  Jennifer  Anniston  Tina  Tumor 
John  Goodman  George  Michael  Rosanno  Barr  Brooks  Shiolds 
Tommy  Los  Bianca  Butcher  Pamela  Anderson  CAint  Eastwood 
Tom  Cruisai  Annis  Lennox  Nicole  Kx1man  Frank  Sinatra 
Kurt  Cobsin  Joanna  Lumley  Courtney  Love  Danny  Devito 
Bruce  Willis  Go"  a  labw  Domi  Moore  rAint  Eastwood 
Sophie  RhyWones  Chrd  Eastwood  Prince  Edward  Bianca  Butcher 
The  Oution  Frank  Sinatra  Prince  Philip  Annis  Lennox 
Posh  Spica  Danny  Devito  Dowd  Beckham  Joanna  Lumley 
Peggy  ButCtW  Clat  Eastwood  Frank  Butcher  Geri  Halliwell 
Chen  Blow  Madonna  Tony  Blair  Rob  C.  Nesbit 
Patsy  Kerns  Juba  Roberts  Liam  GaKagheir  David  Bowie 
Lady  Disria  Tirm  Turner  Prince  Chades  Sean  Connery 
Liz  Hurbey  Smoke  Sholds  Hugh  Grant  George  Michael 
Tony  Bliur  Bianca  Butcher  Sophie  Rhys-Iones,  Clint  Eastwood 
Liam  Gallogheir  AnneLennox  The  Clueen  Frank  Sinatra 
Prince  Charles  Joanna  Lumley  Posh  Spice  Danny  Devito 
Hugh  Grant  God  Halliwall  PONY  Butcher  Clirt  Eastwood 
Prince  Edward  Rob  a  No"  Chad  SIM  Madonna 
Prince  Philp  David  Bowie  Patsy  Kensit  Juba  Roberts 
David  Sockharn  sow  Cannery  Lady  Dianis  Tins  Tumor 
Frank  Butcher  George  Lid"  Liz  Hurley  Smoke  Shields 
Pamela  Anderson  Madonna  Fox  Mulder  Rob  C.  Nesbit 
Nicole  WkIman  Juba  Roberts  Bill  Clinton  David  Bowie 
Courtney  Love  Title  Tumor  Brad  Pitt  Sean  Connery, 
Dentil  Moore  Brooks  Sholds  John  Goodirrion  George  Michael 
Done  Scully  Clint  Eastwood  Tommy  Los  Bianca  Butcher 
Hilary  Clinton  Frank  Sinatra  Torn  Cruise,  Annie  Lonnox 
Jennifer  Anniston  Do"  Devito  Kurt  Cobain  Joanna  Lumley 
Rollann's  earr  C&O  Eastwood  Bruce  vow  God  Halliwell 
Tommy  Lee  Bianca  Butcher  Dana  Scully  Clint  Eastwood 
TOM  CAU"  Arne  Lennox  Wary  Clinton  Frank  Sinatra 
Kurt  C*ban  Joanna  Lumley  Jennifer  Anniston  Danny  Devito 
on"  was  Gen  Halkwall  ROSWWO  Barr  Clio  Eastwood 
Fox  Mulder  Rob  Q  Nesbit  Pamela  Anderson  Madom  a 
BIN  Clinton  David  Bowie  Nicole  Kkknan  Juba  Roberts 
Brad  Pitt  Sew  CAnnory  Courtney  Lwo  This  Tumor 
John  Goodman  George  L41d"  Derni  Moore  Brooks  Shield* 
Chad  Blair  Modonnis  P,  i  Edward  Rob  C.  Nesbit 
P"  Konort  Juba  Roberts  P..  Philip  David  Bowie 
Lady  Disra,  Tina  Tumor  David  Beckhern  Seen  Connery 
Liz  Hurley  Brooks  Shiekle  Frank  Butcher  Go""  Michael 
Sophie  Rhysijories,  Clint  Eastwood  Tony  Blair  Bianca  Butcher 
The  OUGM  Frank  Sinstris  Liam  GaLighstr  Annie  Lennox 
Posh  Spot*  Do"  Devito  Prince  Charles  Joanna  Lumley 
Peggy  Butcher  Clint  Eastwood  Hugh  Grant  Gen  HaNivell 209 
APPENDIX  5 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  4.1 
Set  I 
Ronnie  Barker/  Ronnie  Corbett 
Sarah  Ferguson  /  Prince  Andrew 
Bob  Geldof  /  Paula  Yates 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones  /  Prince  Edward 
Jennifer  Saunders  /  Dawn  French 
Hugh  Laurie  /  Stephen  Fry 
Pamela  Anderson  /  Tommy  Lee 
Doctor  Spock  /  Captain  Kirk 
Nicole  Kidman  /  Tom  Cruise 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
Jackie  Onnasis  /  John  F.  Kennedy 
Kurt  Cobain  /  Courtney  Love 
Set  2 
Prince  Charles  /  Lady  Diana 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
John  Lennon  /  Paul  McCartney 
Nicholas  Lyndhurst  /  David  Jason 
Richard  Maddely  /  Judy  Finnegan 
Eric  Morcombe,  /  Ernie  Wise 
Paul  Simon  /  Art  Garfunkel 
Carole  Hathaway  /  Doug  Ross 
Bing  Crosby  /  Bob  Hope 
Mia  Farrow  /  Woody  Allen 
Andre  Aggassi  Brooke  Shields 
Ginger  Rogers  Fred  Astaire 
Set  3 
Elaine  C.  Smith  /  Rab  C.  Nesbitt 
Posh  Spice  /  David  Beckham 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Bob  Mortimer  /  Vic  Reeves 
Fred  McCauley  /  Ali  McCoist 
Peter  Cook  /  Dudley  Moore 
Kenny  Rogers  /  Dolly  Parton 
Bobby  Brown  /  Whitney  Houston 
Joe  Dimaggio  /  Marflyn  Monroe 
Lois  Lane  /  Clark  Kent 
Jerry  Lewis  /  Dean  Martin 
Stan  Laurel  /  Oliver  Hardy 
APPENDIX  6 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  4.2 
Set  I 
Lady  Diana  /  Prince  Charles 
Bob  Geldof  /  Paula  Yates 
Bob  Mortimer  /  Vic  Reeves 
Cheri  Blair  /  Tony  Blair 
Hilary  Clinton  /  Bill  Clinton 
Dana  Scully  /  Fox  Mulder 
Bob  Hope  /  Bing  Crosby 
John  Goodman  /  Rosanne  Barr 
Set  2 
Ernie  Wise  /  Eric  Morcombe 
Sarah  Ferguson  /  Prince  Andrew 
Paul  McCartney  /  John  Lennon 
Liam  Gallagher  /  Noel  Gallagher 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
Mathew  Perry  /  Courtney  Cox 
Niles  Crane  /  Fraser  Crane 
Courtney  Love  /  Kurt  Cobain 
Set  3 
David  Beckham  /  Posh  Spice 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Nicholas  Lindhurst  /  David  Jason 
Tommy  Lee  Pamela  Anderson 
JF  Kennedy  Marilyn  Monroe 
Nicole  Kidman  /  Tom  Cruise 
Michael  Glassier  /  David  Soul 210 
APPENDIX  7 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  4.3 
APPENDIX  8 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  4.4 
List  I 
Prince  Edward  /  Sophie  Rhys-Jones 
Bob  Geldof  Paula  Yates 
Tommy  Lee  Pamela  Anderson 
Tom  Cruise  /Nicole  Kidman 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
Lady  Diana  /  Prince  Charles 
Courtney  Love  /  Kurt  Cobain 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
List  2 
Hugh  Grant  /  Liz  Hurley 
Prince  Charles  /  Lady  Diana 
Kurt  Cobain  /  Courtney  Love 
Bruce  Willis  /  Demi  Moore 
Posh  Spice  /  David  Beckham 
The  Queen  /  Prince  Philip 
Jennifer  Anniston  /  Brad  Pitt 
Roseanne  Barr  /  John  Goodman 
List  3 
David  Beckham  /  Posh  Spice 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Brad  Pitt  /  Jennifer  Anniston 
John  Goodman  Roseanne  Baff 
Anthea  Turner  Grant  Bovey 
Patsy  Kensit  /  Liam  Gallagher 
Jackie  Onassis  /  John  F.  Kennedy 
Ginger  Rogers  /  Fred  Astaire 
List  4 
Grant  Bovey  /  Anthea  Turner 
Liam  Gallagher  /  Patsy  Kensit 
John  F.  Kennedy  /  Jackie  Onassis 
Fred  Astaire  /  Ginger  Rogers 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones  /  Prince  Edward 
Paula  Yates  /  Bob  Geldof 
Nicole  Kidman  /  Tom  Cruise 
Pamela  Anderson  /  Tommy  Lee 
List  I 
Prince  Edward  Sophie  Rhys-Jones 
Frank  Butcher  Peggy  Butcher 
TommyLee  /  Parnela  Anderson 
Tom  Cruise  /  Nicole  Kidman 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
Lady  Diana  /  Prince  Charles 
Courtney  Love  /  Kurt  Cobain 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
List  2 
Hugh  Grant  /  Liz  Hurley 
Prince  Charles  /  Lady  Diana 
Kurt  Cobain  /  Courtney  Love 
, 
Bruce  Willis  /  Demi  Moore 
Posh  Spice  /  David  Beckham 
The  Queen  /  Prince  Philip 
Jennifer  Anniston  /  Brad  Pitt 
Roseanne  Baff  /  John  Goodman 
List  3 
David  Beckham  /  Posh  Spice 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Brad  Pitt  /  Jennifer  Anniston 
John  Goodman  /  Roseanne  Baff 
Cherie  Blair  /  Tony  Blair 
Patsy  Kensit  /  Liam  Gallagher 
Dana  Scully  /  Fox  Mulder 
Hillary  Clinton  /  Bill  Clinton 
List  4 
Tony  Blair  /  Cherie  Blair 
Liam  Gallagher  /  Patsy  Kensit 
Fox  Mulder  /  Dana  Scully 
Bill  Clinton  /  Hillary  Clinton 
Sophie  Rhys-Jones  /  Prince  Edward 
Peggy  Butcher  Frank  Butcher 
Nicole  Kidman  Tom  Cruise 
Pamela  Anderson  /  Tommy  Lee 211 
APPENDIX  9 
Stimulus  pairs  used  in 
Experiment  4.5 
List  I 
Prince  Edward  SophieRhys-Jones 
Frank  Butcher  Peggy  Butcher 
Tony  Blair/  Cherie  Blair 
TommyLee  /  Parnela  Anderson 
Tom  Cruise  /  Nicole  Kidman 
Fox  Mulder  /  Dana  Scully 
Liz  Hurley  /  Hugh  Grant 
Lady  Diana  /  Prince  Charles 
Patsy  Kensit  /  Liam  Gallagher 
Courtney  Love  /  Kurt  Cobain 
Demi  Moore  /  Bruce  Willis 
Bill  Clinton  /  Hillary  Clinton 
List  2 
Hugh  Grant  /  Liz  Hurley 
Prince  Charles  /  Lady  Diana 
Liam  Gallagher/  Patsy  Kensit 
Kurt  Cobain  /  Courtney  Love 
Bruce  Willis  /  Demi  Moore 
Bill  Clinton  /  Hillary  Clinton 
Posh  Spice  /  David  Beckham 
Zoe  Ball  /  Norman  Cook 
The  Queen  /  Prince  Philip 
Jennifer  Anniston  /  Brad  Pitt 
Roseanne  Barr  /  John  Goodman 
Catherine  Zeta-Jones/Michael  Douglas 
List  3 
David  Beckham  /  Posh  Spice 
Norman  Cook  /  Zoe  Ball 
Prince  Philip  /  The  Queen 
Brad  Pitt  /  Jennifer  Anniston 
John  Goodman  /  Roseanne  Barr 
Michael  Douglas/Catherine  Zeta-Jones 
SophieRhys-Jones  /  Prince  Edward 
Peggy  Butcher  /  Frank  Butcher 
Cherie  Blair  /  Tony  Blair 
Pamela  Anderson  /  Tommy  Lee 
Nicole  Kidman  /  Tom  Cruise 
Dana  Scully  /  Fox  Mulder 
Note:  Appendices  4.1  to  4.5  include 
only  the  critical  stimulus  pairs  used. 
The  method  sections  describe  how 
these  stimuli  are  manipulated  (and 
combined  with  non-critical  stimuli)  to 
produce  stimulus  pairs  for  the  different 
conditions  in  each  experiment. 